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To Erlend 
 
Abstract
In security assessment and management there is no single correct solution to
the identied security problems or challenges. Instead there are only choices and
tradeo¤s. The main reason for this is that modern information systems and se-
curity critical information systems in particular must perform at the contracted
or expected security level, make e¤ective use of available resources and meet
end-usersexpectations. Balancing these needs while also fullling development,
project and nancial perspectives, such as budget and TTM constraints, mean
that decision makers have to evaluate alternative security solutions.
This work describes parts of an approach that supports decision makers in choos-
ing one or a set of security solutions among alternatives. The approach is called
the Aspect-Oriented Risk Driven Development (AORDD) framework, combines
Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM) and Risk Driven Development (RDD) tech-
niques and consists of the seven components: (1) An iterative AORDD process.
(2) Security solution aspect repository. (3) Estimation repository to store experi-
ence from estimation of security risks and security solution variables involved in
security solution decisions. (4) RDD annotation rules for security risk and security
solution variable estimation. (5) The AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis
and trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. (6) Rule set for how to transfer RDD informa-
tion from the annotated UML diagrams into the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. (7)
Trust-based information aggregation schema to aggregate disparate information
in the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. This work focuses on components 5 and 7,
which are the two core components in the AORDD framework.
This work has looked at four main research questions related to security solution
decision support. These are:
RQ.1: How can alternative security solutions be evaluated against each other?
RQ.2: How can security risk impact and the e¤ect of security solutions be mea-
sured?
RQ.3: Which development, project and nancial perspectives are relevant and
how can these be measured?
RQ.4: How can the disparate information involved in RQ.1, RQ.2 and RQ.3 be
combined?
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The main contributions of this work towards the above-mentioned research ques-
tions are:
C.1: A set of security risk variables.
C.2: A set of security solution variables.
C.3: A set of trade-o¤ parameter variables to represent and measure relevant
development, project and nancial perspectives.
C.4: Methodology and tool-support for comparing the security solution variables
with the security risk variables.
C.5: Methodology and tool-support for trading o¤ security solutions and iden-
tifying the best-tted one(s) based on security, development, project and
nancial perspectives.
C.1-C.5 is integrated into components 5 and 7 of the AORDD framework. C.1,
C.2 and C.4 address RQ.1 and RQ.2, while C.3 and C.5 address RQ.3 and RQ.4
and C.5 addresses RQ.4.
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Preface
Living in a technological society is like riding a bucking bronco. I dont believe we
can a¤ord to get o¤, and I doubt that someone will magically appear who can lead
it about on a leash. The question is: how do we become better broncobusters?
William Ruckelshaus
Risk in a Free Society
Modern society relies heavily on networked information systems. The risks asso-
ciated with these systems might have serious implications, such as threatening
the nancial and physical well-being of people and organisations. For example,
the unavailability of a telemedicine system might result in loss of life and an
Internet-based organisation can be put out of business as a result of a successful
denial of service (DoS) attack. Hence, decision-makers must gain control over
risks associated with security attacks and they need techniques to support them
in determining which security strategy best serves their many perspectives.
In practice, the traditional strategy for security assurance has been penetration
and patch, meaning that when the penetration of a software system is discovered
and the exploited weaknesses are identied the vulnerability is removed. This
strategy is often supported by the use of tiger teams, which cover all organised
and authorised penetration activity. Many of the major software vendors still use
this strategy today, as the size and complexity of their software has outgrown
their ability to ensure su¢ cient coverage of their testing. Some million lines of
code have many possible combinations of potential use and misuse. Even though
both alpha and beta testing user groups are used the last few per cent of testing
and vulnerability analysis are left to the end-users and the todays very active
hacker environment. This process transfers responsibility for the security of the
information system to the consumers and system administrators. Thus, the soft-
ware vendor takes no responsibility for the security level of their software and
provides no documentation of the risk level associated with using the system.
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Hence, these information systems are shipped with a high degree of uncertainty
in their security level.
Military systems struggled with similar problems in the beginning of the 1980s
and developed early approaches for advanced classication and access control
models and software evaluation methods, such as the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) also known as the Orange Book. TCSEC is a United
States Government Department of Defense (DoD) standard that species the ba-
sic requirements for assessing the e¤ectiveness of the computer security controls
built into an information system (called computer system in the standard). This
is done by the use of seven predened security classes; D, C1, C2, B1, B2, B3
and A1, where class A1 o¤ers the highest level of assurance. Similar e¤orts were
also undertaken in Europe and Canada which led to the Information Technol-
ogy Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) and the Canadian Trusted Computer
Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC).
Later industry adopted these models, but not without problems as most of them
are unsuitable for cost-e¤ective development of industrial applications. There are
several reasons for this, one being the clear di¤erences between the environments
that military and industrial systems operate in. As a response to this the security
evaluation standard ISO 15408 Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation was developed as a common e¤ort by the the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). The Common Criteria has today largely
taken over from TCSEC, ITSEC and CTCPEC.
The Common Criteria is tailored for industrial purposes and is the result of
the experience and recommendations of researchers and experienced developers
both within the military sector and from industry. The standard has adopted
the strategy from TCSEC and its subsequent evaluation standards. It evaluates
the security level of information systems using a hierarchy of predened evalua-
tion classes called evaluation assurance levels (EAL). The EALs and associated
guidelines take an evaluator through a well-formulated and structural process of
assessing the security level of a system to gain condence in the security controls
of the system. However, even though the Common Criteria is developed for an
industrial setting the evaluation process is time and resource demanding and con-
sidered by many not to be worth the e¤ort and cost. This is particularly true for
web-based applications where a system may be of no interest to the market by
the time the evaluation is completed. Furthermore, despite the structural process
that a Common Criteria evaluation undertakes the evaluation is still a subjec-
tive assessment and does not su¢ ciently address the development, project and
nancial perspectives of information systems.
Security assessment and management is a strategy for controlling the security of
a system that lies between the penetration and patch and the security evaluation
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strategies. In security assessment and management several techniques for iden-
tifying and assessing security problems in an information system are combined
into a process that ensures that there is continuous review and update of its
security controls. This process is based on observations from vulnerability analy-
sis or hacker reports and from the structural and continuous examination of the
potential security problems and challenges in the information system. Security
assessment and management can be employed at any level of rigour and can be
tailored for any type of system. However, as for the Common Criteria, security
assessment and management is subjective and its results depend on the ability
of the risk analyst carrying out the assessment. There are also problems with
estimating the variables involved as little empirical information for security risk
estimation exists.
Thus, the situation is that the ad-hoc and after-the-fact security strategy pen-
etration and patchensures that systems are delivered within a reasonable time
and cost, but with a high degree of uncertainty and lack of condence in the e¢ -
ciency of the security controls in an information system. On the other hand, the
preventive security strategy employed by Common Criteria evaluation provides
condence in the e¢ ciency of the security controls, but is too costly and demands
too much in terms of time and resources. It is also very dependent on the expe-
rience level of the evaluator for it to be practical in todays highly competitive
market with strict budget and time-to-market (TTM) constraints. Security as-
sessment and management relies on subjective judgments and su¤ers from the
lack of empirical data. However, all three approaches possess some desired prop-
erties in a development setting where security, development, project and nancial
perspectives must be fullled. This is the reason why this work is based on the
recommendations in the Common Criteria as a penetration and patch type of
construct in the setting of security assessment and management that makes use
all available information for identifying the best-tted security solutions for the
security problems or challenges of an information system.
Trondheim, ...............................
September 2007 Siv Hilde Houmb

Contents
Part I. Background and Research Context
1. Research Context : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 3
1.1 Background and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Research objective and research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Main contributions of this work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.1 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Research method and way of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.1 Application of action research for this work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. Outline of the Thesis : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 17
Part II. Background Information and State of the Art
3. Security in Information Systems : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 21
3.1 Security standards and regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4. The Common Criteria : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 29
4.1 Relevant parts of Common Criteria terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 Evaluation and certications according to the Common Criteria . . 31
4.3 Performing a Common Criteria evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5. Risk Assessment and Management of Information Systems : : : 37
5.1 Security (risk) assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
x Contents
5.1.1 Performing security assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2 AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.3 CRAMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.4 The CORAS approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.4.1 CORAS risk management process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6. Towards Quantitative Measure of Operational Security : : : : : : : 51
7. Subjective Expert Judgment : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 55
7.1 Aggregation techniques for combining expert opinions . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8. Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 63
9. Architecture/Design trade-o¤ analysis : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 69
9.1 Architecture Trade-o¤ Analysis Method (ATAM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
9.2 Cost Benet Analysis Method (CBAM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Part III. Security Solution Decision Support Framework
10. The AORDD Framework : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 77
11. The AORDD Process : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 81
Part IV. AORDD Security Solution Trade-O¤ Analysis
12. The Role of Trade-O¤ Analysis in Security Decisions : : : : : : : : : 89
13. AORDD Security Solution Trade-O¤ Analysis : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 93
13.1 Phase 1: Risk-driven analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
13.1.1 Relationship between misuse variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
13.1.2 Deriving the list of security risks in need of treatment . . . . . 104
13.2 Phase 2: Trade-o¤ analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
13.2.1 Identifying and assigning values to assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Contents xi
13.2.2 Relationship between MI/SE and AV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
13.2.3 Misuse and security solution costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
14. Structure of the Trade-O¤ Analysis : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 121
15. The Trade-O¤ Tool : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 129
15.1 SSLE subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
15.1.1 Aggregating asset value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
15.2 RL subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
15.3 SSTL subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
15.4 TOP subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Part V. Aggregating Information in the Trade-O¤ Tool
16. Information Sources : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 149
16.1 Sources for observable information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
16.2 Sources for subjective or interpreted information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
17. Trust-Based Information Aggregation Schema : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 157
17.1 Step 1: Specify trust context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
17.2 Step 2: IS trustworthiness weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
17.2.1 Knowledge level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
17.2.2 Expertise level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
17.2.3 Computing IS trustworthiness weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
17.3 Step 3: Trust between decision maker and IS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
17.4 Step 4: Update relative IS trustworthiness weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
17.5 Step 5: Aggregate information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Part VI. Validation, Discussion and Concluding Remarks
18. Validation of the Approach : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 179
xii Contents
18.1 Demonstration of the trade-o¤ tool and TBIAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
18.1.1 Aggregating information for the trade-o¤ tool using TBIAS 181
18.1.2 Example of trading o¤ two DoS solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
19. Discussion : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 203
19.1 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
20. Concluding Remarks and Suggestions for Further Work : : : : : : 219
References : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 229
Part VII. Appendices
Appendix A.1: AORDD Concepts : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 233
Appendix B.1: P.16: Houmb and Georg (2005) : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 237
Appendix B.2: P.26; Houmb et al. (2006) : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 253
Appendix B.3: P.17; Houmb et al. (2005) : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 285
Appendix C: Publication List : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 305
List of Figures
1.1 The relation between the research questions, main contributions and
the three studies of this work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 The phases and iterations of the construction (work) process . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Action research and how it inuenced the construction process . . . . . . . 14
1.4 The evaluation and validation process used in this work . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1 ST, PP and ToE in relation to phases of a development process . . . . . . 32
4.2 Relationship between PP, ST and ToE in Common Criteria (page 45
in Part 1 of [15]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1 AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk management process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2 The ve main components of the CORAS framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.1 Example case description using a state transition diagram . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.2 Example of Triang(a,b,c) distribution for three experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.3 Robustness analysis used to derive the weighting schema . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.1 Example BBN for rewall down. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.1 The seven components of the AORDD framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
11.1 Outline of the AORDD process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
11.2 Overview of the activities of the requirement and design phase of the
AORDD process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
13.1 The two phases of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis . . . . 94
xiv List of Figures
13.2 The security assessment concepts involved in Phase 1 and 2 of the
AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
13.3 Concepts involved in Phase 1 of the AORDD security solution trade-
o¤ analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
13.4 Example of a risk model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
13.5 Relation between security threat, security vulnerability and misuse . . . 100
13.6 Overview of how misuses happen and how they can be prevented . . . . . 101
13.7 Illustration of a misuse hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
13.8 Concepts involved in Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution trade-
o¤ analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
13.9 The input and outputs of Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution
trade-o¤ analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
13.10Asset value table as a composite of the 15 asset valuation categories
(sub variables) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
13.11The 15 misuse impact sub variables and how to aggregate these into
the misuse impact table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
13.12The relation between misuse impacts, the original asset values and the
resulting updated asset value table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
13.13The 15 security solution e¤ect sub variables and how to aggregate
these into the security solution e¤ect table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
14.1 Overview of the structure and the step by step procedure of the trade-
o¤ analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
14.2 Variables involved in estimating the risk level of a ToE in the trade-o¤
analysis method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
14.3 The relation between misuse cost and security solution cost in the
trade-o¤ analysis method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
15.1 The top-level network of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
15.2 SSLE subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
15.3 Asset value subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
15.4 The ToE risk level or operation security level of a ToE as a result of
the environmental (security) and internal (dependability) inuence on
the ToE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
15.5 RL subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
List of Figures xv
15.6 Negative and positive misuse impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
15.7 Misuse impact (MI) subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
15.8 Misuse cost (MC) subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
15.9 SSTL subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
15.10Security solution cost (SC) subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
15.11TOP subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
17.1 Overview of the ve steps of the trust-based information aggregation
schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
17.2 General reference knowledge domain model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
18.1 Reference knowledge domain model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
18.2 Information source knowledge domain models for experts 4, 6, 15 and
18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
18.3 Information inserted and propagated for security solution s1 (cookie
solution) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
18.4 Information inserted and propagated for security solution s2 (lter
mechanism) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
18.5 The top-level network of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
18.6 The resulting risk level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
18.7 The resulting security solution treatment level for the security solution
s1 with the information from the information sources inserted and
propagated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
18.8 The resulting security solution treatment level for the security solution
s2 with the information from the information sources inserted and
propagated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
18.9 Details on the computations made for the Security Solution E¤ect
node for security solution s1 and security solution s2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
18.10TOP subnet with prior probability distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
18.11Status of TOP subnet when security requirement information is en-
tered and propagated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
18.12Evidence, propagation and result for the TOP subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
18.13Fitness score for s1 (cookie solution) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
18.14Fitness score for s2 (itering mechanism) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

List of Tables
7.1 Answer table for Question 1 in the questionnaire for Expert i . . . . . . . . 58
8.1 Node probability table for ftp fork attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13.1 Example asset value table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
13.2 Example of qualitative scale evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
15.1 Nodes and their states in the TOP subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
17.1 Example calibration variables for determining the expertise level for
an information source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
18.1 The combined knowledge and experience level questionnaire . . . . . . . . . 186

Part I
Background and Research Context

4 1. Research Context
problems are often costly in terms of money and time and resources. Thus, se-
curity issues should be addressed at the appropriate level for a reasonable cost.
In a system development context this means that information security should
be addressed as part of the development process rather than as an afterthought.
Additionally, as cost and security are not the only perspectives involved in sys-
tem development designers and decision makers need to evaluate security risks
and security solutions in relation to development, project and nancial perspec-
tives as well. As it is hardly ever evident which of the alternative solutions that
meet these multi-dimensional perspectives the best, the alternatives need to be
evaluated against each other to identify the best-tted solution.
The security standard ISO 15408 Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (Common Criteria) [15] permits comparability between re-
sults of independent security evaluation. Hence, the Common Criteria is useful
as a guide for choosing one security solution among alternatives. However, the
Common Criteria has a pure security perspective and does not provide any sup-
port for choosing security solutions based on other of the involved perspectives,
such as development, project and nancial perspectives.
Penetration and patch strategies are more exible in taking additional perspec-
tives into consideration. In such a security strategy a solution is only identied
and employed whenever a problem is discovered and the choice of security solu-
tion is restricted by the time and budget available at the time the problem occurs.
However, this leaves a business prone to security attacks and without control. Se-
curity assessment and management on the other hand focuses on future events and
potential security risks and have several well-tested methodologies for identifying
and assessing security risks a priori. The problem with security assessment and
management though is that no e¤ective approaches for measuring and evaluating
alternative solutions to the security risks have been established. Furthermore,
most of these techniques do not su¢ ciently address the development, project and
nancial perspectives involved. What is needed is a security strategy that benets
from best practice and comparability of the Common Criteria, the ad-hoc and
time e¤ectiveness of penetration and patch strategies and the preventive focus
of security assessment and management. Furthermore, the strategy must o¤er
su¢ cient performance, meaning that it must possess the ability to be carried out
within a reasonable time frame, as well as take the relevant development, project
and nancial perspectives into consideration.
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1.1 Background and motivation
6 February 2007 is the date where the so far last major security breach was
reported in Norway (today is 6 August 2007). This time a major bank in Norway
had to close down many of their branches due to a virus attack that successfully
executed a DoS attack and took out many of the banks critical business servers.
The only services provided by the bank on 7 February 2007 was cash withdrawal
using ATMs and Internet banking. The news story showed frustrated customers
and Bank representatives assuring that no customersbank accounts were a¤ected
by the attack and that all services would be running normally from the next day.
Last year (2006) was remarkably bad in terms of security incidents. Not only
were Windows-based personal computers and servers a¤ected, which had been
the case before 2006, this time the type of security incidents had expanded to
also target Macintosh and embedded systems in critical infrastructure. 2006 was
also the year when the rst terror-motivated security attacks materialised.
PriceWaterhouseCooper reported in their information security breaches survey
for 2006 [26] that around 62% of all UK businesses experienced serious security
incidents in 2006. This is a high number. For premeditated and malicious incidents
the number is even more worrying as the number of business a¤ected by such
security attacks has increased by around 34% from 1998 to 2006. There are several
reasons for this increase one being the heavy computerising of the businesses
another the increased number of automated attack tools a¢ liating script kiddies.
However, of the many security attacks leading to security incidents in 2006 the
attack on the web services of the US export department on 9 October 2006 was
particularly worrying. This attack originated from several computers located in
China and resulted in more than a months downtime for the web service issuing
online export licences for the US.
The increased amount of serious security incidents reported the past few years
has put focus on information security. However, solutions to information security
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1.2 Research objective and research questions
The objective of this work has been to aid a decision maker in choosing the
best-tted security solution among alternatives taking relevant security, develop-
ment, project and nancial perspectives into consideration. The context of this
decision support for choice of security solution is the development of security
critical information systems and a security solution can be comprised of one or
more of the following: security control, security mechanism, security procedure,
security process, security policy or similar. This work is based on several secu-
rity standards that will be discussed throughout this work and has adopted and
rened the denitions of an information system and information security from
these standards.
Denition Information system is a system containing physical and conceptual
entities that interacts as a potential target for intended or unintended security
attacks which might a¤ect either the system itself, its data or its stakeholders
and end-users (modied from IEEE Std 14712000 [52]).
Denition Information security comprises all perspectives related to den-
ing, achieving, and maintaining condentiality, integrity, availability, non-
repudiation, accountability, authenticity and reliability of an information sys-
tem (adapted and modied for information security from ISO/IEC TR 13335
[54]).
The above research objective requires techniques for estimating security risks
and security solutions so that alternative security solutions can be evaluated
against each other to derive the best-tted security solution. This also involves
the identication of relevant development, project and nancial perspectives that
should be taken into consideration when evaluating alternative security solutions,
as well as a clear perception of how to measure the tness of a security solution.
Additionally, information sources for estimating security risk, security solution
and development, project and nancial perspectives needs to be identied and
combined. This led to the following research questions:
RQ.1: How can alternative security solutions be evaluated against each other to
identify the most e¤ective alternative?
RQ.2: How can security risk impact and the e¤ect of security solutions be mea-
sured?
RQ.3: Which development, project and nancial perspectives are relevant for
an information system and how can these be represented in the context of
identifying the most e¤ective security solution among alternatives?
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RQ.4: How can the disparate information involved in RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 be
combined such that the most e¤ective security solution among alternatives
can be identied?
1.3 Main contributions of this work
The main contributions of this work towards the above four research questions
are:
C.1 A set of security risk variables used to measure the impact, frequency and
cost of potential undesired events, which in this work is called misuses.
C.2 A set of security solution variables used to measure the treatment e¤ect and
cost of alternative security solutions.
C.3 A set of trade-o¤ parameter variables to represent and measure relevant
development, project and nancial perspectives.
C.4 Methodology and tool-support for comparing the security solution variables
with the security risk variables to identify how e¤ective a security solution is
in protecting against the relevant undesired behaviour (misuse).
C.5: Methodology and tool-support for trading o¤ security solutions and iden-
tifying the best-tted one(s) based on security, development, project and
nancial perspectives.
C1-C5 are integrated into the Aspect-Oriented Risk Driven Development (AORDD)
framework which is a security solution decision support framework comprised of
seven components: (1) An iterative AORDD process. (2) Security solution aspect
repository. (3) Estimation repository to store experience from estimation of secu-
rity risks and security solution variables involved in security solution decisions.
(4) RDD annotation rules for security risk and security solution variable estima-
tion. (5) The AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and trade-o¤ tool BBN
topology. (6) Rule set for how to transfer RDD information from the annotated
UML diagrams into the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. (7) Trust-based informa-
tion aggregation schema to aggregate disparate information in the trade-o¤ tool
BBN topology. This work focuses on components 5 and 7, which are the AORDD
security solution trade-o¤ analysis and trade-o¤ tool and the trust-based infor-
mation aggregation schema. Details of the AORDD framework are given in Part
3 while details of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis (component 5)
are given in Part 4 and details of the trust-based information aggregation schema
(component 7) are given in Part 5.
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Fig. 1.1. The relation between the research questions, main contributions and the three
studies of this work
Figure 1.1 shows which of the ve contributions in this work addresses which
of the four research questions posed in this work. Figure 1.1 also shows that
each of the three simulation examples performed in this work addresses all four
research questions and tests all ve contributions. The three simulation examples
are named Study 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Details are in Section 1.4.
Contributions 1 and 2 are closely related as the tness of a security solution is
the sum of the e¤ect of applying security solutions on the security risks. The set
of security risk variables must therefore be comparable with the set of security
solution variables. Security risk is in this work dened as a function over misuse
frequency (MF), misuse impact (MI), mean e¤ort to misuse (METM), mean time
to misuse (MTTM) and misuse cost (MC) and security solution e¤ect is dened
as a function over security solution e¤ect (SE) and security solution cost (SC).
Thus, MF, MI, METM, MTTM and MC are the security risk variables and SE
and SC are the security solution variables. This means that C.1 and C.2 address
research questions RQ.1 and RQ.2.
Contribution 3 is a selection of relevant development, project and nancial per-
spectives in a security critical information system development context. These
are modelled as a set of trade-o¤ parameters in the AORDD security solution
trade-o¤ analysis and the trade-o¤ tool, which are component 5 of the AORDD
framework. The trade-o¤ parameters included are: priorities, budget, business
goals, standards, business strategy, law and regulations, TTM, policies and se-
curity risk acceptance criteria. For policies, business goals, standards, business
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strategy and law and regulations only the security perspective is considered. This
means that C.3 addresses research question RQ.3 and RQ.4.
To evaluate security solutions and identify the best-tted security solution among
alternatives for a particular context a methodology for measuring and compar-
ing security risk variables, security solution variables and trade-o¤ parameters
is needed. This is covered by contributions 4 and 5 of this work. Contribution
4 is a methodology for evaluating the e¤ect that a security solution has on a
security risk while contribution 5 is a methodology for identifying the best-tted
security solution taking security, development, project and nancial perspectives
into consideration. This means that C.4 addresses research question RQ.1, RQ.2
and RQ.4 and that C.5 addresses research question RQ.3 and RQ.4.
1.3.1 Publications
The work presented in this thesis is supported by a number of papers that each
discusses issues related to the seven components of the AORDD framework to
some degree. However, only three of the papers in the below publication list
are enclosed as appendices to this thesis. These are P.16, P.17 and P.26. P.16
gives an overview of the AORDD framework and its components. P.17 and P.26
describe parts of the rst and second version of the AORDD security solution
trade-o¤ analysis. This thesis gives an overview of the current version of the
AORDD framework in Part 3 and describes the current version of the two core
components of the AORDD framework; the security solution trade-o¤ analysis
and trade-o¤ tool and the trust-based information aggregation schema, in Parts
4 and 5. Details of which component(s) of the AORDD framework that the other
relevant papers in the below publication list discusses are given throughout this
work.
P.1: Siv Hilde Houmb, Folker den Braber, Mass Soldal Lund and Ketil Stølen.
Towards a UML Prole for Model-based Risk Assessment. In Proceedings
of the First Satellite Workshop on Critical System Development with UML
(CSDUML02) at the Fifth International Conference on the Unied Modeling
Language (UML2002). Pages 79-92, TU-Munich Technical Report number
TUM-I0208. Dresden, Germany, 2002.
P.2: Theodosis Dimitrakos, Brian Ritchie, Dimitris Raptis, Jan Øyvind Aagedal,
Folker den Braber, Ketil Stølen and Siv Hilde Houmb. Integrating model-
based security risk management into eBusiness systems development - the
CORAS Approach. In Proceedings of the IFIP Conference on Towards The
Knowledge Society: E-Commerce, E-Business, E-Government. Pages 159-
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175, Vol. 233, Kluwer IFIP Conference Proceedings. Lisbon, Portugal, 2002.
ISBN 1-4020-7239-2.
P.3: Ketil Stølen, Folker den Braber, Rune Fredriksen, Bjørn Axel Gran, Siv
Hilde Houmb, Mass Soldal Lund, Yannis C. Stamatiou and Jan Øyving
Aagedal. Model-based risk assessment - the CORAS approach. In Proceedings
of Norsk Informatikkonferanse (NIK2002), Pages 239-249, Tapir, 2002.
P.4: Siv Hilde Houmb, Trond Stølen Gustavsen, Ketil Stølen and Bjørn Axel
Gran. Model-based Risk Analysis of Security Critical Systems. In Fischer-
Hubner and Erland Jonsson (Eds.): Proceedings of the 7th Nordic Workshop
on Secure IT Systems. Pages 193-194, Karlstad University Press, Karlstad,
Sweden, 2002.
P.5: Ketil Stølen, Folker den Braber, Theodosis Dimitrakos, Rune Fredriksen,
Bjørn Axel Gran, Siv Hilde Houmb, Yannis C. Stamatiou and Jan Øyv-
ing Aagedal. Model-Based Risk Assessment in a Component-Based Software
Engineering Process: The CORAS Approach to Identify Security Risks. In
Franck Barbier (Eds.): Business Component-Based Software Engineering.
Chapter 10, pages 189-207, Kluwer, ISBN: 1-4020-7207-4, 2002.
P.6: Siv Hilde Houmb and Kine Kvernstad Hansen. Towards a UML Prole for
Model-based Risk Assessment of Security Critical Systems. In Proceedings
of the Second Satellite Workshop on Critical System Development with UML
(CSDUML03) at the Sixth International Conference on the Unied Modeling
Language (UML2003). Pages 95-103, TU-Munich Technical Report number
TUM-I0323. San Francisco, CA, USA, 2003.
P.7: Glenn Munkvoll, Gry Seland, Siv Hilde Houmb and Sven Ziemer. Empirical
assessment in converging space of users and professionals. In Proceedings of
the 26th Information Systems Research Seminar in Scandinavia (IRIS26).
14 Pages. Helsinki, Finland, 9-12 August, 2003.
P.8: Siv Hilde Houmb and Jan Jürjens. Developing Secure Networked Web-based
Systems Using Model-based Risk Assessment and UMLsec. In Proceedings of
IEEE/ACM Asia-Pacic Software Engineering Conference (APSEC2003).
Pages 488-498, IEEE Computer Society. Chiang Mai, Thailand, 2003. ISBN
0-7695-2011-1.
P.9: Jan Jürjens and Siv Hilde Houmb. Tutorial on Development of Safety-
Critical Systems and Model-Based Risk Analysis with UML. In Dependable
Computing, First Latin-American Symposium, LADC 2003. Pages 364-365,
LNCS 2847, Springer Verlag. Sao Paolo, Brazil, 21-24 October 2003. ISBN
3-540-20224-2.
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P.10: Siv Hilde Houmb and Ørjan M. Lillevik. Using UML in Risk-Driven De-
velopment. In H.R. Arabnia, H. Reza (Eds.): Proceedings of the International
Conference on Software Engineering Research and Practice, SERP 04. Vol-
ume 1, Pages 400-406, CSREA Press. Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 21-24 June
2004. ISBN 1-932415-28-9.
P.11: Siv Hilde Houmb, Geri Georg, Robert France and Dan Matheson. Using
aspects to manage security risks in risk-driven development. In Proceedings
of the Third International Workshop on Critical Systems Development with
UML (CSDUML04) at the Seventh International Conference on the Unied
Modeling Language (UML2004). Pages 71-84, TU-Munich Technical Report
number TUM-I0415. Lisbon, Portugal, 2004.
P.12: Jingyue Li, Siv Hilde Houmb and Axel Anders Kvale. A Process to Com-
bine AOM and AOP: A Proposal Based on a Case Study. In Proceedings
of the 5th Workshop on Aspect-Oriented Modeling (electronic proceeding)
at the Seventh International Conference on the Unied Modeling Language
(UML2004). 8 pages, ACM. Lisbon, Portugal, 11 October 2004.
P.13: Jan Jürjens and Siv Hilde Houmb. Risk-driven development process for
security-critical systems using UMLsec. In Ricardo Reis (Ed.): Information
Technology, Selected Tutorials, IFIP 18th World Computer Congress, Tu-
torials. Pages 21-54, Kluwer. Toulouse, France, 22-27 August 2004. ISBN
1-4020-8158-8.
P.14: Mona Elisabeth Østvang and Siv Hilde Houmb. Honeypot Technology in
a Business Perspective. In Proceedings of Symposium on Risk-Management
and Cyber-Informatics (RMCI04): the 8th World Multi-Conference on Sys-
temics, Cybernetics and Informatics (SCI 2004). Pages 123-127, International
Institute of Informatics and Systemics. Orlando, FL, USA, 2004.
P.15: Siv Hilde Houmb, Ole-Arnt Johnsen and Tor Stålhane. Combining Dis-
parate Information Sources when Quantifying Security Risks. In Proceedings
of Symposium on Risk-Management and Cyber-Informatics (RMCI04): the
8th World Multi-Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics (SCI
2004). Pages 128-131, International Institute of Informatics and Systemics.
Orlando, FL, USA, 2004.
P.16: Siv Hilde Houmb and Geri Georg. The Aspect-Oriented Risk-Driven De-
velopment (AORDD) Framework. In Proceedings of the International Con-
ference on Software Development (SWDC-REX). Pages 81-91, University of
Iceland Press. Reykjavik, Iceland, 2005. ISBN 9979-54-648-4.
P.17: Siv Hilde Houmb, Geri Georg, Robert France, Jim Bieman and Jan Jür-
jens. Cost-Benet Trade-O¤ Analysis Using BBN for Aspect-Oriented Risk-
Driven Development. In Proceedings of the Tenth IEEE International Con-
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ference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS2005). Pages
195-204, IEEE Computer Society Press. Shanghai, China, 2005. ISBN 0-7695-
2284-X.
P.18: Siv Hilde Houmb. Combining Disparate Information Sources When Quan-
tifying Operational Security. In Proceedings of the 9th World Multi-Conference
on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, Volume I. Pages 128-131, Inter-
national Institute of Informatics and Systemics. Orlando, USA, 2005. ISBN
980-6560-53-1.
P.19: Siv Hilde Houmb, Geri Georg, Robert France, Raghu Reddy and Jim
Bieman. Predicting Availability of Systems using BBN in Aspect-Oriented
Risk-Driven Development (AORDD). In Proceedings of 2nd Symposium on
Risk Management and Cyber-Informatics (RMCI05): the 9th World Multi-
Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, Volume X. Pages
396-403, International Institute of Informatics and Systemics. Orlando, USA,
2005. ISBN 980-6560-62-0.
P.20: Siv Hilde Houmb and Karin Sallhammar. Modeling System Integrity of a
Security Critical System Using Colored Petri Nets. In Proceedings of Safety
and Security Engineering (SAFE 2005). Pages 3-12, WIT Press. Rome, Italy,
2005. ISBN 1-84564-019-5.
P.21: Jan Jürjens and Siv Hilde Houmb. Dynamic Secure Aspect Modeling with
UML: From Models to Code. In Model Driven Engineering Languages and
Systems: 8th International Conference, MoDELS 2005. Pages 142-155, LNCS
3713, Springer Verlag. Montego Bay, Jamaica, 2-7 October 2005. ISBN 3-540-
29010-9.
P.22: Dan Matheson, Indrakshi Ray, Indrajit Ray and Siv Hilde Houmb. Build-
ing Security Requirement Patterns for Increased E¤ectiveness Early in the
Development Process. Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Informa-
tion Security (SREIS). Paris, 29 August, 2005.
P.23: Geri Georg, Siv Hilde Houmb and Dan Matheson. Extending Security Re-
quirement Patterns to Support Aspect-Oriented Risk-Driven Development.
Workshop on Non-functional Requirement Engineering at the 8th Interna-
tional Conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems,
MoDELS 2005. Montego Bay, Jamaica, October 2-7 2005.
P.24: Siv Hilde Houmb, Indrakshi Ray and Indrajit Ray. Estimating the Relative
Trustworthiness of Information Sources in Security Solution Evaluation. In
Ketil Stølen, William H. Winsborough, Fabio Martinelli and Fabio Massacc
(Eds.): Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Trust Management
(iTrust 2006). Pages 135-149, LNCS 3986, Springer Verlag, Pisa, Italy, 16-19
May 2006.
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P.25: Geri Georg, Siv Hilde Houmb and Indrakshi Ray. Aspect-Oriented Risk
Driven Development of Secure Applications. In Damiani Ernesto and Peng
Liu (Eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Annual IFIP WG 11.3 Working Confer-
ence on Data and Applications Security 2006 (DBSEC 2006). Pages 282-296,
LNCS 4127, Springer Verlag, Sophia Antipolis, France, 31 July - 2 August
2006.
P.26: Siv Hilde Houmb, Geri Georg, Robert France and Jan Jürjens. An Inte-
grated Security Verication and Security Solution Design Trade-o¤ Analysis.
In Haralambos Mouratidis and Paolo Giorgini (Eds), Integrating Security
and Software Engineering: Advances and Future Visions. Chapter 9, Pages
190-219. Idea Group Inc, 2007. ISBN: 1-59904-147-6. 288 pages.
P.27: Siv Hilde Houmb, Geri Georg, Robert France, Dorina C. Petriu and Jan
Jürjens (Eds.). In Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Critical
Systems Development Using Modeling Languages (CSDUML 2006). 87 pages.
Research Report Telenor R&I N 20/2006, 2006.
P.28: Geri Georg, Siv Hilde Houmb, Robert France, Ste¤en Zschaler, Dorina
C. Petriu and Jan Jürjens. Critical Systems Development Using Modeling
Languages CSDUML 2006 Workshop Report. In Thomas Kühne (Eds.),
Models in Software Engineering: Workshops and Symposia at MoDELS 2006,
Genoa, Italy, October 1-6, 2006, Reports and Revised Selected Papers. Pages
27-31, LNCS 4364, Springer Verlag, 2007.
P.29: Dorina C. Petriu, C. Murray Woodside, Dorin Bogdan Petriu, Jing Xu,
Toqeer Israr, Geri Georg, Robert B. France, James M. Bieman, Siv Hilde
Houmb and Jan Jürjens. Performance analysis of security aspects in UML
models. In Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Software and
Performance, WOSP 2007. Pages 91-102, ACM. Buenes Aires, Argentina,
5-8 February 2007. ISBN 1-59593-297-6.
1.4 Research method and way of work
The research method adopted in this work is action research [90]. In action re-
search the construction and evaluation of an approach under development is done
in an integrating and reecting context. This means that the constructors (such
as developers of software systems or researches of methodology) and end-users
work together in a setting that enables the end-users to express their goals and
opinions explicitly and implicitly and the constructor can passively observe and
actively interact with the tasks performed by the end-users. Here, the goal of the
constructor is to understand the why, when and what of the tasks performed by
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the end-users. The latter is called change and reection and hence the emphasis
in action research is more on what practitioners do than on what they say they
do.
Action research comes in a number of shapes and are applied in elds such as
organisation development and education and health [90, 99]. Lately, action re-
search has also been adapted for and applied in the software engineering domain
[100], such as that of the CORAS project [19]. More information and appropri-
ate references on action research and theory on community of practice for which
action research is based upon are in Munkvoll et al. (2003) [76].
1.4.1 Application of action research for this work
Most action research projects set out to explicitly study something in order to
change and improve it. In many cases the need for change or improvement arises
from an unsatisfactory situation that those a¤ected want to improve. However, it
can also arise from a need to extend or rene an already satisfactory situation. As
improvement can only be facilitated by a complete understanding of the particular
work situation it is important to ensure that the constructors have the ability to
study and understand the problems of the end-users. This is best done through
practical participation and experimentation. Hence, the process of action research
is iterative and usually consists of some variation of the three phases: hypothesis,
eldwork and analysis and conclusion based on the results from the eldwork and
analysis.
This work has used an example-driven action research approach both for the ini-
tial explorative phase and for the development and evaluation phase. The explo-
rative phase focused on understanding the needs of the decision maker (end-user)
in the context of security solution decisions. This was performed in a number of
iterations through execution and observation of security solution decision situa-
tions using simulation examples. The development and evaluation phase included
the interpretation of the result from the explorative phase and change and re-
ection through example-driven testing of alternative approaches and techniques
to the problems or challenges discovered. This phase also went through a num-
ber of iterations as well as reiterated back to the explorative phase as it became
evident that a better understanding of the problems and challenges involved in
security solution decisions were needed. These two phases constitute the overall
work process of this work. To achieve a structured and repeatable process within
each of the two work phases each was called a construction process and structured
like a development process as shown in Figure 1.2.
As action research is used in this work the testing phase is extended to include
prototyping. Also, as the evaluation is example-driven through testing and pro-
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Requirements
Phase
Design
Phase
Test and
Prototyping
Phase
Implementation
Phase
Evaluate, Refine
and Update Phase
Fig. 1.2. The phases and iterations of the construction (work) process
Develop version n of approach
Test version n of approach in trial n
Evaluation of version n of approach
If approach does not meet
requirements, or predefined
goals not met: n=n+1
Requirements and
predefined goals
are met (sufficently met)
Fig. 1.3. Action research and how it inuenced the construction process
totyping an additional loop-back phase called evaluate, rene and update are
performed in all iterations before nally entering the implementation phase. This
ensures that the approach developed is su¢ ciently mature and evaluated before
any implementation activity is started. Hence, the work process iterates between
all phases, as well as between the testing and prototyping phase and the require-
ments phase. This means that several iterations involving the four rst phases
were executed before any full iteration was performed. Figure 1.3 shows how
action research inuenced the construction process while Figure 1.4 illustrates
how the community of practice was built and maintained throughout this work
and and gives an overview of the step-wise construction and evaluation strategy
adapted in this work.
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ConstructorsPractitioners
Evaluation session:
Examine evaluation results,
and refine and update
methdology
2
3
4
1
Test and evaluation
through example runs
Fig. 1.4. The evaluation and validation process used in this work
As can be seen in Figure 1.4 the communities of practice were built and main-
tained using three main constructs: (1) Requirement specication, design, testing
and implementation with involvement from both the practitioner and constructor
roles where the practitioners execute and the researchers observe. (2) Test and
evaluation through practical examples. (3) Evaluation, rene and update based
on the results from the example runs. An important question in the latter was:
Did the methodology meet its intentions su¢ ciently in terms of feasibility, usabil-
ity and applicability? The results from the evaluation session in (3) are used as
input to the next iteration in the construction of the methodology. This process
was repeated until the requirements of the end-user were met or the goal of this
work was su¢ ciently achieved.
This work re-engineered parts of the ACTIVE e-commerce platform in three full
iterations of the action research based work process described above. Each of
these iterations are called a study and referred to as study 1, 2 and 3 in Figure
1.1. These studies are simulation examples as they were not carried out in an
industrial setting but rather in a research setting. Details are given in Chapter
18.
In addition to the three simulation examples included as part of the action re-
search work process three controlled experiments were executed; one using stu-
dents at NTNU and two using a mixture of students and people with relevant
industrial background at Colorado State University, Fort Collins, US. These three
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experiments were performed to explore the relation between some of the variables
in the trust-based information aggregation schema described in Part 5 of this the-
sis. A selection of the results from the rst experiment is given in Houmb, Johnsen
and Stålhane (2004) [49].
2. Outline of the Thesis
As can be seen from the publication list in Section 1.3.1 this work has crawled
down many small paths. The reason for this is that risk assessment and manage-
ment is still a rather new eld within the security domain and quantication of
security risks, security levels or operational security level of information systems
are even less explored. However, during the last thirteen years, since the pub-
lication of the rst major paper on quantifying security risks as an operational
measure by Littlewood et al. (1993) [74], the focus has shifted but the domain is
still far from mature. There is thus substantial work left in advocating a broader
acceptance on the importance of structured and formalised security assessment
and management both during development and as a continuous day-to-day activ-
ity and particular on how to handle security risk in relation to other perspectives.
The latter has however improved as the nancial factors became more important
during and after the massive breakdown of the dot-com bubble in 2001.
In an attempt to avoid confusing the reader by presenting the many detours in
this work the focus is put on three topics and these are: (1) Giving an overview of
the AORDD framework. (2) Describing the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis and associated trade-o¤ tool. (3) Describing the trust-based information
aggregation schema used to combine information as input to the trade-o¤ tool.
The reminder of this work is organised as follows:
Part 2: Background Information and State of the Art. This part provides back-
ground information in terms of state of the art within security and risk assessment
and management, risk management processes and development processes relevant
for this work. This part also gives an overview of relevant security standards and
describes the state of the art in security evaluation, quantifying security, archi-
tectural/design trade-o¤ analysis and subjective expert judgment.
Part 3: Security Solution Decision Support Framework. This part is the rst of the
three main parts of this work and gives an overview of the AORDD framework and
its seven components. This part also looks into how each of these components
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relates to each other and how each contributes in aiding a decision maker in
choosing a security solution among alternatives.
Part 4: AORDD Security Solution Trade-O¤ Analysis. This part is the second of
the three main parts of this work and provides details on the AORDD security
solution trade-o¤ analysis, which is one of two main components of the AORDD
framework. The trade-o¤ analysis is implemented as the BBN topology trade-o¤
tool which is also described in this part.
Part 5: Aggregating information in the trade-o¤ tool. This part is the last of the
three main parts of this work and describes the steps-wise trust-based information
aggregation schema, which is an performance-based weighting expert opinion
aggregation schema tailored for security solution decision support. This part also
gives an overview of information sources suitable for estimating the security risks
and security solutions variables in the AORDD security solution trade-o¤analysis
and trade-o¤ tool.
Part 6: Validation, Discussion and Concluding Remarks. This part concludes
this work and contains a validation of the applicability, feasibility and usabil-
ity of the AORDD framework as a security solution decision support approach
by demonstrating the use of the trust-based performance weighting schema and
the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and trade-o¤ tool. In addition,
this part includes a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the AORDD
framework as a security solution decision support framework and concludes with
a summary of this work, as well as some insights into ongoing and further work.
Part 7: Appendices. This part contains the appendices to this work which is the
following:
 Appendix A: AORDD Concepts
 Appendix B.1: P.16: Houmb and Georg (2005); The Aspect-Oriented Risk-
Driven Development (AORDD) Framework
 Appendix B.2: P.26: Houmb et al. (2006); An Integrated Security Verication
and Design Security Solution Trade-o¤ Analysis
 Appendix B.3: P.17: Houmb et al. (2005); Cost-Benet Trade-O¤ Analysis
Using BBN for Aspect-Oriented Risk-Driven Development
 Appendix C: Publication list
Part II
Background Information and State of the Art

3. Security in Information Systems
According to ISO 15408:2006 Common Criteria for Information Technology Secu-
rity Evaluation Common Criteria [15] security is about protection of assets from
unauthorised disclosure, modication or loss of use. Hence, the goal of security
assurance is to establish condence in that assets are su¢ ciently protected from
potential security risks. Assets in this context are entities that have a value to
one or more of the system stakeholders.
The ascribed meaning of security, security threats and security attacks in relation
to an information system is however ambiguously dened and used. This is also
the case across well-known security standards, such as ISO 15408:2006 Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Common Criteria [15],
ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Information technology Code of Practice for information
security management [55] and ISO/IEC TR 13335:2001 Information technology
Guidelines for management of IT Security [54]. ISO/IEC 17799 talks about
information security while ISO 15408 (Common Criteria) and ISO/IEC TR 13335
targets Information Technology (IT) security. Furthermore, Common Criteria and
ISO/IEC 17799 dene security to include condentiality, integrity and availability
of IT and information systems respectively while ISO/IEC 13335 has a broader
scope that also covers the security attributes authenticity, accountability, non-
repudiation and reliability. This ambiguity makes it hard to communicate and
manage security and leads to confusion and imprecise description of the potential
undesired behaviour of a system. To meet these challenges and avoid confusion
in the context of this work a clear and precise denition of the involved concepts
including security, security threats, security attacks, security assessment, security
management, security assurance and security evaluation is given in the following.
IT security relates to an IT system while information security relates to an infor-
mation system. IT systems are systems with computers connected to a network
containing data, software and hardware as a potential target for intended or un-
intended security attacks that might a¤ect either the system itself, its data or its
stakeholders and users [54]. An information system goes beyond the concept of
computers and does also covers the conceptual parts related to a system, such as
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the people who use, develop, manage and maintain the system. Hence, IT systems
are the computerised part of an information system.
This work targets information systems and has adopted the denition of informa-
tion system from the architecture standard IEEE Std 1471-2000 Recommended
Practice for Architectural Description of SoftwareIntensive Systems [52] while
security is understood as information security and dened according to ISO/IEC
TR 13335, which includes all seven security attributes.
Denition Information system is a system containing physical and conceptual
entities that interacts as a potential target for intended or unintended security
attacks which might a¤ect either the system itself, its data or its stakeholders
and end-users (modied from IEEE Std 14712000 [52]).
Denition Information security comprises all perspectives related to den-
ing, achieving, and maintaining condentiality, integrity, availability, non-
repudiation, accountability, authenticity and reliability of an information sys-
tem (adapted and modied for information security from ISO/IEC TR 13335
[54]).
According to the Common Criteria a security critical information system is a
system where information held by IT products is a critical resource which enables
organisations to succeed in their mission. This means that the success of such a
system is highly dependent on its perceived level of security. The security level
of an information system should be understood as the ability of the system to
meet the end-users expectations and ensure that their personal information is
kept condential (secret), is available to them upon request and is not modied
by unauthorised users. An information system should perform its functionality
while exercising proper control of the contained information to ensure that it is
protected against unwanted or unwarranted dissemination, alternation or loss.
The term IT security is used in the Common Criteria to cover prevention and
mitigation of undesired events a¤ecting the value of assets.
Denition Assets are entities that have value to one or more of the system stake-
holders modied from [15]).
Denition Stakeholder is an individual, team or organisation (or classes thereof)
with interest in or concerns relative to an information system (modied from
the software architectural standard IEEE 1471 [52]).
Denition Physical assets are physical entities of value to one or more stake-
holders, such as hardware and other infrastructure entities, operating systems,
application and information (interpretation of denition given in [20]).
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Denition Conceptual assets are non-physical entities of value to one or more
stakeholders, such as people and their skills, training, knowledge and experi-
ence, and the reputation, knowledge and experience of an organisation (in-
terpretation of denition given in [20]).
Denition Asset value is the value of an asset in terms of its relative impor-
tance to a particular stakeholder. This value is usually expressed in terms of
some potential business impacts. This could in turn lead to nancial losses,
loss of revenue, market share or company image (modied from the risk man-
agement standard AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4]).
In this work, as in AS/NZS 4360:2004, CRAMM and CORAS, assets are the cen-
tre of the attention and denes the entities of concern in an information system.
In the reminder of this work a security critical information system is understood
as a system that contains assets with values which it is critical to preserve one
or more of the security attributes of. Here, critical means that security attacks
against the security attributes of such a system might lead to unacceptable loss
of value of one or more of the asset for at least one of the involved stakeholders.
Such systems include for example systems for e-commerce, medical systems, -
nancial systems and databases that stores personal information. The preservation
of the information held by these systems is often a critical success factor for the
organisation and its stakeholders to succeed in their goals. End-users or anyone
that are involved in the day-to-day use of these systems expect that the sensitive
information they provide to the system are adequately protected.
Denition Security critical information system is an information system wh-
ere there are assets with values for which it is critical to preserve one or more
of the security attributes of (modied from [15]).
Denition Condentiality (or secrecy) means that information is made avail-
able or disclosed only to authorised individuals, entities or processes [54].
Denition Integrity means that information is not destroyed or altered in an
unauthorised manner and that the system performs its intended function in
an unimpaired manner free from deliberate or accidental unauthorised ma-
nipulation of the system [54].
Denition Availability means that system services are accessible and usable on
demand by an authorised entity [54].
Denition Authenticity ensures that the identity of a subject or resource is the
one claimed [54].
Denition Accountability Accountability means that actions of an entity may
be traced uniquely to the entity [54].
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Denition Non-repudiation is the ability to prove that an action or event has
taken place in order to prevent later repudiation of this event or action [54].
Denition Reliability is the ability of an item to perform a required function
under stated conditions [96] (Please note that the use of the term item
intentionally allows for the calculation of reliability for individual components
or for the system as a whole.).
A security threat denotes a potential action that violates one or more security at-
tributes of an information system by exploiting vulnerabilities in the information
system. A security attack is the employment of a security threat. Such threats
and attacks denote unauthorised use of an information system and can be either
intentional or unintentional (accidental). Furthermore, a security attack might be
initiated by both external and internal users of an information system. In fact,
research indicates that about 80% of all security breaches are caused by insiders,
meaning a companys own employees.
Security attacks can be either active or passive [95]. In an active attack the in-
truder engages in tampering with the information being exchanged either through
modication of data streams or through creation of false data streams. Active at-
tacks target the integrity, availability and authenticity of assets and the account-
ability and non-repudiation of the identity and actions of the authorised users
of a system. In a passive attack the intruder observes the information passing
through a communication channel without interfering with its ow or content.
Passive attacks a¤ect the condentiality of assets.
3.1 Security standards and regulations
Security management standards aid in the overall and detailed management of
security in an organisation. In this work the most relevant standards within the
security domain are the ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Information Technology  Code
of Practice for information security management [55], ISO/IEC TR 13335:2001
Information Technology Guidelines for management of IT Security [54] and the
Australian/New Zealand standard for risk management AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4].
However, it is important to note the distinction between security management and
security risk management. The rst do not necessary include any use of structured
risk analysis methods while the latter does. Security management is often aided
by the use of checklists, vulnerability analysis and other similar security analysis.
Risk analysis in the context of this work refers to safety analysis methods adapted
to the security domain, such as those described in the CORAS framework [97].
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The security management standard ISO/IEC 17799 provides recommendations
for information security management and supports the people in an organisation
that are responsible for initiating, implementing or maintaining security in an or-
ganisation. The standard aid in developing organisational-specic security stan-
dards and hence ensures e¤ective security management in practice. The standard
also provides guidelines about how to establish condence in inter-organisational
matters.
The security management standard ISO/IEC 13335 provides guidance on how
to manage IT security. Here, the main objectives are to dene and describe the
concepts associated with the management of IT security, to identify the relation-
ships between the management of IT security and management of IT in general,
to present models for reasoning about IT security and to provide general guidance
on the management of IT security.
AS/NZS 4360 is a widely recognised and used standard within the risk assess-
ment and management domain. The standard is a general risk management stan-
dard that has been tailored for security risk assessment and management in the
CORAS framework [97]. The standard includes a risk management process that
consists of ve assessment sub-processes and two management sub-processes, a
detailed activity description for each sub-process, a separate guideline compan-
ion standards and general risk management advice. More information on risk
management and AS/NZS 4360 is in Chapter 5.
The last category of security standards relevant for this work is security evalu-
ation standards. ISO 15408:2005 Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation [15] is an example of a security evaluation standard. Such
standards with their associated evaluation techniques and guidelines have been
around since the beginning of the 1980s. The oldest known standard for evaluation
and certication of information security of IT products is the Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [24]. The standard was developed by the
US Department of Defense (DoD), issued in 1985 and evaluates systems accord-
ing to the six predened classes: C1, C2, B1, B2, B3 and A1. These classes are
hierarchically arranged with A1 as the highest level and C1 is the lowest level
(actually TCSEC groups these classes into four categories: A, B, C and D, but
category D is not used for certication). Each class contains both functional and
assurance requirements. The functional requirements are divided into authenti-
cation, role-based access control, obligatory access control and logging and reuse
of objects. TCSEC is also known as the Orange Book and was developed with
military IT systems in mind. The standard was to some extent also used to evalu-
ate industrial IT products but was shown to be too cost and resource demanding
and thus not su¢ ciently e¤ective in an industrial setting.
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As a response to the development of TCSEC the United Kingdom, Germany,
France and the Netherlands produced their own national evaluation criteria.
These were harmonised and in 1991 published under the name Information Tech-
nology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) [25]. ITSEC certication of a soft-
ware product means that users can rely on an assured level of security for any
product they are about to purchase. As for TCSEC, ITSEC certify products
according to predened classes of security (E0, E1, E2, E3, E4, E5 and E6).
A similar activity was also undertaken in Canada by the Communications Se-
curity Establishment (CSE), which is an intelligence agency of the Canadian
government charged with the duty of keeping track of foreign signals intelligence.
The Canadian initiative led to the Canadian Trusted Computer Product Eval-
uation Criteria (CTCPEC) [39]. CTCPEC was published in 1993 and combines
the TCSEC and ITSEC approaches.
However, TCSEC, ITSEC and CTCPEC did not su¢ ciently address the needs
from industry and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
started combining these e¤orts into one industrial adapted version called the
Common Criteria (ISO 15408). This work started in 1990 and led to the publi-
cation of the Common Criteria version 1.0 in 1995. The Common Criteria has
since then largely taken over for TCSEC, ITSEC and CTCPEC. The idea behind
the Common Criteria was to merge the three existing approaches into a world
wide framework for evaluating security properties of IT products and systems.
The standard incorporates experience from TCSEC, ITSEC, CTCPEC and other
relevant standards and provides a common set of requirements for the security
functions of IT products and systems. As for its predecessors certication is done
according to predened levels. In the Common Criteria these are called evalu-
ation assurance levels (EAL) and there are seven EALs: EAL1, EAL2, EAL3,
EAL4, EAL5, EAL6 and EAL7 where EAL 7 is the highest level and includes
requirements for the use of formal methods during the development of the IT
product.
The Common Criteria also provide a program called Arrangement on the Recog-
nition of Common Criteria Certicates in the eld of IT Security (CCRA) and
an evaluation methodology called Common Methodology for IT Security Eval-
uation (CEM). These two together ensure the equality and quality of security
evaluations such that results from independent evaluations can be compared and
hence aid decision makers (customers) in choosing among security solutions. More
information on CCRA and CEM is given in Chapter 4.
A common problem for most security evaluations however is the large amount
of information involved. The result of evaluations is also subject to bias as the
evaluation is done by one or a few evaluators. However, these evaluators must
usually be certied to perform the evaluation but that does not prevent the
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evaluation from involving a high degree of subjectivity. It is these problems that
the AORDD framework, and in particular the AORDD security solution trade-
o¤ analysis described in Part 4 of this work and the trust-based information
aggregation schema described in Part 5 of this work, is meant to aid.

4. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
The current version of the Common Criteria is version 3.1 [15] which was pub-
lished in September 2006. As with its preceding versions, version 3.1 consist of
four parts: Common Criteria Part 1, Common Criteria Part 2, Common Criteria
Part 3 and the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation (CEM), with the associated numbers CCMB-2006-09-001, CCMB-2006-
09-002, CCMB-2006-09-003 and CCMB-2006-09-004 respectively. Here, Common
Criteria Parts 1 to 3 contain the general model, the security functional compo-
nents and the security assurance components and targets mainly developers and
consumers of IT products. The CEM is a guidance tool for a Common Criteria
evaluator that also provides useful information and guidance for developers in
preparing information for the evaluation and for consumers in getting an insight
into the activities leading to the evaluation conclusion and on how to read and
interpret the evaluation result.
The Common Criteria provides a methodology and process that allows for com-
parability between results of independent security evaluations. This is the main
contribution of the Common Criteria to the security evaluation domain. The
standard does this by providing a common set of requirements for the security
functionality of IT products and for the assurance measures that are applied to
these products during evaluation. In addition, the Common Criteria o¤ers con-
structs for consumers to specify their security requirements and evaluation results
formulated such that it helps a consumer to determine whether a particular IT
product fulls their security needs.
During a Common Criteria evaluation the IT product is denoted Target of Evalua-
tion (ToE). A ToE can consist of any specied combination of hardware, rmware
or software, the development environment of these and the operational environ-
ment that these are intended to work in or evaluated for. Hence, a ToE is a
specic conguration of an IT product. It should be noted however that the pro-
cedures and techniques used for accreditation of IT products according to the
evaluation results are outside the scope of the Common Criteria and are handled
by separate evaluation authorities. Guidance on certication and accreditation
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and a set of experience and interpretation documents for all parts of a Common
Criteria evaluation and certication are available for download from the Common
Criteria portal (see http://www.commoncriteria.org).
There are three groups with general interest in a Common Criteria evaluation
and these are consumers, developers and evaluators. Consumers can use Common
Criteria evaluations and Common Criteria information to assist in procurement
of IT products. This means that a consumer can have alternative IT products
to choose between and would like to identify which of the alternatives that are
best-tted to his or her needs. Thus, consumers can use the Common Criteria
to compare di¤erent IT products congured into ToEs in a Common Criteria
evaluation. Consumers may also use Protection Proles (PP) to specify their
security requirements (also called needs). A PP is a particular set of security
requirements specied for a type or group of IT Products that can either be
certied separately or used as a requirement specication.
Developers use the Common Criteria to assist in the identication of security
requirements and to package information on the security of their IT product to
aid consumers in their procurement (or rather convince a consumer to purchase
their product). The above is achieved by following the general guidelines given in
Common Criteria Part 1 and the guidelines for selection and assignment of the
security functional components in Common Criteria Part 2.
An evaluator uses the Common Criteria to aid in deriving and formulating judg-
ments about the conformance of a ToE to its security requirements. The Common
Criteria also gives the evaluator guidelines on which actions to carry out during a
Common Criteria evaluation. Generally, an evaluator is supported by the security
assurance components in Common Criteria Part 3 and the evaluation methodol-
ogy in CEM.
4.1 Relevant parts of Common Criteria terminology
As discussed earlier the security domain is not consistent in the use of and as-
cribed meaning of the concepts involved in assessing, managing and evaluating
the security of information systems. Therefore, this section provides the Com-
mon Criteria security evaluation concepts relevant for this work. This is to aid
in the understanding of the focus and contribution of this work. The denitions
are taken from Common Criteria v3.1 Part 1. Please note that a denition of the
concept assetis not included in the denition list below as it has been dened
earlier. Any concepts used by this work not given in the below denition list are
dened when rst used. There are also concepts where the ascribed meaning in
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this work di¤ers from that of the Common Criteria. Any such situation is clearly
stated throughout this work.
Denition Development environment is the environment in which the ToE is
developed [15].
Denition Evaluation authority is a body that implements the Common Cri-
teria for a specic community by means of an evaluation scheme and thereby
sets the standards and monitors the quality of evaluation conducted by bodies
within that community [15].
Denition Evaluation scheme is the administrative and regulatory framework
under which the Common Criteria is applied by an evaluation authority
within a specic community [15].
Denition Operational environment is the environment in which the ToE is
operated [15].
Denition Security Target (ST) is an implementation-dependent statement of
the security needs for a specic TOE [15].
Denition Protection Prole (PP) is an implementation-independent state-
ment of security needs for a TOE type [15].
Denition Target of Evaluation (ToE) is a set of software, rmware and/or
hardware possibly accompanied by guidance [15].
Denition User is any external entity (human user or machine user) to the ToE
that interacts (or may interact) with the ToE [15].
It should be noted from the denition of ToE and the earlier denition of IT
system (product) and information system that a ToE does not fully address
all perspectives of an information system. A ToE covers parts or whole of the
computerised part of an information system. As discussed earlier an IT system
is the computerised part of an information system and hence in this work an
information system covers the ToE, the user, the development environment and
operational environment and has a broader scope than the Common Criteria.
Details are given in Parts 3 and 4 of this thesis.
4.2 Evaluation and certications according to the Common
Criteria
The Common Criteria recognises two types of evaluations: (1) ST/ToE evaluation
and (2) PP evaluation. In case of an ST/TOE evaluation particular parts of or
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Objectives Requirements Specifications Mechanisms
Fig. 4.1. ST, PP and ToE in relation to phases of a development process
the whole IT product are dened into a ToE. In case of a PP evaluation particular
parts of or the whole IT product type is dened into a ToE type. A PP is an
implementation-independent version of a particular IT product type, such as
Smart Cards. This means that a PP can be looked upon as a template for a
type of IT products. Figure 4.1 illustrates the process of a Common Criteria
evaluation in relation to a standard development process while Figure 4.2 shows
the relationship between PP, ST and ToE. The important factor to note in this
context is that the result of either a PP or ST/ToE evaluation is stored for later
reuse in a PP and ToE registry respectively.
As discussed earlier the Common Criteria does not directly deal with the cer-
tication and accreditation process. This is done by local evaluation authorities
usually on a country-wise basis using their local evaluation scheme. However,
CEM is a common methodology for the Common Criteria evaluation process
and provides general guidelines that these local evaluation schemes can be based
upon. CEM is mutually recognised across the existing local evaluation schemes
and thus contributes to enhancing the ability of consumers to compare alterna-
tive solutions. However, there are activities in an evaluation process that require
subjective interpretation and opinion and thus are hard to objectivelycompare.
In Norway the evaluation scheme is held by the Norwegian Certication Authority
for IT Security (SERTIT) operated by the Norwegian National Security Agency.
This means that SERTIT is the authority issuing Common Criteria certicates
to IT products in Norway and hence denes the certication and accreditation
methodology and process for the evaluation scheme in Norway. In practice this
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means that SERTIT is responsible for all evaluation done within the Norwegian
scheme. SERTIFF is also responsible for issuing accreditations for evaluators and
thus determines who can be qualied evaluators in Norway. To be a qualied
evaluator under the SERTIT scheme potential evaluators need to undertake a
trial evaluation to prove their ability to understand the Common Criteria and
the CEM. Qualied evaluators are called EVIT and accredited as a laboratory
according to the Norwegian standard NS-ISO 17025 [78]. There are two o¢ cial
evaluators in Norway per 30 June 2006 and these are Norconsult AS and Secode
Norge AS.
CCRA is the arrangement on the recognition of Common Criteria certications in
the eld of IT security and is an international regulatory framework for evaluator
schemes that works towards establishing certication frameworks so that cer-
ticates from di¤erent evaluation schemes can be mutually recognised (meaning
internationally recognised between the member CCRA certication authorities).
CCRA was established on 23 May 2000. As of 5 June 2007 there are 12 certicate
authorisation schemes recognised by CCRA. These are the certicate schemes of
Australia and New Zealand (Australasian Information Security Evaluation Pro-
gram (AISEP)), Canada (Canadian Common Evaluation and Certication Cri-
teria Scheme), France (French Evaluation and Certication Scheme), Germany
(German Evaluation and Certication Scheme), Japan (Japanese Evaluation and
Certication Scheme), the Republic of Korea (Korea IT Security Evaluation and
Certication Scheme (KECS)), the Netherlands (Netherlands Scheme for Certi-
cation in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB)), Norway (Norwegian Certication
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Authority for IT Security (SERTIT)), Spain (Organismo de Certicacíon de la
Seguridad de las Tecnologías de la Información), the United Kingdom (UK IT
Security Evaluation and Certication Scheme) and the United States (Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS)). In addition, there are 11
countries that are in the process of setting up or getting acceptance for their lo-
cal schemes. These are called certication consuming by the CCRA and include:
Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy,
Singapore, Sweden and Turkey.
4.3 Performing a Common Criteria evaluation
A Common Criteria evaluation usually involves the developer and the evaluator.
In some cases the consumer is known and requests the evaluation. In addition
there are cases where the entity paying for the evaluation is external to the
developer and therefore called the sponsor. An example of such is when the
consumer is the Norwegian military authorities with the Norwegian Government
paying for the evaluation. In this case the Norwegian Government is called the
sponsor.
The developer is always the entity that has or is developing the IT product that
the evaluator evaluates using the local evaluation scheme. Since it is a particular
conguration of an IT product that is of interest in a Common Criteria evaluation
the evaluation target and context are specied into a ToE or type of ToE. This
means that one IT product might lead to several ToEs. Note that each ToE has
a development and operational environment associated to it.
A Common Criteria evaluation is performed by the evaluator using Common Cri-
teria Part 3; security assurance components. Part 3 provides a set of assurance
components that denes a set of evaluation tasks structured into groups of com-
ponents that target a particular security level and which the evaluator and the
developer needs to execute. These groups of components are called Evaluation
Assurance Levels (EAL). Recall that there are seven EAL levels where EAL 1
provides the lowest level of assurance and EAL 7 provides the highest level of
assurance or condence in that the assets of the ToE are su¢ ciently protected.
Before an evaluation can be carried out there are specic pieces of information
that the developer needs to provide. These pieces of information can be derived
by the developer using the Common Criteria Part 3 to guide the development of
the ToE. By doing so the developer are able to prepare the necessary development
documents and to perform the required analysis for a Common Criteria evalu-
ation, such as vulnerability analysis to provide the necessary evidence that the
ToE posses the required security attributes. The general idea is that the developer
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needs to provide any piece of information that is required for the evaluator to
gain the necessary condence in the security abilities of the ToE. The evaluator
uses Common Criteria Part 3 to check the development deliverables and perform
additional analyses depending on which EAL the ToE targets.
Generally, the Common Criteria o¤ers a well-founded, well-tested and struc-
tural industry standard means of evaluating IT products. However, the standard
has not gained as wide use as anticipated. Although this is improving, for ex-
ample through the adaptation of the Common Criteria in ETSI TISPAN (see
http://portal.esti.org), it might be too large a framework for systems with rapid
and ad-hoc development processes, short TTM, tight budget constraints and short
life-time. Web-based systems, such as some e-commerce systems, are examples of
systems that might fall out of the market before a Common Criteria evaluation
are completed. This does not mean that the Common Criteria is not relevant for
these systems. On the contrary, the very existence of these systems depends on
their security level. There is a need for methodology and tool support to make
the Common Criteria applicable in practice for these systems. This has partly
been addressed by the AORDD Security Solution Trade-O¤ Analysis developed
in this work. Details are given in Part 4.

5. Risk Assessment and Management of
Information Systems
The [risk assessment] approach adopted should aim to focus security
e¤ort and resources in a cost-e¤ective and e¢ cient way [1]
Security is traditionally maintained through security policies and security mech-
anisms. Security policies specify roles related to who, what and when of an in-
formation system, meaning which users (who) can perform which actions (what)
at which points in time (when). Thus, security policies give procedures and rules
for the authorised use of an information system and are often on a conceptual
or enterprise level of abstraction. Security mechanisms are the concrete security
controls implemented in a system, such as rewalls, ltering on Internet gateway,
encryption of communication and data and anti-virus software. The purpose of
these mechanisms is to protect data, software and hardware from malicious at-
tackers by preventing them from exposing it, altering it, removing it or in any
way obstructing authorised behaviour in the system and normal internal system
behaviour. Security mechanisms thus implement the security policies.
An important perspective to remember in this context is that it is possible to
employ and su¢ ciently maintain the strongest available protective security mech-
anisms against the outsiders (unauthorised entities of the system) and still end
up with a weak system due to the lack of proper protection against insiders (au-
thorised entities) and lack of fail-secure and fail-safe mechanism to protect the
system from committing suicide. There is also the perspective of insiders and
outsiders working together to break the security mechanism of an information
system.
There are many reasons why information systems are not secure. One major rea-
son is the complexity of todays information systems and the need for continuous
maintenance, which means that all systems need at least one system adminis-
trator with a username and password to perform every action possible on the
information system. This raises the issue of a healthy delegation of responsibility
with a clear denition of the roles involved. For such separation of concerns to
work it must be properly maintained and revised regularly and employed in such a
way that it does not introduce new vulnerabilities. This calls for the use of proper
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risk control. Risk management and risk assessment are techniques that can be
used to identify, monitor and control the risk level of an information system.
There are several principles about how risk assessment can be performed. These
can be roughly classied into three main types: rule based, risk based (probabilis-
tic) and judgment based (expert judgment). Rule based risk assessment covers all
approaches where an assessor or evaluator checks a system against a set of crite-
ria or guidelines given by standards and/or checklists. These criteria or checklists
thus represent rules that a system should comply with. Hence, these criteria or
guidelines are considered best practiceand by following these rules the system
is su¢ ciently protected. This imply that the potential risks in a system are known
and rarely change.
Probabilistic risk assessment targets both known and unknown undesired events
(risks) and focuses on identifying and assessing the probability of these events.
However, it is important to distinguish between the frequentist (classical or ob-
jective) and the Bayesian interpretation of probability [105, 16, 31, 32]. In classi-
cal interpretations it is assumed that there exists a true value P which denotes the
probability of the occurrence of a given event A. The true value P is unknown
and needs to be estimated. The classical interpretations only allow the use of
empirical data from actual use of the system or similar systems to estimate P .
Hence, estimation cannot be done based on any subjective data (also called in-
terpreted data) as this is considered to be uncertain data. The uncertainty in
classic interpretation is related to how close the calculated value of P , called P 0,
is to the true value of P .
The perspective of uncertainty is understood di¤erently in subjective interpreta-
tion. Here the data sources express their subjective uncertainty regarding future
observable events. The probability in this case expresses the experts or subjects
uncertainty for P and thus there is no meaning in talking about the uncertainty of
the probability itself [31, 32]. The latter is called judgment based risk assessment
or subjective expert judgment.
Subjectivity is not a new subject in risk assessment and management. It has
been discussed within the reliability domain since the 1970s [31, 32]. There have
also been activities on the area of aggregating subjective expert judgment, such
as guidelines and questionnaires for collecting relevant information from experts
[17, 79]. It is this subjective interpretation of probability that this work makes
use of in the trust-based information aggregation schema described in Part 5.
Details on subjective expert judgment are given in Chapter 7.
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5.1 Security (risk) assessment
Risk assessment is often referred to as risk analysis. However, this work dis-
tinguish between the two terms and understands risk analysis as referring to
the analysis of consequence and frequency of a potential threat or undesired
event/behaviour. Risk assessment is seen as referring to the whole process of iden-
tifying, analysis, evaluating and treating risks. The reader should note however
that risk assessment is di¤erent from risk management in that risk management
refers to monitoring, communicating, consulting and controlling that the results
of a risk assessment is employed and maintained in practice. Risk assessment is
a one-time activity while risk management is a continuous activity and involves
several risk assessments. When risk assessment is used to assess security critical
systems or examine the security level of a system it is often referred to as se-
curity risk assessment or simply security assessment. Similarly, risk management
is often called security management whenever used for managing results from
security assessments.
The purpose of any risk assessment is to identify potential threats or undesired
events/behaviour and assess their degree of criticality to the system. Hence, se-
curity assessment provides relevant and necessary information to support deci-
sion makers in choosing a security solution, meaning a solution to the security
threats posed upon an information system by reducing or removing the criticality
that these represent. Decision makers can also use these results when prioritis-
ing di¤erent sets of solutions, also called countermeasures, into an e¤ective and
cost-friendly overall security strategy.
The intention of security (risk) assessment is not to obtain a completely secure
system but rather to ensure the employment and maintenance of a correct or
rather an acceptable level of security. Assessment activities also contribute to
increased knowledge and insight into the system and the dependencies and inter-
relations between the system and its environment. This is an important issue in
a security solution decision-making context but also motivates and increases the
awareness of the importance of systematic security follow-ups.
5.1.1 Performing security assessment
Performing security assessment is a multidisciplinary task. The process requires
knowledge of the technical and operational perspectives of an information sys-
tem and on the circumstances that may result in undesired system behaviour.
Experts in the area of performing security assessment are also required, that is
experts with knowledge of the assessment techniques and methods and the math-
ematical/statistical concepts needed for carrying out the tasks involved. Due to
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the increased complexity of information systems and the inherent problem with
accidental complexity and poor user interfaces there is also a need for experts in
the area of behaviour and organisational perspectives, that is experts that have
knowledge of human reactions and work capacity under stress.
Some kind of a model of the information system is often used to direct the assess-
ment activities. A model in this context refers to a representation of the infor-
mation system at some level of abstraction. Such a model can be either graphical
or mathematical. However, establishing a mathematical description is necessary
if the intention is to perform calculations of the input data at some point during
the assessment. This does not mean that security assessments performed with-
out extensive use of models or with inaccurate models is useless and provide no
useful results. The result from a security assessment is not only dependent on
the model but also on the composition of the assessment team and the informa-
tion sources used to evaluate or estimate the involved variables. What should be
noted though is that the results from a security assessment performed based on a
particular model are no more accurate than the model itself. Additionally, when
security assessment is used as an integrated part of the development, such as in
the CORAS approach, the result is also a¤ected by the degree to which the actual
implementation of the system relates to the models that the security assessment
was performed on. If the system is not implemented as described by the models,
the security assessment results might be of little or no relevance.
There are many ways to perform a security assessment but most security assess-
ment processes goes through the three phases: planning, execution and use. A
general description of these three phases is given below, this is taken from Aven
(1992) [5]:
1. Planning
 Objectives
 System denition
 Time planning
2. Execution
 System description
 Denition of system failure
 Assumptions
 Causal Analysis
 Data collection and analysis
 Presentation of results
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3. Use
 Reliability evaluation
 Decisions
The planning phase deals with the preparatory activities that are important for
a successful result of a security assessment. This phase is used to dene what
the assessment will include and what is out of scope, the goal with the security
assessment and a plan for the use of the results from the assessment. Activities
involved in this phase are: identify the objectives of the assessment, dene the
scope of the assessment and creating plans for who does what at which time and
a description of the expertise needed for each of the involved tasks.
The execution phase deals with the actual execution of the security assessment.
This means actively using the plans made during the planning phase to direct
the tasks of the security assessment. At this point in a security assessment it is
important to keep in mind the objectives and scope of the security assessment.
The phase starts by creating a clear and unambiguous description of the system
being analysed and by linking this description to the objectives and scope of the
security assessment as dened in the planning phase. The next activity concerns
the denition of types of system failures, which means providing a rough descrip-
tion of the expected normal and potential abnormal behaviour of the information
system. Then the assumptions associated with the assessment need to be unam-
biguously described. This includes among other things to describe the possible
interpretation of the security threat to make sure that all involved stakeholders
understand and agree on the circumstances for interpreting the assessment re-
sults. The phase ends by carrying out the analysis tasks, collecting the results
and formulating the results so that they can be presented to the target audience.
The use phase deals with the application of the results from the execution phase
and on how these results can be used to support and direct the decisions that
need to be made. This involves qualitative or quantitative evaluation of potential
security solutions to the identied security risks, identifying a treatment plan,
allocating resources, etc.
5.2 The Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk
Management
The Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:2004
[4] provides a generic framework for the process of managing risks. The standard
divides the elements of the risk management process into seven sub-processes
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Fig. 5.1. AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk management process
where ve are sequential and related to risk assessment activities and two are in
parallel with the other ve and cover the risk management part of the process.
An overview of the process is given in Figure 5.1.
As for the general security assessment process outlined in the previous section the
rst sub-process of AS/NZS is used to dene the context for the assessment. This
sub-process also deals with establishing the criteria for what constitute acceptable
and unacceptable risk. This is called dening the risk acceptance criteria.
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During the second sub-process the potential threats, vulnerabilities and their
associated impacts are identied. The results from sub-process 2 are then analysed
and evaluated in two subsequent sub-processes. The fth and last sub-process in
the risk assessment part of the process deals with identifying and evaluating
potential treatments to the identied risks. The two parallel sub-processes cover
the risk management perspective of the process and focus on the communicating
and consultation with the involved stakeholders, such as the decision maker and
the monitoring and reviewing of the execution and results of each of the risk
assessment sub-processes. The following gives a brief description of the activities
involved in each sub-process.
Establish the context
The activities of the rst sub-process of the risk assessment part of the AS/NZS
4360 risk management process focuses on the context that the organisation op-
erates in. The sub-process is divided into ve activities:
Establish the external context focuses on dening the external environment in
which the organisation operation. This includes among other thinfs a specication
of the organisations strengths and weaknesses, key business drivers and external
stakeholders.
Establish the internal context aims at understanding the organisation and its ca-
pabilities, including its culture, business goals, objectives, structure and strate-
gies.
Establish the risk management context involves describing the goals, objectives,
strategies, scope and parameters involved in a directed and proper identication,
analysis, evaluation, treatment and management of the potential risks.
Develop risk evaluation criteria involves establishing a clear denition of what
constitute acceptable risk and what constitute unacceptable risk in terms of ac-
ceptance criteria. The important factor to note in this context is that acceptable
risk will not be treated and hence the denition of the risk evaluation criteria
should be executed with care. The criteria may be a¤ected by legal requirements,
the perceptions of external and internal stakeholders or by organisational policies.
Dene the structure deals with dividing the assessment and management activi-
ties into sets of elements that allow a structured and logical way of assessing and
managing the risks.
Risk identication
The second sub-process of the risk assessment part of the AS/NZS 4360 risk
management process identies the risks that need to be managed. Systematic
methods for risk identication, such as HazOp, FTA, FME(C)A, Markov analysis
and CRAMM, should be applied at this stage. Proper execution of the identi-
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cation of risks is a critical success factor to the success of the risk assessment and
management as potential risks that are not identied at this stage are excluded
from further analysis. The process is divided into two activities:
What can happen, where and when identies the potential threats, vulnerabilities
and subsequent unwanted incidents arising from these.
Why and how can it happen is directed towards identifying the possible causes
initiating the identied threats and describing scenarios to demonstrate how the
threat can be materialised.
Risk analysis
Based on information from sub-processes 1 and 2 the impacts and likelihood
of all identied threats are assessed. The objective of sub-process 3 of the risk
assessment part of the AS/NZS 4360 risk management process is thus to derive
the risk level of each risk identied during risk identication. This is necessary
in order to separate the acceptable risks from the risks requiring treatment. Risk
is analysed by combining estimates of the consequence and the likelihood of the
identied threats in the context of existing control measures. The analysis can
be either qualitative or quantitative depending on the amount and type of data
available. Qualitative analysis uses descriptive scales to describe the magnitude
of potential consequences and the likelihood that those consequences will occur
while quantitative analysis uses numerical values for both measures. The sub-
process is divided into the following activities:
Evaluate existing controls looks into which security mechanisms that are already
in place in the system and the relevant system environment. This involves iden-
tifying the existing management strategies both in terms of technical solutions
and procedures.
Determine consequence and likelihood is the activity where the qualitative or
quantitative analysis of consequence and likelihood of the identied threats is
performed.
Estimate level of risk takes the likelihood and consequence from previous activity
and estimates the risk level. The risk level can be expressed both qualitatively and
quantitatively depending on the output from the previous activity. This means
that if the consequence and likelihood from the prevision activity is expressed as
qualitative values the risk level is expressed as a qualitative value and visa versa.
Risk evaluation
In sub-process 4 of the risk assessment part of the AS/NZS 4360 risk manage-
ment process the risks are evaluated by comparing the risk level with the risk
evaluation criteria established in the rst sub-process. Based on the results of
the evaluation it is decided whether a risk is perceived as acceptable or not. The
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risks identied to be in need of treatment are then assigned a treatment priority.
From this stage on the risks considered to be acceptable are no longer parts of
the assessment. Nevertheless, these risks should be monitored to ensure that they
remain acceptable.
Risk treatment
The last sub-process in the risk assessment part of the AS/NZS 4360 risk manage-
ment process concerns the treatment of the risks. In this sub-process the focus
is on nding alternative treatment solutions to the risks in need of treatment,
meaning the risks identied as not acceptable in the previous sub-process. There
are generally four main treatment strategies [4]: (1) Avoid the risk. (2) Transfer
the parts of or the complete risk to a third party. (3) Reduce the likelihood of
the risk. (4) Reduce the consequence of the risk.
Determining which treatment strategy to choose and the nancial and security
impact of this strategy is derived through a series of treatment activities. Treat-
ment activities specied in ANS/NZS 4360 are the following:
Identify treatment options include the identication of the treatment strategy
and the identication of alternative treatment options within the boundaries of
the treatment strategy. Note that treatment options are identied and evaluated
both for risks with negative impact and for risks with positive impact
Assess treatment options evaluates and compares the benets of implementing a
particular treatment option from the set of alternative treatment opinions iden-
tied in the previous activity with the cost of employing the treatment option in
the system. This activity also recommends a treatment option or usually a set of
treatment options by taking both the nancial and the risk acceptance criteria
into consideration. The general rule given is to choose treatment option(s) so that
the risk is made as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Prepare and implement treatment plans looks at the results from the previous ac-
tivity and develops a plan for how to prepare and implement the treatment option
in the system and/or the system environment. This activity includes resource al-
location, distribution of reponsibilities, performance measures and reporting and
monitoring requirements.
Monitoring and Review
The monitoring and review sub-process is one of the two risk management sub-
processes specied in AS/NZS 4360. In this sub-process stakeholders involved
in managing the risks monitor and review the execution of the treatment im-
plementation plan. The sub-process runs in parallel with the ve risk assessment
sub-processes and monitors and reviews the results from all risk assessment activ-
ities as well as ensuring that continuous attention is given to the system and that
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there is protection of the system against potential risks. Risk management works
best if strategies for managing risks and for monitoring the practical implications
of the risk management strategy are clearly described. For a treatment imple-
mentation plan to remain relevant the plans need to be reviewed and updated
regularly.
Communication and Consultation
Communication and consultation is the second risk management specic sub-
process included in the AS/NZS 4360 risk management process. As discussed
earlier the success of any risk assessment or management plan and activity is
highly dependent on the ability of the involved stakeholders, experts, users and
other interested parties ability to communicate. This is also crucial in risk man-
agement. If the managers and the people developing the system and employing the
treatment options do not communicate and consult to a su¢ cient level through-
out the life-cycle of a system the ability of the management strategy to succeed in
its mission is dramatically reduced. Being in interaction, being in control, having
a proper overview of the implications of all actions, etc. is not just important
in risk management, it is a necessity. The communication perspective is also im-
portant in relation to the potential consumers in order to establish and maintain
mutual respect and condence. Also, a continuous improvement of the risk man-
agement plans and strategies require proper communication and consultation to
ensure that the risk management plan remains relevant for those involved and
not only for the managers.
5.3 CCTA risk analysis and management methodology
(CRAMM)
CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology (CRAMM) [8] is developed
by the British Governments Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency
(CCTA) as a recommended standard for risk analysis of information systems
within healthcare establishments in the UK. This approach incorporates perspec-
tives taken in nance risk management approaches and are tailored for assessing
risks to medical and health related IT system. However, due to the structured and
general process adapted the approach also represents a general, structured and
consistent approach to computer security management of all types of information
systems. CRAMM is also used as the basis for many risk assessment and man-
agement methodologies and frameworks, such as the CORAS framework, and is
the rst risk assessment methodology that successfully and in large-scale adapted
an asset-centric perspective on risk assessment.
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The rst version of CRAMM was issued as a set of paper-based forms. Later
CRAMM was supported by software tools and now it is fully computerised.
CRAMM consists of three stages: (1) Asset identication and valuation. (2) As-
sessment of threats, which is similar to the identication and analysis of risks
activities in the AS/NZS 4360 risk management process. (3) Assess vulnerabili-
ties and suggests countermeasures.
CRAMM has 10 predened asset tables to support the identication and valua-
tion of assets. Furthermore, the asset tables are structured into asset categories
that are linked to lists of known vulnerabilities and threats for each asset cate-
gory. The CRAMM software tool lists these to you automatically based on the
result of the asset identication and valuation in stage 1 of CRAMM.
Furthermore, there are also sets of associated countermeasures to each of the
threats and vulnerabilities stored in respective repositories in CRAMM. The
CRAMM software tool also suggests countermeasures automatically based on
information such as the set of assets identied, the values assigned to these as-
sets and the identied threats and vulnerabilities. However, there is a predened
balance between physical, personnel, procedural and technical countermeasures
that is tailored for medical systems within the CRAMM software tool. This makes
the latter feature less valuable to other types of information systems. To make
CRAMM e¤ective for other types of information systems all decisions made must
be recorded and reviewed and the associated repositories updated to reect the
e¤ects of these decisions. Hence, the software tool needs to learn from experience.
The CORAS approach makes use of the asset-driven approach of CRAMM and
has adopted the asset valuation technique of CRAMM. More details on the
CORAS approach is given in the following.
5.4 The CORAS approach to assessing and managing
security risks
IST-2000-25031 CORAS: A platform for risk analysis of security critical sys-
tems [19] was a Fifth Framework European Commission IST-project that ran
from 2000-2003. The aim of the CORAS project was to develop a framework
for model-based risk assessment of security critical systems. The main result
from the CORAS project is the methodology for model-based risk assessment
that has four supporting pillars: (1) The risk documentation framework based on
RM-ODP. (2) The risk management process based on the AS/NZS4360 risk man-
agement process. (3) The integrated risk management and system development
process based on the Unied Process (UP). (4) The platform for tool inclusion
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based on data-integration using XML. However, the main benets of the CORAS
approach is the tailoring of a set of risk assessment methods from the safety do-
main for the security domain, as well as the focus on integrating risk management
into the system development process. The latter ensures that risks are handled
throughout the development process at the right time and for the correct cost.
Figure 5.2 gives an overview of the CORAS framework [97].
The CORAS framework is model-based in the sense that it gives detailed recom-
mendations for modelling both the system and the risks and treatments identi-
ed during the security (risk) assessment using the Unied Modeling Language
(UML). This means that the CORAS framework provides support, guidelines and
UML modelling elements which extend the value of both system development
and risk assessment activities in three dimensions [97]: (1) To improve precision
of descriptions of the target system. (2) As a media for communication between
stakeholders involved in a risk assessment. (3) To document risk assessment re-
sults and the assumptions on which these results depend. Details are in Stølen et
al. (2002) [97].
Also, the risk assessment methodology in CORAS integrates techniques from
partly complementary risk assessment methods. These include HazOp, FTA,
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FMECA, Markov analysis and CRAMM. Like CRAMM the CORAS method-
ology is asset-driven, which means that the identication of assets is the driving
task in the risk assessment process. Actually, if no assets are identied there is
no need to carry out the risk assessment.
5.4.1 CORAS risk management process
The CORAS risk management process is based on the AS/NZS 4360:1999 risk
management process and the recommendations in ISO/IEC 17799-1:1999 [55].
The underlying terminology of the CORAS risk management process is supported
by the two standards: ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 [54] and IEC 61508:1998 Functional
safety of electical/elect-
ronic/progammable electronic safety-related systems [51]. As for AS/NZS 4360
the CORAS risk management process consists of seven sub-processes where ve
are sequential risk assessment related sub-processes and two are parallel risk man-
agement related sub-processes. In order to adapt the standard for use in the secu-
rity domain CORAS decomposed the ve sequential sub-processes into activities
as shown in the activity list below. For each sub-process the CORAS methodol-
ogy provides guidelines with respect to which models should be constructed and
how these models should be expressed to support the risk assessment activities.
The main di¤erence from the AS/NZS 4360 risk management process is that
the CORAS risk management process has a stronger focus on assets and that
their process is asset-driven. The risk management process is therefore extended
by relevant activities for asset identication and valuation. As for CRAMM the
identication and valuation of assets guides the risk assessment process. More
details are in Stølen et al. (2002) [97] and the other publications from the project.
Please see [19] for details.
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Sub-process 1: Identify Context
 Activity 1.1: Identify areas of relevance
 Activity 1.2: Identify and value assets
 Activity 1.3: Identify policies and evaluation criteria
 Activity 1.4: Approval
Sub-process 2: Identify Risks
 Activity 2.1: Identify threats to assets
 Activity 2.2: Identify vulnerabilities of assets
 Activity 2.3: Document unwanted incidents
Sub-process 3: Analyse Risks
 Activity 3.1: Consequence evaluation
 Activity 3.2: Frequency evaluation
Sub-process 4: Risk Evaluation
 Activity 4.1: Determine level of risk
 Activity 4.2: Prioritise risks
 Activity 4.3: Categorise risks
 Activity 4.4: Determine interrelationships among risk themes
 Activity 4.5: Prioritise the resulting risk themes and risks
Sub-process 5: Risk Treatment
 Activity 5.1: Identify treatment options
 Activity 5.2: Assess alternative treatment approaches
6. Towards Quantitative Measure of Operational
Security
The fact that most security evaluation and assurance approaches are qualitative,
subjective and resource demanding and the need for easily accessible techniques
that provide comparability between security solutions has raised the need for
techniques with the ability to quantify security attributes of information sys-
tems. This relates both to security requirements in Quality of Service (QoS)
architectures and as input to design and architecture trade-o¤ analysis to sup-
port the choice of security solutions such as security mechanisms to comply with
an established security policy.
Early research in this area focused on state transition models such as Markov
or semi-Markov models. In the dependability domain these techniques are used
to measure values such as mean time between failures (MTBF) and to quantify
frequency and consequence of undesired events. However, the dynamic nature of
security attacks makes these models intractable due to the problems with state
explosions. To express the complete state space involved in a security solution
decision situation for an information system it is necessary to consider not only
hardware, operating system and application/services fault but also the surviv-
ability of the system in terms of withstanding intentional and accidental security
attacks.
In Littlewood et al. (1993) [74] the rst step towards operational measures of
computer security is discussed. The authors point to the lack of quantitative
measures available to determine the security level of a system under operation,
called operational security, and suggest a model that relates security assessment
to traditional probability theory. Note that operational security relates to the
ToE working in the operational environment in a Common Criteria context. The
main idea is to reuse the knowledge and methods from the reliability domain and
tailor these for the security domain. This requires rening the concepts involved,
as well as a redenition of the input space and usage environment. The main
di¤erence between the security and the reliability domain is that the input space
not only covers system internal inputs but also external inputs, such as those
coming from intentional attacks to security critical information systems. The
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same applies to the usage environment where the population of attackers and
their behaviour comes in addition to normal system operation. The operational
measures of security discussed in the paper are the e¤orts and time that the
attacker need to invest to perform a security attack in terms of Mean E¤ort to
Security Failure and Mean Time to Security Failure .
In Ortalo et al. (1999) [80] the authors discuss a quantitative model to measure
known Unix security vulnerabilities using a privilege graph. The privilege graph
is transformed into a Markov chain based on the assumption that the probability
of a successful attack given an elementary attack and the associated amount of ef-
fort e spent is exponentially distributed. The e¤ort e is expressed as P (e) = 1 
e
where 1= is the mean e¤ort to successful elementary security attack. Further-
more, the model allows for the evaluation of operational security as proposed in
[74].
In Jonsson and Olovsson (1997) [62] the authors present and discuss a quan-
titative analysis of attacker behaviour based on empirical data collected from
intrusion experiments using undergraduate students at Chalmers University in
Sweden. The results of the experiment indicated that typical attacker behaviour
is comprised of three phases: the learning phase, the standard attack phase and
the innovative attack phase. The authors also found that the probability for suc-
cessful attacks is small during the learning and innovative phases while the prob-
ability is considerably higher during the standard attack phase. For the standard
attack phase the probability for successful attacks was found to be exponentially
distributed.
In Madan et al. (2000) [75] the authors demonstrate an approach for quantifying
security attributes of software systems using stochastic modelling and Markov
theory. In this paper the authors consider security to be a QoS attribute and
interpret security as preserving the condentiality and integrity of data and the
avoidance of denial of service attacks. The authors model the combination of
attacker behaviour and the response from the system to the attack as a random
process using stochastic modelling techniques. The stochastic model is used to
analyse and quantify the security attributes of the system, such as the Mean
E¤ort to Security Failure and Mean Time to Security Failure as rst introduced
in [74]. The authors argue that qualitative evaluation of security is no longer
acceptable and that it is necessary to quantify security in order to meet contracted
levels of security. Furthermore, the authors compare intrusion tolerance with
fault tolerance and pinpoints that it can be assumed that once a system has
been subjected to a security attack an intrusion tolerant system responds to this
security threat in a manner similar to the actions initiated by a fault tolerant
system. Such situations can be modelled using the stochastic modelling techniques
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Markov chains and semi-Markov processes. However, the authors did not look into
the problem of state explosion and how to handle this issue in practice.
In Wang et al. (2003) [104] the state transition approach described in [75] is
extended. The paper points to the weakness of Markov models by discussing
the di¢ culty of capturing details of real architectures in a manually constructed
Markov model. The authors advocate the use of higher level formalism and make
use of Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) to model the behaviour of an intrusion tolerant
system for quantifying security attributes. The SPN model is then parameterised
and transferred into a continuous-time Markov chain. This model contains the
behaviour of two main entities: the attacker behaviour and the response from the
system to an attack. As in [75] security is considered a QoS attribute. The model
also handles simultaneously co-existence of several vulnerabilities in a system.
The example system used to demonstrate the approach both in [104] and [75] is
the SITAR intrusion tolerance system.
In Singh et al. (2003) [92] the authors describe an approach for probabilistic
validation of an intrusion-tolerant system. Here, the authors use a hierarchical
stochastic activity net (SAN) model to validate intrusion tolerant systems and
to evaluate the merits of several security design choices. The proposed model is
composed of sub-models of management algorithms, replicas and hosts where the
hosts are structured into application domains of di¤erent sizes. The management
sub-model controls the initiation of new replicas and the removal of host and
even whole domains. Issues discussed in the paper are the number of hosts that
can be handled by a domain and how to manage a corrupted host. The intrusion-
tolerant system includes an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect corrupted
hosts. However, as for IDS intrusion-tolerant systems are subject to the problem
of false positives.
The above described work represents state of the art in quantifying operational
security. The AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis benets from these
pieces of work and have incorporated the notion of operational security level
both in the structure and in the set of variables in the trade-o¤ analysis and
associated trade-o¤ tool. Details are in Part 4.

7. Subjective Expert Judgment
Uncertainty is what is removed by becoming certain and certainty is achieved
through a series of consistent observations. In subjective interpretation of prob-
ability uncertainty expresses the degree of belief of a particular subject. For ex-
ample, expert i believes that the number of DoS attacks per month for a .NET
e-commerce system is between 2 and 20 and the most likely around 10. To fur-
ther specify the uncertainty condence intervals and ner granulated uncertainty
functions can be used. However, this is only allowed in the Bayesian interpreta-
tion of probability and not in the truly subjective interpretation, which is used
in this work.
Probability becomes purely subjective when a true value does not exist (it has not
yet or cannot be observed directly). In such cases the focus is put on observable
values that are unknown at the time of the assessment but that can be observed
some time in the future. The future observable values are expressed as the sub-
jective estimate of what the expert thinks will be the outcome. This does not
refer to the actual value and is rather an expression of how uncertain the expert
is about what will be the actually outcome. Note that the expert provides his or
her opinion based on his or hers set of relevant experience, knowledge and rec-
ommendations provided by one or more external sources that the expert trusts.
How to measure trust and how to aggregate these three categories of information
in the context of this work is discussed in Part 5 and demonstrated in Part 6 of
this thesis.
An experts uncertainty is described by a subjective probability distribution for
uncertain quantities with values in a continuous range. The Triangular distribu-
tion is the most commonly used distribution for modelling expert opinions [102].
This is dened by its minimum value (a), most likely value (b) and maximum
value (c). Ideally, any probability distribution should be available to the experts
when expressing their belief. However, experience has shown that simple proba-
bility distributions are more tractable and even more importantly understandable
for the experts. The latter is important as it has been observed that poor perfor-
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1. System OK 2. System Degraded 3. System NOT OK
Fig. 7.1. Example case description using a state transition diagram
mances by experts are often not due to lack of expertise but rather to the lack of
training in subjective probability assessment [38, 17].
When expert judgments are cast in the shape of distributions of uncertain quan-
tities the issue of conditional dependence is important. Quantied uncertainty in
an uncertainty analysis is always conditional upon something and it is essential
to make clear the conditional background information. This is the role of the
case structure, which describes the areas of interest or problem that the experts
are to assess. The case structure both describes the problem in question and is
used to derive the questionnaire for the elicitation variables in subjective expert
judgments. These variables are essential in the expert opinion aggregation and
discussed, along with the questionnaire, further in Section 7.1.
Gossens et al. (2000) [38], Cooke and Gossens (2000) [17] and Øien and Hokstad
(1998) [79] describe the procedure guides for structured expert judgment elicita-
tion. The main structure of such procedures is usually a variant of the following
three steps: (1) Preparation for elicitation, which includes identifying and select-
ing experts and describe the area of interest. (2) Elicitation, which is the actual
collection of expert judgments. (3) Post-elicitation, which includes among other
things the aggregation and analysis of expert opinions. In the following a brief
example of the techniques for the three steps is given. Further details and specic
expert elicitation techniques can be found in the above references.
Figure 7.1 shows an example case description. Here, the problem to that the
experts shall assess (area of interest) is modelled in terms of three states expressed
in a state transition diagram. The three states are: (1) System OK, (2) System
degraded and (3) System NOT OK. State 1 denotes all situations where the
system is operating according to specications. State 2; system degraded, includes
all situations where the system is under attack and is usually modelled more nely
granulated. State 3 models the situation of a successful attack, meaning that the
system has been compromised.
Example of information of interest for this case description is the probability of a
system to be in the degraded and NOT OK state; states 2 and 3 respectively. The
Triang(a,b,c) distribution is used to elicit expert judgments and the questionnaire
derived from the case description are:
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Probability of being in state 1
a. What is the minimum probability that the system is in state 1?
b. What is the most likely probability that the system is in state 1?
c. What is the maximum probability that the system is in state 1?
Probability of being in state 2
a. What is the minimum probability that the system is in state 2?
b. What is the most likely probability that the system is in state 2?
c. What is the maximum probability that the system is in state 2?
Probability of being in state 3
a. What is the minimum probability that the system is in state 3?
b. What is the most likely probability that the system is in state 3?
c. What is the maximum probability that the system is in state 3?
Expert elicitation targeting estimation of the cost associated with the di¤erent
states would give the following questionnaire:
Cost related to state 1
a. What is the minimum cost of being in state 1?
b. What is the most likely cost of being in state 1?
c. What is the maximum cost of being in state 1?
Cost related to state 2
a. What is the minimum cost of being in state 2?
b. What is the most likely cost of being in state 2?
c. What is the maximum cost of being in state 2?
Cost related to state 3
a. What is the minimum cost of being in state 3?
b. What is the most likely cost of being in state 3?
c. What is the maximum cost of being in state 3?
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Table 7.1. Answer table for Question 1 in the questionnaire for Expert i
Question 1
Expert i Triang(a,b,c) x f(x)
Min (a)
Most likely (b)
Max (c)
Both the questionnaire for probability and cost elicitation can be tailored to
a particular undesired event called misuse in this work or security mechanism
or control called security solution in this work. This makes it possible to aid
the choice of security solution for a particular conguration of the information
system, called ToE in the Common Criteria, and provides information that can
be used to support the choice of security solution. The latter is the objective of
this work and have been materialised in the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis and trade-o¤ tool described in Part 4. Details of decision-support for the
choice of security solution is given in Parts 3 and 4 of this work, Houmb et al.
(2005) [44] enclosed as Appendix B.3 and Houmb et al. (2006) [48] enclosed as
Appendix B.2.
The Triang distribution is given as Triang(a,b,c) where a=minimum, b=most
likely and c=maximum, with the probability density function f(x) = 2(x a)(b a)(c a) in
the interval [a; c]. Table 7.1 shows an example answer table for Question number 1
in the above questionnaire for Expert number i. In expert elicitation such a table
is lled out for each combination of question and expert and the probability
density function (pdf) is calculated to derive the shape of the distribution.
Figure 7.2 shows an example Triang(a,b,c) distribution for Question 1 in the
questionnaire for three experts. As can be seen in this gure the result from the
expert elicitation is widely distributed and there seems to be little consensus
between the experts. Some common reasons for such situations is that the area
of interest are new and little explored, that one or more of the experts do not
have a su¢ cient amount of relevant knowledge and experience in the area or
that one or more of the experts did not understand the statistical implications of
their answers. The last can be treated by adding feedback meetings to the expert
elicitation process. In these meetings the risk analyst interprets the contextual
meaning of the answers from all the experts and gives each expert feedback on
the contextual implications of his or her opinions. The risk analyst also often
presents an overview of the answers given by all involved experts. Then, based
on the feedback given and the overview of information provided by the other
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Fig. 7.2. Example of Triang(a,b,c) distribution for three experts
involved experts each expert is given the ability to adjust their answers such that
it better reects their actual belief.
The example in Figure 7.2 shows that it is of vital importance to calibrate the ex-
perts in expert elicitation. This is done using empirical control, such as that incor-
porated in rational consensus described by Cooke and Goossens (2000) [17]. When
performing empirical control it is important to reect on the concept of when a
problem is actually an expert judgment problem. Expert judgments should not
be used for problems that are physically measurable or for problems that have no
answers, such as meta-physical problems. A problem is suited for expert judgment
if there is relevant scientic expertise. This entails the existence of theories and
measurements relevant to the area of interest but where the quantities themselves
cannot be measured in practice.
For an expert judgment problem there will usually be relevant experiments that in
principle can be used to enable empirical control. However, such experiments will
most often not be performed because of lack of resources or strict time constraints.
This does not mean that information cannot be elicited, just that it is too costly
and time demanding to perform the experiments. In such cases empirical control
is achieved based on prior relevant experience where the analyst reasons about the
soundness of the results from the expert elicitation by comparing the experts with
each other taking their knowledge and experience into mind and by comparing the
results with whatever observable information that is available. Empirical control
can also be obtained by looking into the degree of consensus of the information
elicited from the sets of experts involved. If the consensus is low a new expert
elicitation should be performed. Additionally, empirical control can be executed
using robustness and discrepancy analysis on the expert elicitation results as
described in Goossens, Cooke and Kraan (1998) [37].
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There are three additional factors that must be taken care of during elicitation of
expert judgment and these are scrutability, neutrality and fairness. Scrutability
or accountability is of great importance and means that all data including details
of the experts and the tools used must be open to peer review and that the re-
sults must be reproducible by competent reviewers. Neutrality is also important.
This means that all elicitation and evaluation methods must be constructed such
that they encourage experts to state their true opinions. Underestimation and
overestimation should be taken into account in relation to neutrality. Underesti-
mation means that the expert has little condence in his or her experience and
knowledge and consequently gives pessimistic information. Overestimation is the
opposite and means that the expert has great condence in his or her expertise
and knowledge and consequently provides optimistic information. Additionally,
there is the issue of disregarding known and important information when assess-
ing the problem area as discussed in Kirkebøen (1999) [71]. Fairness means that
experts should not be prejudged prior to processing the results of their assess-
ment.
7.1 Aggregation techniques for combining expert opinions
After the elicitation of expert judgment the results are examined in order to
decide on a suitable expert judgment aggregation technique. This is step 3 in
the structured expert judgment elicitation described above. This decision can
be aided by the use of robustness and discrepancy analysis as shown in Figure
7.3. Robustness and discrepancy analysis is performed to assess the robustness of
the combined result from the expert judgment, to examine the consensus among
the experts and to examine whether some of the expert opinions are of greater
importance than others
Robustness and discrepancy analysis can be done on both the expert judgment
and on the calibration variables. Such an analysis is performed by removing ex-
pert judgments or calibration variables from the data set one at the time and
then recalculate the result to account for the relative information loss that the
information removal has on the original result. Calibration variables in subjec-
tive expert judgments are the variables that are used to derive the appropriate
expert opinion weighting scheme. These variables serve a threefold purpose in
expert elicitation (modied from Goossens, Cooke and Kraan (1998) [37]): (1) To
quantify expertsperformance as subjective assessors. (2) To enable performance-
optimised combinations of expert distributions. (3) To evaluate and validate the
aggregation of expert judgments.
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Fig. 7.3. Robustness analysis used to derive the weighting schema
Generally, there are two main types of expert aggregation techniques: (1) Equal
weighted combination and (2) Performance-based weighted combination. The lat-
ter includes a wide variety of weighting schemas but the easiest way to aggregate
expert judgments is the equal weighted combination. However, experience has
shown that performance-based weighting schemas generally outperform the equal
weighting schema [17]. The main reason for this is that experts as a group often
show poor performance due to group dynamic problems [17]. Another observa-
tion made during expert elicitation by Cooke and Gossens (2000) [17] is that a
structured combination of expert judgment may show satisfactory performance
even though the experts individually perform poorly. The main reason for this
is because performance-based weighting schema will assign low weights to these
experts to counter for their poor performance.
The trust-based information aggregation schema described in Part 5 of this work
is a performance weighting schema for aggregating disparate information as input
to the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and trade-o¤ tool described
in Part 4.

8. Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN)
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) has proven to be a powerful technique for rea-
soning under uncertainty and have successfully been applied when assessing the
safety of systems as discussed in [21], [23], [29], [91] and [30]. The rst major
contribution to this paradigm of uncertainty modelling was by Pearl (1988) [83]
and Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988) [73].
Today, BBN is used to aid decision makers in domains such as medicine, software,
mechanical industry, economy and military. In the medical domain BBN is used
for supporting decisions in the diagnosis of muscle and nerve diseases, in antibi-
otic treatment systems and in diabetes advisory systems. In the software domain
BBN is used to aid in software debugging, printer troubleshooting, safety and
risk evaluation of complex systems and for the help facilities in Microsoft O¢ ce
products. In the mechanical industry BBN is used to aid diagnosis and repair
of on-board unmanned underwater vehicles, in systems for control of centrifugal
pumps and in systems for process control in wastewater purication. In the -
nancial domain BBN is used to aid credit application evaluation and portfolio
risk and return analysis and in the military domain BBN is used in the NATO
Airborne Early Warning system.
A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN), also called Bayesian Network (BN) or belief
network, is tailored to model situations involving uncertainty. Several circum-
stances can give rise to this uncertainty. When choosing between alternative se-
curity solutions, which is the objective of this work, uncertainty involves a wide
variety of factors, such as incomplete understanding of a security problem or the
behaviour of a software system and its security (system) environment, incomplete
knowledge of the e¤ect of a security incident or the inherent vulnerabilities of the
system, inconsistent information on the behaviour of the system or the e¤ect that
some security solution (security mechanism, process, procedure etc.) has on the
system behaviour or any combination of the above.
In the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis described in Part 4 and in
the trust-based information aggregation schema described in Part 5 there are
several types of information sources with variable levels of trustworthiness in-
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volved. These information sources are critical in the AORDD framework, which
is the security solution decision support approach developed in this work. In the
AORDD framework each information source provides qualitative and/or quanti-
tative information on the uncertain circumstances of future potential misuses and
the e¤ect that alternative security solutions may have on these misuses. With-
out such information it is di¢ cult to identify the best-tted security solution
among alternatives. However, combining disparate information and aggregating
uncertainty is a rather challenging task as there are multi-dimensional dependen-
cies involved. The latter makes BBN an excellent implementation language for
the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and the trust-based information
aggregation schema described in Parts 4 and 5 of this work.
The problematic part of modelling uncertainty is that the outcome of an event is
dependent on many factors and on the outcome of other events. Hence, there are
complex dependency relationships that need to be accounted for. This is handled
by the underlying computation model of BBN, which is based on Bayes rule and
rst introduced as a methodology for modelling problems involving uncertainty
in the late 1980s. Bayes rule calculates conditional probabilities and given the
two variables X and Y the probability P for the variable X given the variable
Y can be calculated from: P (XjY ) = P (Y jX)  P (X)=P (Y ). By allowing Xi to
be a complete set of mutually exclusive instances Bayes formula can be extended
to calculate the conditional probability of Xi given Y . The latter form the basic
for computation engines in BBN tools, such as the HUGIN tool [50] used to
implement the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and the trust-based
information aggregation schema described in Parts 4 and 5 of this work. Details
on Bayes rule is available at the Serene website [91] and in Vose (2000) [102] or
similar textbooks on probability theory.
When modelling a problem or the variables involved in a case description, as
described in Chapter 7, BBN is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
together with an associated set of probability tables. A DAG consists of nodes
representing the variables involved and arcs representing the dependencies be-
tween these variables. Nodes are dened as stochastic or decision variables and
multiple variables are often used to determine the state of a node. Each state
of each node is expressed using probability density functions (pdf). Probability
density expresses the condence in the various outcomes of the set of variables
connected to a node and depends conditionally on the status of the parent nodes
at the incoming edges. This ts well with what is needed to model expert opinions
as described in Chapter 7.
There are three types of nodes in a DAG: (1) Target node(s), (2) Intermediate
nodes and (3) Observable nodes. Target nodes are nodes about which the objec-
tive of the network is to make an assessment (the question that needs an answer).
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Firewall
down
ftp fork attack Virus attack
Fig. 8.1. Example BBN for rewall down
An example of such a node is the node Firewall downas shown in the exam-
ple BBN in Figure 8.1. Intermediate nodes represent variables that connect the
observable nodes with the target nodes. These nodes usually represent events or
similar factors which there exist limited information or beliefs on. The associated
variables are hidden variables. Typically hidden variables represent issues or per-
spectives that increase or decrease the belief in the target node. Observable nodes
are nodes that represent events where evidence or information on these events
can be directly observed or obtained in other ways.
In the example BBN there are no intermediate nodes and two observable nodes,
namely ftp fork attackand Virus attack. The directed arcs between the nodes
denote the causal relationship between the underlying variables. Evidence or in-
formation is thus entered at the observable nodes and propagated through the
network using these causal relationships and a propagation algorithm based on
the underlying computational model of BBN.
As described above the nodes represent stochastic or decision variables. Further-
more, a variable can be either discrete or continuous. For example, the target
node of the example BBN in Figure 8.1 is Firewall down. This node is a discrete
variable with the two associated values trueand false. The arcs in the example
BBN represent causal relationships between the observable nodes and the target
node. Suppose that the associated variable with the observable node ftp fork
attackalso is discrete with values trueand false. Since the rewall being down
can cause an ftp fork attackthe relationship between the two variables is mod-
elled as a directed arc from the node Firewall downto the node ftp fork attack
where the direction of the arc represents the causal direction of the relationship.
In the example BBN in Figure 8.1 this means that the rewall is downdoes
not imply that an ftp fork attackwill denitely happen but that there is an
increased probability that this attack will occur. In a BBN this causal relation is
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Table 8.1. Node probability table for ftp fork attack
Firewall down True False
ftp fork attack
True 0.8 0.1
False 0.2 0.9
model in the probability table for each node. For the node ftp fork attackthe
probability table (also called the Node Probability Table or NPT) might look like
that of Table 8.1.
The example NPT represents the conditional probability of the variable ftp fork
attackgiven the variable Firewall down; P (ftp fork attackjFirewall down).
The possible values (true or false) for ftp fork attack are shown in the rst
column. Note that there is a probability for each combination of events (four in
this case) although the rules of probability mean that some of this information
is redundant. There might be several ways of determining the probabilities in an
NPT such as that in the NPT above where the probabilities are based on pre-
viously observed frequencies of times when the Firewall is down. Alternatively,
if no such statistical data are available subjective probabilities estimated by ex-
perts can be used. The strength of BBN is that they can accommodate subjective
probabilities and probabilities based on empirical data. As limited empirical in-
formation is available for choosing among alternative security solutions this is a
most desirable feature in this work.
The BBN method is applied whenever using BBN as a decision making tool. The
application of the BBN method consists of three main tasks:
 Construction of the BBN topology
 Elicitation of probabilities to nodes and edges
 Making computations
Construction of the BBN topology where a BBN topology is a hierarchy of DAGs
linked together, is done by examining the variables involved and their relation-
ships and by modelling these explicitly as nodes and arches in a hierarchy of
DAGs. Elicitation of probabilities to nodes and edges involves the collection and
aggregation of evidence/information, such as elicitation of expert opinions as de-
scribed in Chapter 7. The probabilistic relationship between the nodes in a DAG
is described using node probability tables (NPT) where variables can be indepen-
dent or dependent. Examples of independent variables are observable nodes that
are d-separated from all other nodes in the topology. Details on d-separation is
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found in Jensen (1996) [59]. Collecting evidence for the observable nodes in a BBN
topology may not be straightforward. This problem was discussed in Chapter 7
and will be discussed further in Parts 4 and 5 of this work.
Making computation means propagating information and evidence entered into
the observable nodes of the BBN topology. These pieces of information is propa-
gated to the target node of the topology through the intermediate nodes. Prop-
agation is done by updating the conditional probabilities on the edges of the
topology taking the new evidence into consideration. There exist e¤ective algo-
rithms used for evidence propagation, such as Bayesian evidence propagation and
the HUGIN propagation algorithm. Details are in Jensen (1996) [59].
For more information on BBN and in particular the highly relevant work on
application of BBN for software safety assessment the reader is referred to Gran
(2002) [40] and the SERENE project (http://www.hugin.dk/serene/) [91].

9. Architecture/Design trade-o¤ analysis
The two most commonly used software architectural trade-o¤ analysis methods
are the Architecture Trade-o¤Analysis Method (ATAM) [70] and the Cost Benet
Analysis Method (CBAM) [69]. Both ATAM and CBAM were developed by the
Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon. There are also several
other methods available that build on parts of these two methods. However, in
this work the focus is put on ATAM and CBAM as representatives of relevant
trade-o¤ analysis for the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis.
9.1 Architecture Trade-o¤Analysis Method (ATAM)
ATAM focuses on providing insight into how quality goals interact with and
trade-o¤ against each other. ATAM consists of a set of steps that aids in the elic-
iting of quality requirements along multiple dimensions, in analysing the e¤ects
of each requirement in isolation and in understanding the interactions of these
requirements. The result of an ATAM is a set of potential architectural decisions
and a description of how these decisions are linked to business goals and desired
quality attributes of the future or existing system.
There are four phases in ATAM: (1) Presentation, (2) Investigation and Analysis,
(3) Testing and (4) Reporting. In the presentation phase the context and goals
of the particular trade-o¤ context is presented and an introduction to ATAM as
a method is given. In the investigation and analysis phase the current situation
is examined and potential architectural approaches are identied and evaluated
by looking at their associated quality attributes. In the testing phase the ar-
chitectural approaches are analysed in more detail and the associated scenarios
are identied and prioritised. In the reporting phase the result from the three
previous phases are packaged and presented to the appropriate stakeholders and
decision makers. An overview of the four phases and their associated steps are
given below.
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1. Presentation
 Present ATAM. In this step the evaluation leader gives a brief introduction
to ATAM to the assembled participants by focusing on establishing a com-
mon set of expectations and by answering questions from the participants.
 Present business drivers. In this step a project spokesperson (ideally the
project manager or future/current consumer(s)) describes the business
goals that motivate the development e¤ort and hence the primary archi-
tectural drivers, such as high availability, time to market or high security.
 Present architecture. In this step the architect describes the current archi-
tecture of the system by focusing on how it addresses the business drivers.
2. Investigation and Analysis
 Identify architectural approaches. In this step the architect identies and
describes alternative architectural approaches. Note that the architectural
approaches are not analysed at this point.
 Generate quality attribute utility tree. In this step the quality factors that
comprise system utility, such as performance, availability, security, mod-
iability, usability, etc., are elicited and specied as scenarios annotated
with stimuli and responses and then prioritised. These pieces of informa-
tion are modelled in a utility tree, which is a hierarchic model of the driving
architectural requirements.
 Analyse architectural approaches. In this step the architectural approaches
that address the involved quality factors are elicited and analysed (e.g. an
architectural approach aimed at meeting performance goals will be sub-
jected to a performance analysis) based on the high-priority factors iden-
tied in the previous step. During this step the architectural risks, the
sensitivity points and the trade-o¤ points are also identied.
3. Testing
 Brainstorm and prioritise scenarios. In this step a larger set of scenar-
ios for each architectural approach is elicited in an brainstorming session
preferably involving the entire group of stakeholders. This set of scenarios
is then prioritised using a voting process involving the entire stakeholder
group.
 Analyse architectural approaches. This step reiterates the analysis of the ar-
chitectural approaches step from the investigation and analysis activity for
the group of highly ranked scenarios identied in the previous step. These
scenarios are considered to be test cases and the analysis may uncover
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additional architectural approaches, risks, sensitivity points and trade-o¤
points.
4. Reporting
 Present results. In this step the results and collected information from the
previous steps of ATAM (approaches, scenarios, attribute-specic ques-
tions, the utility tree, risks, non-risks, sensitivity points and trade o¤s) are
collected and put into an easily understandable format to be presented to
the decision maker or similar.
9.2 Cost Benet Analysis Method (CBAM)
CBAM is an extension of ATAM that takes both the architectural and the eco-
nomic implications of decisions into consideration when evaluating alternative
architectures. CBAM focuses on how an organisation should invest its resources
to maximise gains and minimise risks and o¤ers a set of techniques for assessing
the uncertainty of the judgments involved in assessing costs and benets for each
alternative architecture.
CBAM begins where ATAM concludes and depends on the artefacts produced by
ATAM. ATAM uncovers the architectural decisions made and links these to busi-
ness goals and quality attribute response measures. CBAM builds on these pieces
of information by eliciting the costs and benets associated with the decisions.
As the architectural solutions have both technical and economic implications the
business goals of a software system should inuence the architectural solution
used by software architects or designers. The technical implications are the char-
acteristics of the software system (namely the quality attributes) while the direct
nancial implications are the cost of implementing the system. However, the
quality attributes also have nancial implications as the benets are measured as
nancial return on investment derived from the system.
When the ATAM is applied to a software system the result is a set of documented
artefacts. These are the following:
 A description of the business goals that are critical for the success of the system.
 A set of architectural views that document the existing or proposed architec-
tures.
 A utility tree that represents a decomposition of the quality goals of the stake-
holders for each architecture that starts with high-level statements of quality
attributes and ends with specic scenarios.
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 A set of architectural risks that have been identied.
 A set of sensitivity points, which are architectural decisions that a¤ect some
quality attribute measure of concern.
 A set of trade-o¤ points, which are architectural decisions that either positively
or negatively a¤ect more than one quality attribute measure.
ATAM also identies the set of key architectural decisions that are relevant to the
quality attribute scenarios elicited from the stakeholders. These decisions result
in specic quality attribute responses, such as levels of availability, performance,
security, usability and modiability. Each decision also has associated costs. This
means that using redundant hardware to achieve a desired level of availability has
one cost and check-pointing to a disk le has another cost. Furthermore, both
architectural solutions will result in (presumably di¤erent) measurable levels of
availability. It is these nancial considerations that CBAM addresses.
CBAM is performed in two iterations: (1) Establish an initial ranking and (2)
Incorporating uncertainty. An overview of the two iterations of CBAM is given
below.
Iteration I: Establish an initial ranking
In the rst iteration of CBAM a series of 9 steps are executed to establish an
initial ranking of the result from ATAM. This intial ranking is later rened in the
second iteration of CBAM. These steps serve to reduce the size of the decision
space, rene the scenarios, collect su¢ cient information for decision making and
to establish an initial ranking of architectural strategies derived using ATAM.
Step 1: Collate scenarios. This step collates the scenarios elicited during the
ATAM exercise and asks stakeholders to contribute with new scenarios if such
exist. Then the scenarios are prioritised in relation to satisfying the business goals
of the system and the top one-third of the scenarios are chosen for further study.
Step 2: Rene scenarios. This step renes the scenarios from Step 1 by focusing on
their stimulus/response measures. Then for each scenario the worst, current, de-
sired and best-case quality attribute response level is identied and documented.
Step 3: Prioritise scenarios. In this step 100 votes are allocated to each stake-
holder and each of these are asked to distribute the votes among the scenarios
by considering the desired response value for each scenario. The votes are then
summed and the top 50% of the scenarios are chosen for further analysis. This is
done by assigning a weight of 1.0 to the highest rated scenario and then rating
the other scenarios in relation to this scenario. The result of this voting is the
scenario weights used to calculate the overall benet of an architectural solution.
9.2 Cost Benet Analysis Method (CBAM) 73
Step 4: Assign utility. In this step the utility for each quality attribute response
level (worst-case, current, desired or best-case) is assigned to all scenarios. The
quality attributes of concern in this context are those identied in the previous
step.
Step 5: Develop architectural strategies for scenarios and determine their expected
quality attribute response levels. In this step the architectural strategies address-
ing the top 50% from Step 3 is developed further to determine the expected
quality attribute response levels that will result from implementing the di¤erent
architectural strategies. Given that an architectural strategy may a¤ect multiple
scenarios, this calculation must be performed for each a¤ected scenario.
Step 6: Determine the utility of the expected quality attribute response level by
interpolation. In this step the elicited utility values is used to determine the utility
of the expected quality attribute response level. The calculation is performed for
each a¤ected scenario.
Step 7: Calculate the total benet obtained from an architectural strategy. In this
step the utility value of the current level is subtracted from the expected
level and normalised using the votes from Step 3. Then the benet of a partic-
ular architectural strategy is summed over all scenarios and all relevant quality
attributes.
Step 8: Choose architectural strategies based on Return On Investment (ROI)
subject to cost and schedule constraints. In this step the cost and schedule im-
plications of each architectural strategy is determined. Then the ROI value for
all remaining architectural strategies are calculated as a ratio of benet to cost
and ranked according to their ROI values. These architectural strategies are then
selected from the top of the rank list and down until the budget or schedule is
exhausted.
Step 9: Conrm the results with intuition. In this step the chosen architectural
strategies are evaluated to examine if they seem to align with the business goals
of the organisation. If that is not the case, issues that may have been overlooked
during the analysis should be taken into consideration and reiteration of some
of the previous steps might be necessary. If signicant issues exist it might be
necessary to reiterative all nine steps.
Iteration II: Incorporating uncertainty
A more sophisticated and realistic version of CBAM are achieved by expanding
on the steps of CBAM iteration 1. This is done by incorporating uncertainty.
This version of CBAM is covered by iteration 2 of CBAM. When incorporating
uncertainty information about risk estimation and uncertainty and the alloca-
tion of development resources are added into the result from iteration 1. Each
category of relevant information may potentially a¤ect the investment decisions
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under consideration. Therefore, the way each of the nine steps of iteration 1 is
augmented must be considered carefully for correctness and for practicality.
The stakeholder weights in iteration 2 of CBAM are assigned by voting using
utility scores. Utility is measured as the relationship between a score and the
best score possible, which is usually set to equal 100%. Utility scores are then
assigned to each architectural scenario from iteration 1 given in terms of worst
case, current, desired and best. Utility scores are given to both scenarios and
architectural strategies. To eliminate and prioritise scenarios the stakeholders vote
individually or together and the total sum of votes for all scenarios is normalised
over 100%. This is to force the stakeholders to prioritise among the alternatives
and to avoid them giving votes to an architectural strategy independent of the
other architectural strategies involved.
The AORDD security solution design trade-o¤ analysis described in Part 4 is
a security specic design trade-o¤ analysis. This trade-o¤ analysis incorporates
ideas from both ATAM and CBAM but is extended to include security solution
and misuse-specic parameters in addition to the economic implications from
CBAM and other relevant development, project and nancial perspectives as
input to the trade-o¤ analysis. The analysis is also extended to incorporate the
notion of operational security level, as discussed in Littlewood et al. (1993) [74],
to evaluate the operational security level of an information system.
Part III
Security Solution Decision Support Framework

10. The Aspect-Oriented Risk Driven
Development (AORDD) Framework
The security solution decision support approach developed in this work is
called the Aspect Oriented Risk Driven Development (AORDD) framework. The
AORDD framework combines the risk driven development (RDD) work of the
CORAS project with the aspect-oriented modelling (AOM) work of the AOM
group at Colorado State University (CSU) (see http://www.cs.colostate.edu/
~france/#Projects). The framework benet from techniques in ATAM, CBAM,
subjective expert judgment, security assessment and management, the Common
Criteria, operational measures of security and BBN and is tailored for aiding
decision makers or designers and the like in choosing the best-tted security so-
lution or set of security solutions among alternatives. The context of this work
is security solution decisions for information systems in general and e-commerce
systems in particular.
Figure 10.1 illustrates the AORDD framework and its seven components which
are:
1. An iterative AORDD process.
2. Security solution aspect repository.
3. Estimation repository to store experience from estimation of security risks
and security solution variables involved in the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology
of component 5.
4. RDD annotation rules for security risk and security solution variable estima-
tion.
5. The AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and trade-o¤ tool BBN
topology.
6. Rule set for how to transfer RDD information from the annotated UML
diagrams into the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology.
7. Trust-based information aggregation schema to aggregate disparate informa-
tion in the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology.
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Fig. 10.1. The seven components of the AORDD framework
The main components of the AORDD framework are component 5: the AORDD
security solution trade-o¤ analysis and component 7; the trust-based information
aggregation schema. The ve other components in the framework are supportive
components for component 5 and 7. This means that they either provide the
underlying process or techniques necessary to support the identication of the
best-tted security solution among alternative security solutions, which is the
task of components 5 and 7.
What is important to note for the AORDD framework is that it can be used in
all phases of the life-cycle of a system and that it is a general security solution
decision support framework. The latter means that the approach in principle is
applicable for all types of information systems. However, as mentioned earlier
this work has only looked into the use of the AORDD framework for supporting
security solution decisions in e-commerce systems where the focus has been on
the design phase of a development. Details are in Part 6 of this thesis.
Security solution decisions in the design phase of a development are called security
design decisions. In such decisions separation of concerns is important to distin-
guish between the alternative security solutions so that they can be evaluated
against each other. In the AORDD framework separation of concern is supported
by the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis by a¢ liating AOM techniques
in combination with RDD techniques. AOM techniques o¤er the ability to sep-
arate security solutions to security problems and challenges of an information
system from the core functionality of the information system. AOM achieves this
by modelling each alternative security solution as an separate and independent
security solution aspects and by gathering the core functionality of the system in
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what is called the primary model. This clear separation makes it possible to eval-
uate one security solution at a time and to observe in practice how the di¤erent
alternatives a¤ect the core functionality of the system. For this to be e¤ective in
practice e¤ective and tool-supported composition techniques, security verication
and composition analysis is necessary.
The AORDD framework makes use of the AOM technique developed at CSU,
which includes composition techniques and to some extent tool-support for com-
posing security solution aspects with the core functionality of an information
system modelled in the primary model. The security verication approach used
in the AORDD framework is the UMLsec approach developed by Jürjens (2005)
[67]. The UMLsec approach is tool-supported and proven to be fairly e¤ective
and accurate. Details are in [67]. It should be noted however that thus fare the
AORDD framework has only used the UMLsec approach to verify the security
attributes of the security solution aspects and not the nal composed model.
Techniques for analysing the composed model to check that no security design
aws arise as a result of the composition and that the resulting model preserve
the security attributes of the security solution has not been explored to much
extent thus far. The latter is on-going work and the initial ideas are described in
Georg, Houmb and Ray (2006) [35].
Information on AOM and AOM techniques can be found in [33, 34, 98] and
the references therein. Additionally, Houmb et al. (2006) [48] in Appendix B.2
provides a brief introduction to AOM and describes the role of AOM in the
AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis. Details on the AORDD framework
and its components are in Houmb and Georg (2005) [42], Appendix B.1. Houmb
et al. (2006) [48] in Appendix B.2 gives an overview of a specialised version of
the AORDD framework called the Integrated Security Verication and Security
Solution Design Trade-O¤ Analysis (SVDT) approach.

11. The AORDD Process
The underlying methodology of the AORDD framework is the AORDD process.
The AORDD process [47] is based on the CORAS integrated system development
and risk management process [97], structured according to the phases of the
Rational Unied Process (RUP) [86] and the viewpoints of the Reference Model
for Open Distributed Processing (RM-ODP) [56]. As for the CORAS integrated
system development and risk management process, the whole or a part of an
information system congured into a ToE is designed, analysed and composed
according to a particular RM-ODP viewpoint in all iteration of the AORDD
process. (Note that the ToE is called Target of Assessment (ToA) in CORAS).
Hence, security assessment is an integrated activity of the development that drives
all iterations of the AORDD process. Security as a quality attribute of the ToE
is by this addressed as early as possible and hopefully at the right time for a
reasonable price. More information on how to integrate security assessment into
the development of an information system is given in Stølen et al. (2002) [97].
Rather than describing all perspectives of the AORDD process the following
description is focused on providing an overview of the AORDD process and to
explain how it di¤ers from the CORAS integrated system development and risk
management process. Readers are referred to Stølen et al. (2002) [97] for other
details.
The AORDD process di¤ers from the CORAS process in that it provides tech-
niques, syntax and some semantic for describing security solutions (called treat-
ment options in CORAS) as security solution aspects and for composing the
security aspects with a primary design model. This is then used as input to the
AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis in sub-process 5.
Modelling the security solutions as security solution aspects ease the task of de-
veloping and evaluating alternative security solutions in the risk treatment sub-
process (sub-process 5) of the CORAS risk management process, which is part
of the CORAS integrated system development and risk management process.
This also enhances software evolution and increases reusability. However, as the
CORAS risk management process and the underlying CORAS MBRA method-
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ology do not include guidelines for evaluating alternative security solutions and
identifying the most e¤ective set of security solutions for a security problem or
challenge, which is a critical success factor for cost-e¤ective development of secu-
rity critical information systems, these issues need to be addressed explicitly in
the AORDD process. Thus, the AORDD process provides activities, techniques
and guidelines that assist a decision maker, designer or the like in choosing from
alternative security solutions. The AORDD process also o¤ers guidelines on how
to estimate the involved variables in security solution decision support.
Figure 11.1 illustrates the iterative nature of the AORDD process while Figure
11.2 gives an overview of the activities involved in the requirement and design
phases. The AORDD process consists of a requirement phase, a design phase, im-
plementation phase, deployment phase and a maintenance phase. Development
spirals from requirements to maintenance and in each phase development ac-
tivities are structured into iterations. Work moves from one phase to the next
after rst iterating through several sub-phases that end with acceptable analysis
results.
It should be noted that the analysis activity in AORDD di¤ers from the assess-
ment activity, as shown in Figure 11.1. In the AORDD process assessing risks
concern identifying potential security problems and to identify and evaluate al-
ternative security solutions to solve the security problem or challenge while the
analyse activity refers to the verication and analysis of the composed models to
identify design aws. Details on the latter is in Georg, Houmb and Ray (2006)
[35].
As can be seen in Figure 11.1 each phase and all iterations in each phase includes
a security assessment activity. This security assessment activity is where the secu-
rity risks to a ToE (or information system) is identied and where the alternative
security solutions to solve the security risks are analysed. As described in Chap-
ter 5 security assessment is a specialisation of risk management for the security
domain that was adapted into a MBRA domain for security critical information
systems by the CORAS project. In the AORDD framework the risk assessment
process of CORAS has been augmented with activities to support and execute
the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis.
The activities of the security assessment step in the AORDD process is as fol-
lowing:
 Sub-process 1: Context identication
Activity 1.1: Identify purpose and scope of assessment
Activity 1.2: Describe the target of evaluation (ToE), business perspectives
and the security environment
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Fig. 11.2. Overview of the activities of the requirement and design phase of the AORDD
process
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Activity 1.3: Identify system stakeholders
Activity 1.4: Identify assets and have stakeholders assign values to assets
Activity 1.5: Describe the asset-stakeholder graph
Activity 1.6: Describe relevant security policies (SP)
Activity 1.7: Identify and describe the security risk acceptance criteria (SAC)
 Sub-process 2: Risk identication
Activity 2.1: Identify security threats to assets from the security environment
Activity 2.2: Identify vulnerabilities in ToE, security policies, security processes,
security procedures and the security environment
Activity 2.3: Document misuse scenarios and group misuses into misuse
groups
 Sub-process 3: Risk analysis
Activity 3.1: Estimate impact of misuse
Activity 3.2: Estimate frequency of misuse
 Sub-process 4: Risk evaluation
Activity 4.1: Determine level of risk for each set of impact and frequency
Activity 4.2: Evaluate risks against the security risk acceptance criteria
(SAC)
Activity 4.2: Categorise risks in need of treatment into risk themes
Activity 4.3: Determine interrelationships among risk themes
Activity 4.4: Identify conicts among risk themes
Activity 4.5: Prioritise risk themes and risks
Activity 4.6: Resolve identied conicts
 Sub-process 5: Risk treatment
Activity 5.1: Identify alternative security solutions and group these into se-
curity solution sets
Activity 5.2: Identify e¤ect and cost of all alternative security solutions
Activity 5.3: Model all security solutions as security solution aspects using
RDD modelling elements
Activity 5.4: Compose security aspects with primary model and compose
RDD information
11. The AORDD Process 85
Activity 5.5: Evaluate and nd the best-tted security solution or set of
security solutions using the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis
The main di¤erence from the activities of the CORAS security assessment process
is the renement of the activities in sub-process 1, the use of the concept misuse
rather than unwanted incident in sub-process 2, a clear separation of potential
conicts among risk themes and risks in sub-process 4 and a renement and
extension of the activities of sub-process 5. It is in sub-process 5 that the security
solution decision support is made explicit by use of the AORDD security solution
trade-o¤ analysis to support the choice of security solution or set of security
solutions among alternatives.
As can be seen in Figure 11.2 the security assessment step in the requirement spec-
ication phase is done using the functional and security requirements as the ToE.
The result of this activity is a set of unresolved security problems or challenges.
These problems are either solved in sub-process 5 of the respective iteration or
transformed into security requirements for the next iteration. In the design phase
the security risk assessment is done using the available design specication as
the ToE. Similar to the requirement phase the security problems or challenges
identied are either solved as a security solution design decision in sub-process
5 of the security assessment step of a particular iteration or transformed into
security requirements in the next iteration. This means that whenever new se-
curity requirements are introduced the relevant parts of the information system
goes through a new requirement security risk assessment before proceeding to the
next development phase.
Details on the AORDD process are in Houmb et al. (2004) [47]. Details on the
AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis are in Part 4, Houmb et al. (2006)
[48] in Appendix B.2 and Houmb et al. (2005) [44] in Appendix B.3. Details on
the AORDD framework are in Houmb and Georg (2005) [42], Appendix B.1.

Part IV
AORDD Security Solution Trade-O¤Analysis

12. The Role of Trade-O¤Analysis in Security
Decisions
In security assessment and management there are no single correct solution to
the identied security problems or challenges but rather choices and tradeo¤s.
The main reason for this is that information systems and in particular security
critical information systems must perform at the contracted or expected security
level, make e¤ective use of available resources, comply with standards and regula-
tion and meet end-usersexpectations. Balancing these needs while also fullling
development, project and nancial perspectives to an information system such as
budget and TTM constraints require decision makers, designers and the like to
evaluate alternative security solutions to their security problems or challenges.
As described in Chapter 10 (Part 3) choosing among alternative security solutions
is part of the risk treatment sub-process of the security assessment activity in the
AORDD process. The technique used to perform this activity is the AORDD
security solution trade-o¤ analysis. This analysis takes security, development,
project and nancial perspective into mind during its evaluation of how well a
particular security solution ts with the set of stakeholder and system goals and
expectations and the requirements posed upon an information system. This is
measured as a security solution tness score, but before discussing the details of
how to use the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis to derive this tness
score, it is important to clearly dene and explain the ascribed meaning to the
concepts trade-o¤ analysis and security solution in the context of the AORDD
framework. This is to enable reproducibility of this work.
Denition Trade-o¤ Analysis is making decisions when each choice has both
advantages and disadvantages. In a simple trade-o¤ it may be enough to list
each alternative and the pros and cons. For more complicated decisions, list
the decision criteria and weight them. Determine how each option rates on
each of the decision score and compute a weighted total score for each option.
The option with the best score is the preferred option. Decision trees may be
used when options have uncertain outcomes [101].
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Denition Security solution is any construct that increases the level of con-
dentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation,
and/or reliability of a ToE. Examples of security solutions are security re-
quirements, security protocols, security procedures, security processes and se-
curity mechanism, such as cryptographic algorithm and anti-virus software.
As can be seen by the above denitions trade-o¤ concerns decisions where there
are alternative solutions that all have both advantages and disadvantages in terms
of the goals involved. To aid such decisions it is necessary to measure the alter-
natives against each other by means of comparable relative weights derived using
a set of decision criteria. This means that the estimation techniques used must
produce comparable weights for the alternative security solutions.
Estimation techniques can be either qualitative or quantitative. In the context of
the AORDD framework these are used to measure the degree that a security solu-
tion addresses the set of decision criteria involved in a security solution decision.
For the security assessment activity in the AORDD process decision criteria are
called trade-o¤ parameters and includes security risk acceptance criteria, stan-
dards, policies, laws and regulation, priorities, business goals, TTM, budget, the
e¤ect that a security solution have on the security problem or challenge that it is
a solution to and the resources needed for employment and proper maintenance
of the security solution. Details are in Chapter 13.
The AORDD framework measures security in terms of the seven security at-
tributes condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-
repudiation and reliability. This means that the AORDD security solution trade-
o¤ analysis can use these seven security attributes to measure the decision score
for each of the decision variables mentioned above. When deriving the tness
score of a security solution using the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis
each of these decision scores are combined into a total decision score. This total
decision score measures the perceived level of fullment of the stakeholder and
system goals and expectations and the requirements posed upon an information
system for an security solution relative, to the other alternative security solutions.
Details are in Chapter 13.
However, as discussed in Chapter 5 there is usually a great deal of uncertainty
involved in security solution trade-o¤ analysis as little hard or empirical data
or evidence on the actual e¤ect and cost of a particular security solution exists.
There are many reasons for this, one being the instability of the security environ-
ment of an information system and that information systems tend to vary from
each other to such a degree that experience on one cannot directly be reused on
the other. Other sources of uncertainty in a security solution trade-o¤ context are
the lack of overview of the factors involved in the security solution decision and
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that new security solutions are introduced faster than their actual e¤ect in var-
ious situations are demonstrated. Thus, the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis needs to deal with disparate information and uncertainties.
Recall from Chapter 5 that uncertainty in this work is interpreted according
to the subjectivistic interpretation of probability. Note that uncertainty usually
cannot be completely dealt with, as this implies deriving at a state where there
is certain which security solution alternative is the better. Thus the goal of the
AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis is not to remove uncertainty, but
to derive at a state where there are clear indications that one or a few of the
alternative security solutions are better suited than others.

13. AORDD Security Solution Trade-O¤Analysis
The AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis is part of the risk driven devel-
opment (RDD) strategy in the AORDD framework. In this context RDD means
that identifying, analysing and evaluating security risks is the driving factor in
the development process. This RDD strategy is incorporated into the activities of
the AORDD process and used to decide whether to move from one development
iteration or phase to the next in the AORDD process. The role of the security
solution trade-o¤ analysis in the AORDD framework is to evaluate alternative
security solutions to the identied security risks in all iterations and phases of
the AORDD process. This refers to Activity 5.5; Evaluate and nd the best-tted
security solution or set of security solutions using the AORDD security solution
trade-o¤ analysis, of the security assessment activity of the AORDD process.
Details are in Chapter 11.
There are several ways to measure what is the ttest security solution amongst
alternatives. In the AORDD framework this is done using a tness score derived
from decision variables addressing the following high level perspectives: security
level and relevant development, project and nancial goals. This means that the
tness score is an expression of how well a security solution meets the contracted,
expected or required security level and the relevant development, project and
nancial perspectives for the ToE or the information system. The AORDD secu-
rity solution trade-o¤ analysis deals with this by separating the analysis into two
phases: (1) Evaluate security risks against the security risk acceptance criteria
and (2) Trade-o¤ alternative security solutions by means of relevant development,
project and nancial perspectives.
Figure 13.1 gives an overview of the groups of inputs and outputs of the two-
phase trade-o¤ analysis while Figure 13.2 shows the security assessment concepts
involved in the trade-o¤ analysis. There are also development, project and nan-
cial perspectives involved and these are represented by the trade-o¤ parameters
in Figure 13.1 and discussed in detail in Section 13.2.
The rst phase of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis is called risk-
driven analysis. The risk-driven analysis involves the evaluation of the set of
94 13. AORDD Security Solution Trade-O¤ Analysis
Risk-driven
analysis
Trade-off
analysis
best “fitted”security solution
or set of security solutions
trade-off parametersalternative security solutions
list of security risks in need of treatment
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Fig. 13.1. The two phases of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis
identied misuses and their associated risk levels, which are the result of sub-
processes 2, 3 and 4 of the AORDD process, against the relevant set of security
risk acceptance criteria, such as those identied in sub-process 1 of the AORDD
process. The result of this phase is a list of security risks in need of treatment.
This means that the risk-driven analysis covers sub-processes 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the
AORDD process, as described in Chapter 11.
The list of security risks in need of treatment, the set of alternative security so-
lutions and the trade-o¤ parameters which are the relevant development, project
and nancial perspectives involved, are the inputs to the second phase of the
AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis. Here, the security risks are the prob-
lems or challenges that need to be solved, the security solutions are the alternative
ways of solving the problems and the trade-o¤ parameters are the decision vari-
ables. The outputs from the second phase are the best-tted security solution or
set of security solutions. This means that Phase 2 is where the security solutions
are traded-o¤. This is done by deriving the relative tness score for each security
solution and then comparing these to identify the best-tted security solution or
set of security solutions. As for Phase 1 there are security assessment concepts
involved and these are shown in Figure 13.2. More details on both phases are
given in the following.
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Fig. 13.2. The security assessment concepts involved in Phase 1 and 2 of the AORDD
security solution trade-o¤ analysis
13.1 Phase 1: Risk-driven analysis
The activities in the risk-driven analysis are supported by standard vulnerability
assessment and vulnerability scans, other types of security analysis and stan-
dard risk assessment methods, such as those in the CORAS framework. In the
AORDD framework no constraints are put on the selection of the methods used
as long as the output is a list of security risks in need of treatment, as shown
in Figure 13.2. However, the AORDD process o¤ers a structured approach to
derive these pieces of information through the activities of sub-processes 2, 3
and 4 in its security assessment activity, as described in Chapter 11. In addition,
security risk acceptance criteria are needed. These are derived in activity 1.7 of
the AORDD security assessment activity. Hence, the relevant activities from the
AORDD security assessment activity for Phase 1 is the following:
 Sub-process 1: Context identication
Activity 1.7: Identify and describe the security risk acceptance criteria (SAC)
 Sub-process 2: Risk identication
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Activity 2.1: Identify security threats to assets from the security environment
Activity 2.2: Identify vulnerabilities in ToE, security policies, security processes,
security procedures and the security environment
Activity 2.3: Document misuse scenarios and group misuses into misuse
groups
 Sub-process 3: Risk analysis
Activity 3.1: Estimate impact of misuse
Activity 3.2: Estimate frequency of misuse
 Sub-process 4: Risk evaluation
Activity 4.1: Determine level of risk for each set of impact and frequency
Activity 4.2: Evaluate risks against the security risk acceptance criteria
(SAC)
Activity 4.2: Categorise risks in need of treatment into risk themes
Activity 4.3: Determine interrelationships among risk themes
Activity 4.4: Identify conicts among risk themes
Activity 4.5: Prioritise risk themes and risks
Activity 4.6: Resolve identied conicts
The above activity list involves a set of concepts and these are the pieces of
information involved in Phase 1 of the trade-o¤ analysis. These concepts are
security threat, vulnerability, misuse, misuse frequency, misuse impact, security
risk and security risk acceptance criteria, as shown in Figure 13.3. Figure 13.3
shows parts of the AORDD concept-relation model described in Houmb and
Georg (2005) [42], Appendix B.1.
In the following the assumption is that the output from sub-processes 2 and 3
of the AORDD security assessment activity are sets of vulnerabilities, security
threats, misuses, misuse frequency and misuse impact. These pieces of information
are necessary in order to derive the risk level of the ToE and for evaluating
which of the security risks that needs to be treated. In the AORDD security
assessment activity deriving the security risks is the task of sub-process 4 where
a security risk is derived for each misuse by combining the misuse frequency with
one of the misuse impacts. This means that one misuse leads to one or more
security risks depending on the number of associated misuse impacts. As both
misuse frequency and misuse impact can be described either as a qualitative
value or as a quantitatively value the resulting risk level can also be measured
either qualitatively or quantitatively. However, to combine misuse frequency and
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Fig. 13.3. Concepts involved in Phase 1 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis
misuse impact into a security risk both values need to be in the same format or
transformed in such a way that they can be combined.
When qualitative values are used for all involved concepts it is called qualitative
risk evaluation. Qualitative risk evaluation usually involves two sets of qualita-
tive scales that are combined into a qualitative scale describing the risk level
of a security risk. For example, if the misuse frequency is measured according
to the qualitative scale {incredible, improbable, remote, occasional, probable and
frequent} and the misuse impact is measured according to the qualitative scale
{negligible, marginal, critical and catastrophic} the resulting security risk may
be measured according to the qualitative scale {low, medium, high, extreme and
catastrophic}, denoting the level of risk. The way this is done in practice is to
combine the two input qualitative scales into a risk matrix with misuse impact
values on the vertical scale and misuse frequency values on the horizontal scale.
Each cell in the risk matrix then denotes a risk level, which in this context is
according to the qualitative scale {low, medium, high, extreme and catastrophic}.
Examples of qualitative scales for misuse impact, misuse frequency and risk level
are in AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4].
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Fig. 13.4. Example of a risk model
Misuse frequency and misuse impact can also be expressed as quantitative values
and in such cases misuse frequency are either given as the number of occurrences
within a certain time frame or as a probability measure, such as for example
the probability for the misuse to occur within a certain time frame. Quantitative
misuse impact values may be measured using several units, including nancial
loss, loss of reputation etc. When both misuse frequency and misuse impact are
given as quantitative values it is called quantitative risk evaluation. Quantities
risk evaluation di¤ers from qualitative risk evaluation in that quantitative misuse
frequency and impact values are directly computable and thus the risk level are
directly derived as the product of the two.
However, probability as an expression of misuse frequency can be given according
to the classical or the subjective interpretation of probability. Classical interpre-
tation in the case of quantitative risk evaluation means that there is a probability
P for an event e to occur within the time frame t. This P is interpreted as a true
value of the actual event e and the uncertainty of how close P is to the true value
is modelled by associating condence intervals. Interpreting quantitative misuse
frequency values in the subjectivist way means that P is considered as a belief
in the occurrence of the event e expressed using some probability distribution,
such as the Triang distribution. In this case it is not the true value of P that
is expressed but an experts or other information sources uncertainty on the
occurrence of event e within time frame t. The same is the case for subjective
interpretation of quantitative misuse impact values.
Furthermore, it does not always make sense to directly multiply the misuse fre-
quency and misuse impact values to obtain the risk level in quantitative risk
evaluation. The reason might be that the impacts of particular misuses are de-
pendent on each other. In such cases the risk level can be derived by examining
the misuse frequency and misuse impact values separately before combine them
in a risk model, such as the one shown in Figure 13.4.
In the risk model in Figure 13.4, loss related to a particular security threat
are expressed by the impact space f(I1; F1); (I2; F2); :::; (In; Fn)g where Fi is the
occurrence rate or occurrence probability for the misuse leading to the impact Ii.
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This results in the set of losses fL1; L2; :::; Lig and measures such as statistical
expected loss can be used to express the risk level. Statistic expected loss is
determined by summing over the impact space by multiplying each loss in the
set fL1; L2; :::; Lig with its associated impact, as shown in Equation 13.1.
Statistical expected loss= (I1F 1)  L1+:::+ (IiF i)  Li+:::
+(In  Fn)  Ln (13.1)
Using risk models and expressing risk level using intuitive measures like statis-
tical expected loss makes the results from the risk-driven analysis in Phase 1 of
the trade-o¤ analysis easily accessible for the decision makers. These measures
are concrete and enable the decision makers to directly compare the alternative
security solutions by means of the e¤ect on the impact space and the statistical
expected loss.
There are also risk evaluation situations where there are insu¢ cient information
to asses the impact, the frequency or both. In such situations it becomes partic-
ularly valuable to use the subjective interpretation of probability as this opens
for the use of subjective expert judgments. Examples of such are the Markov like
analysis described in Houmb, Georg, France, Reddy and Bieman (2005) [43].
13.1.1 The relationship between vulnerability, security threat, misuse
and security risk in AORDD
The AORDD security assessment activity performs two types of identication ac-
tivities during sub-process 2. These are vulnerability analysis and security threat
identication. This separation of identication activities is according to AS/NZS
4360:2004 and the the Common Criteria and is done to distinguish between prob-
lems with the ToE or its security environments, from the events that might exploit
these problems in an undesired manner. This means that a vulnerability is un-
derstood as a weakness in the ToE or the ToE security environment that can
be misused and a security threat is the event that performs the misuse of the
weakness in the ToE or the ToE security environment.
Denition Vulnerability is a weakness in the ToE and/or the ToE security envi-
ronment that if exploited a¤ects the capabilities of one or more of the security
attributes condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability,
non-repudiation or reliability of one or more assets (modied from AS/NZS
4360:2004 [4]).
100 13. AORDD Security Solution Trade-O¤ Analysis
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Fig. 13.5. Relation between security threat, security vulnerability and misuse
Denition Security Threat is a potential undesired event in the ToE and/or
the ToE security environment that may exploit one or more vulnerabilities
a¤ecting the capabilities of one or more of the security attributes conden-
tiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation or
reliability of one or more assets (modied from AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4]).
The result of a security threat exploiting a vulnerability is some undesired event.
This undesired event is called a misuse. It is important to note however that
misuses can only occur if both a vulnerability and a security threat exist and
if the vulnerability is exploitable by the security threat. This means that the
set of potential misuses is a sub set of the set of vulnerabilities and that the
set of potential security threats and hence M =  ST \ SV where M is the
set of misuses, ST is the set of security threats and SV is the set of security
vulnerabilities, as shown in Figure 13.5.
The undesirability of a misuse is always towards one or more of the system assets
as the AORDD process and the AORDD framework is asset-driven. The way
assets can be a¤ected is that their values are either reduced or increased. In the
AORDD framework asset value reduction results from some loss in the capabilities
of one or more of the security attributes of a ToE while asset value increase results
from some gain in the capabilities of one or more of the security attributes of a
ToE. The actual asset value loss or gain is not the misuse, but rather the impact
of the misuse. These issues are elaborated on in the following.
Denition Misuse is an event that a¤ects one or more of the security at-
tributes condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability,
non-repudiation or reliability of one or more assets.
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Fig. 13.6. Overview of how misuses happen and how they can be prevented
As misuses leads to impacts that can be negative or positive, the resulting secu-
rity risk can also be either negative or positive. Exploring the positive e¤ects of
misuses are often referred to as opportunity analysis and commonly used in the
nance and stock trade domain. However, this issue will not be elaborated on in
this work as it was not part of the scope of this work.
Assuming that misuses have negative impact on asset values it is important to
know how to prevent, detect or act on misuses. Figure 13.6 illustrates the general
principle of how misuses are created and how they can be prevented. As can be
seen in the gure there are situations where security threats are identied but
where there does not exists any vulnerabilities for the security threat to exploit
and hence no misuse can occur. In such situations no treatment is needed as there
are no events or impact to reduce or prevent. Also, if there already exist practice,
procedure or security mechanism in the ToE and/or the ToE security environment
that are able to prevent the security threat from exploiting the vulnerability no
misuse will occur. Such existing security threat protections are called safeguards.
Denition Safeguard is an existing practice, procedure or security mechanism
in the ToE and/or the ToE security environment that reduces or prevents
security threats from exploiting vulnerabilities and thus reduces the level of
risk (modied from ISO 13335 [54]).
In addition to the above mentioned cases there might be situations where a
security threat is not able to exploit a vulnerability even though no safeguards
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exists. The reason for this might be that the magnitude of the security threat is
not big enough to launce the exploit. In such cases the exploit might be launched
if several security threats are initiated simultaneously and where the combination
of these breaks the exploit limit. This is best modelled using Petri Nets (PN) or
similar dynamic modelling behaviour semantic. An example of a Coloured Petri
Nets (CPN) model that capture the perspective of misuse comprised of several
simulations security threats initiated by several attackers is described in Houmb
and Sallhammar (2005) [46].
Furthermore, there are also cases where a security threat exploits a vulnerability
and initiate a chain of misuses resulting in a misuse hierarchy, as illustrated
in Figure 13.7. In the case of a misuse hierarchy there is always either a single
security threat or several simultaneously security threats that initiate the chain of
events. This security threat is referred to as a basic security threat. An example of
a misuse hierarchy security attack is the "ILOVEYOU" virus. This virus exploited
a vulnerability in the email client Microsoft Outlook so that when a user opened
the email with the virus, the virus used the address book in Microsoft Outlook and
the usersemail account to propagate the virus. For some companies many of these
address book entries where address lists and internal contacts and the amount
of email sent within and out of the SMTP server in some of these companies
triggered the exploit of a vulnerability in some Virus walls and resulted in the
Virus wall either letting all emails pass through without cheeking for viruses or
that emails got stuck in an never-ending sending queue on the Virus wall.
As described earlier, a security risk is usually measured as the combination of one
misuse frequency and one misuse impact. In the AORDD framework additional
concepts related to operational security level are also included. These are mean
time and e¤ort to misuse and called MTTM and METM. In the misuse hierarchy
this means that there is a set of misuse frequency, misuse impact, MTTM and
METM for each level in the hierarchy. As the occurrence of a misuse in the layer
above in the misuse hierarchy is dependent on the occurrence of all misuses in
the layers below the misuse frequency for each level is a multiple of the misuse
frequency for the current layer and all layers below.
MF j=
jQ
i=1
MF iMF (i 1) (13.2)
whereMFj is the misuse frequency for the current layer j,MFi is the misuse fre-
quency for layer number i and MF(i 1) is the misuse frequency for layer number
(i  1).
The associated denitions are given below:
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Fig. 13.7. Illustration of a misuse hierarchy
Denition Basic Security Threat is the initial security threat that exploits one
or more vulnerabilities in the ToE or the ToE security environment and leads
to a chain of misuses.
Denition Misuse Frequency is a measure of the occurrence rate of a misuse
expressed as either the number of occurrences of a misuse in a given time
frame or the probability of the occurrence of a misuse in a given time frame
(modied from AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4]).
Denition Misuse Impact is the non-empty set of either a reduction or an in-
crease of the asset value for one asset.
Denition Loss is a reduction in the asset value for one asset.
Denition Gain is an increase in the asset value for one asset.
Denition Security Risk is the combination of exactly one misuse frequency,
one misuse impact, one mean time to misuse (MTTM) and one mean e¤ort
to misuse (METM) (modied from AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4] by taking in the
concepts for operational security level from Littlewood et al. [74]).
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13.1.2 Deriving the list of security risks in need of treatment
Denition Security Risk Acceptance Criteria is a description of the accept-
able level of risk (modied from AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4]).
The security acceptance criteria are derived in activity 1.7 of the AORDD security
assessment activity. Such criteria are descriptions of what is an acceptable level
of risk for a particular ToE. These criteria are usually given by the set of stake-
holders involved in the security assessment and management and most preferable
the decision maker. The reason for this, is that the stakeholder responsible for
an eventual damage or paying for the security solution aiming at preventing,
detecting or removing the security risk should also decide on the acceptable po-
tential damage. This potential damage should also be evaluated in relation to the
cost associated with the potential security solutions. It is however often di¢ cult
for any stakeholder to set the acceptance level before some information on the
potential damage is available. In practice this means that such criteria often are
negotiated between the stakeholders during the risk evaluation phase of a security
assessment, which refers to sub-process 4 of the security assessment activity in
the AORDD process. The acceptance criteria can also be derived from relevant
standards, company security policies and business goals.
In the AORDD framework the security risk acceptance criteria are recommended
derived as part of the context identication in sub-process 1. However, secu-
rity risk acceptance criteria information is also supported as dynamic and nego-
tiable information in the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis. This means
that the criteria may be updated whenever more information becomes available
throughout the development or assessment of a ToE and that it can be a ne-
gotiation variable while trading of security solutions in Phase 2 of the trade-o¤
analysis. The latter is described in Section 13.2.
In Phase 1 of the trade-o¤ analysis the security risk acceptance criteria available
at the time is used to evaluate which security risks are acceptable and which
are not acceptable. The main goal of this task is to partition the set of result-
ing security risks from sub-process 4 of the AORDD security assessment activity
into the subset of security risks that must be treated and the subset of security
risks that can be discarded from further consideration. An example of a security
risk acceptance criteria used to partition risk levels is that all risks with levels
greater than or equal to risk level HIGHmust be treated. In this context treated
means reducing the risk level to lower than HIGH. Note that in this example
all security risks with the risk level lower than HIGH are disregarded and not
included in the trade-o¤ analysis performed in Phase 2 of the AORDD security
solution trade-o¤ analysis. Also note that the security risk acceptance criteria
should be formatted to be comparable with the security risks, as discussed ear-
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lier. For example if the security risks are given in terms of a risk matrix using
the qualitative risk level scale {low, medium, high, extreme, catastrophic}, the
security risk acceptance criteria should preferable also be given according to this
scale. If that is not possible the acceptance criteria must be interpreted or trans-
formed before they can be used to separate the acceptable security risks from the
unacceptable security risks. Similarly, for quantitative security risk measures the
security risk acceptance criteria should be expressed as a comparable quantitative
value of acceptable risk level. The same goes for risk models producing measures
such as statistical expected loss where the security risk acceptance criteria should
preferable be expressed as maximum and minimum acceptable statistical loss.
 NSR = SR \ SAC (13.3)
 ASR = SR  SR \ SAC (13.4)
where NSR is the set of non-acceptable security risks, ASR is the set of accept-
able security risks, SR is the set of security risks and SAC is the set of security
acceptance criteria.
13.2 Phase 2: Trade-o¤ analysis
Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤analysis concerns the evaluation
and choice of security solutions from a set of alternatives. This covers sub-process
5; the risk treatment sub-process, of the AORDD security assessment activity
discussed in Chapter 11 and are called trade-o¤ analysis as it is in this phase
that the alternative security solutions are traded o¤. The main goal of Phase 2
is to identify and evaluate alternative security solutions to the resulting list of
security risks from Phase 1 and the expected output is a rated list of security
solutions for each of the security risks transferred from Phase 1. It is this rated
list that the decision maker uses as support when deciding on which security
solution to employ in the ToE. More details are given in Houmb et al. (2005) [44]
enclosed as Appendix B.3.
The task of Phase 2 in relation to security assessment is to handle risk treat-
ment. Risk treatment is an activity that is included in most security assessment
approaches, such as the CORAS approach and CRAMM. However, there is one
main di¤erence between the risk treatment strategy of the AORDD security so-
lution trade-o¤ analysis and other security assessment approaches and this is the
detailed and structured support for dynamically trading o¤ alternative security
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solutions based on security perspectives and development, project and nancial
perspectives. Actually, the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis focuses
only on the risk treatment part of a security assessment.
In the following the activities of sub-process 5 is given and the concepts involved
in Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis is discussed. The
activities of sub-process 5 of the security assessment activity in the AORDD
process are the following:
 Sub-process 5: Risk treatment
Activity 5.1: Identify alternative security solutions and group these into se-
curity solution sets
Activity 5.2: Identify e¤ect and cost of all alternative security solutions
Activity 5.3: Model all security solutions as security solution aspects using
RDD modelling elements
Activity 5.4: Compose security aspects with primary model and compose
RDD information
Activity 5.5: Evaluate and nd the best-tted security solution or set of
security solutions using the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis
Activity 5.1 identies alternative security solutions to one or more of the security
risks transferred from Phase 1. In the AORDD framework this activity is partly
handled by the security aspect repository, which stores experience from earlier
security solution decision situations and partly by domain knowledge and sub-
jective expert judgment. However, this activity is often not straightforward. See
Houmb et al. (2006) [48] in Appendix B.2 and Georg, Houmb and Ray (2006)
[35] for details.
The way activity 5.1 is performed in practice is to rst identify the alternative
security solutions, then check to what degree each security solution meets the
expected security requirements, before verifying that the security solution does
not contain aws or vulnerabilities and that all involved security requirements
still holds also after each security solution is employed in the ToE and nally
that the core functionality of the ToE is not substantially a¤ected. This is done
for all security risks in the outputted list of security risks from Phase 1 and used
to identify alternative sets of security solutions. In this context a set of security
solutions is one unique conguration of security solutions that together solves
some or all security risks in the resulting list of security risks from Phase 1.
As security solutions often are not independent of each other the dependencies
between the security solutions in a set must also be considered. This is discussed
to some degree in Matheson, Ray, Ray and Houmb (2005) [22]. Note that it
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is also possible to evaluate security solutions for one security risk at the time.
Note also that the sub activities of activity 5.1 is handled by other parts of
the AORDD framework and in particular the RDD annotation rules for security
risk and security solution variable estimation, the UMLsec security verication
technique of Jürjens [67] and AOM composition techniques, such as that discussed
in Straw et al. (2004) [98].
In activity 5.2 the associated cost and treatment e¤ect of each security solution
identied in activity 5.1 is examined and estimated. Note that both the security
solution cost and the security solution e¤ect are variables to the trade-o¤ analysis
in Phase 2, as shown in Figure 13.9. As the values of these variables in many
cases is unknown or at least uncertain they need to be estimated. In the AORDD
framework the treatment e¤ects of a security solution is assessed using AOM
composition, as discussed in Georg, Houmb and Ray (2006) [35]. In addition to
the AOM composition subjective expert judgment and domain knowledge can be
used to assess this variable. The security solution cost is often harder to estimate
as there are many factors involved in estimating cost of future events. The latter
is further elaborated on in Section 13.2.3.
In activity 5.3 each security solution is modelled as a UML security solution
aspect and annotated with RDD modelling elements. The RDD modelling ele-
ments relevant for Phase 2 are the misuse and security solution variables shown
in Figure 13.8. Details on the RDD UML Prole can be found in Houmb, Georg,
France, Reddy and Bieman (2005) [43], Georg, Houmb and Ray (2006) [35] and
Georg, Houmb and France (2006) [36]. Note that the terms in Figure 13.8 have
been dened earlier and are given in complete in Appendix A; AORDD concepts.
In activity 5.4 the security solution aspects are composed with the core func-
tionality of the ToE and the e¤ects that each security solution has on the ToE
are observed. The RDD information in the security solution aspects and the pri-
mary model for the ToE is also composed, as discussed in Georg, Houmb and
Ray (2006) [35]. To validate that no new design aws or other vulnerabilities has
emerged as a direct or indirect result of the composition, it is necessary to follow
all composition activities with testing and verication activities. This issue is
discussed in some detail in Houmb et al. (2005) [44] in Appendix B.3 and Georg,
Houmb and Ray (2006) [35].
In activity 5.5, each of the security solutions are evaluated in terms of their tness
to the decision factors involved in a particular security solution decision situation.
These factors are called the decision criteria and examples of such are the secu-
rity requirements that the security solutions need to meet and the development,
project and nancial perspectives that the ToE must adhere to. The main aim
of this activity is to derive the tness score for each alternative security solution
or each security solution set in terms of the above mentioned decision criteria.
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Fig. 13.8. Concepts involved in Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis
This is done to enable a relevant comparison of the alternative security solu-
tions. However, no matter which variables are involved when evaluating security
solutions against each other, the decision maker needs some type of measurable
and relational expression as output from the trade-o¤ analysis in Phase 2. These
expressions can be either qualitative or quantitative, provided that they are in a
relational form and that they can be directly compared. In the AORDD frame-
work the security solutions are measured in terms of their tness to the decision
criteria and called security solution tness scores.
Figure 13.9 gives an overview of the inputs and outputs of Phase 2 of the AORDD
security solution trade-o¤ analysis. The parameters on the left side of the gure
(solution e¤ect, solution cost, misuse frequency and misuse impact) are input
parameters, which means that they are the information that is traded o¤. The
parameters on the right side of the gure (security risk acceptance criteria, stan-
dards, policies, laws and regulation, priorities, business goals, TTM and budget)
are the decision criteria, which in Phase 2 are called the trade-o¤ parameters.
The trade-o¤ parameters are the information that is used to trade-o¤ the input
parameters.
As can be seen in Figure 13.9, the trade-o¤ analysis evaluates alternative so-
lutions by comparing their security solution tness score. In the nance and
investment domain, alternatives are often measured in terms of Return On In-
vestments (ROI). It would also be preferable to use a similar notion in this work,
such as Return on Security Investments (ROSI), but there are no stable den-
ition and models for computing ROSI that are commonly accepted within the
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Fig. 13.9. The input and outputs of Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis
security domain and those that exist does not cover the necessary factors in-
volved in this work. In this work it is not su¢ cient to only consider the nancial
perspectives, as the tness score is rather an aggregate of the abilities of a secu-
rity solution to meet all relevant perspectives. These perspectives are the above
mentioned decision criteria and expressed as security requirements and project,
development and nancial perspectives, such as TTM, budget constraints, laws
and regulations, policies, etc.
However, before the abilities of a security solution can be evaluated, the input
variables to the trade-o¤ analaysis, such as the misuse impact and security so-
lution e¤ect, must be estimed. In the AORDD framework misuse impact and
security solution e¤ect is measured in terms of their inuence on the values of
the system assets. Thus, before the input variables to the trade-o¤ analysis can
be estimated the system assets must be identied and valued. This is done in
sub-process 1 of the AORDD security assessment activity, as discussed in Chap-
ter 11. In the following the relationship between the asset values and the misuse
impact and security solution e¤ect is discussed.
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13.2.1 Identifying and assigning values to assets
To estimate the misuse impact and the security solution e¤ect the system assets
needs to be identied and assigned values to. This is done as part of the context
identication (sub-process 1) in the AORDD security assessment activity and
more specically activity 1.4. As it is the stakeholders that assign values to the
assets, the relationship between assets and stakeholders and the scope of the
assessment also needs to be determined. These issues are all taken care of in
sub-process 1 of the AORDD security assessment activity.
 Sub-process 1: Context identication
Activity 1.1: Identify purpose and scope of assessment
Activity 1.2: Describe the target of evaluation (ToE), business perspectives
and the security environment
Activity 1.3: Identify system stakeholders
Activity 1.4: Identify assets and have stakeholders assign values to assets
Activity 1.5: Describe the asset-stakeholder graph
Activity 1.6: Describe relevant security policies (SP)
Activity 1.7: Identify and describe the security risk acceptance criteria (SAC)
Assets relate to the ToE and the ToE is parts of or the complete information
system that is being assessed. Note that a ToE can include anything from hard-
ware to humans. However, in this context assets are entities that are of security
interest, meaning that some stakeholder is interested in that the condentiality,
integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation or reliability
attributes of the entity is preserved at a particular level. This level refers to the
desired asset value. To simplify the asset valuation the AORDD framework pro-
vides asset categories and some asset valuation guidelines. The asset categories in
the AORDD framework are modied from CRAMM to t the AORDD security
solution trade-o¤ analysis and includes the following: personal safety, personal
information, company information, legal and regulatory obligations, law enforce-
ment, commercial and nancial interest, company reputation, business strategy,
business goals, budget, physical, data and information, organisational aspects,
software and other. Below is a short description of each asset category, along
with some examples of each. More details are in the CRAMM toolkit (infor-
mation can be found at http://www.cramm.com) and the CRAMM user guide
[103].
Personal safety assets are entities that a¤ect the well-being of humans. Examples
of such include applications that handles medical records, such as a Telemedicine
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system that either transfers, stores or processes sensitive medical information, air
tra¢ c control applications etc.
Personal information assets are pieces of information in the ToE that one or more
stakeholders consider to be of a private or sensitive character. Examples of such
include salary, age, health-related information, bank account number, liquidity
and other similar types of information.
Company information assets are pieces of information in the ToE that a company
considers to be sensitive and of a company condential character. Examples of
such includes user credentials for accessing business critical systems such as user-
name and passwords, business results that are not public, liquidity and other
similar types of information.
Legal and regulatory obligations assets are entities that are a¤ected or controlled
by legal and regulatory body. Examples of such are the tra¢ c information in
a Telecommunication network in Norway, which is regulated by Ekomloven and
controlled by Post- og Teletilsynet.
Law enforcement assets are entities that is a¤ected or regulated by law. Ex-
amples of such are the EU data retention directive (2006/24/EC) [28], which
enforces retention of tra¢ c and subscriber data for Police crime investigations
for Telecommunication providers. The Directive determines the date when all af-
fected providers of services, as specied in the Directive, must provide a solution
that meets the requirements stated in the Directive. In this case both the infor-
mation systems involved and the information stored, by these systems might be
considered as assets.
Commercial and nancial interest assets are entities that are of value to ensure
the nancial stability of a company. Examples of such include stock exchange
related information, quarterly results before they are public etc.
Company reputation assets are entities that might lead to a reduction in the
company reputation if they are revealed to unauthorised parties. Examples of
such include security incident reports, information on identity theft from their
customer database, etc.
Business strategy assets are entities that in some way are critical for the day
to day execution and maintenance of the business strategy. Examples of such
includes business process descriptions, internal control etc.
Business goals assets are entities that in some way are critical for the achievement
of the business goals. This is di¤erent from the business strategy in that the goal
is the description of what the company strives to achieve in short and long-
term while the business strategy is the tool used to achieve the business goals.
Examples of such include business goal description of various types.
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Budget assets are entities that in some way are related to the budget of a company
or specic parts of a company. Examples include any information used to derive
the budget for the di¤erent parts of a company, details on the budget process etc.
Physical assets are entities that represent physical infrastructure that the com-
pany owns or in some way have at their disposal. Examples include buildings,
servers, routers, workstations, network cables etc.
Data and information assets are entities in the data and information set con-
tained or controlled by a company with some value to one or more stakeholders.
Examples include identities of the customers, information on which products cus-
tomers have procured and when, health-related information, billing information
etc.
Organisational aspects assets are entities that in some way denote or represent
the how, who, when and why for an organisation and that are of some value to
one or more stakeholders. Examples of such are the structure of an organisation,
issues related to restructuring of the organisation, the day to day work processes
in the organisation etc.
Software assets are entities that are contained in the software portfolio of a com-
pany. Examples of such are domain specic applications, software licenses, in-
house code and components etc.
The asset category other covers all entities that have some value to one or
more stakeholders and that are not naturally contained in the above mentioned
categories. Examples of such could be entities that are comprised of two or more
asset categories. For more information on assets and how to specify and group
assets, the reader is referred to CRAMM [103] and CORAS [20]. Some details on
how to value assets is given in the following.
Asset valuation and asset valuation categories. For all asset categories in
the AORDD framework, the asset valuation is given according to the seven secu-
rity attributes condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability,
non-repudiation and reliability. Hence, the asset value for each asset are derived
by summing over all values for all security attributes.
AV j=
7X
i=1
avi (13.5)
where AV is the asset value for asset number j, avi is the security attribute value
for security attribute number i and i denotes the security attribute for which the
value is given for.
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Table 13.1. Example asset value table
Asset
Value
Commercial and Economic Interests
1 Of interest to a competitor but of no com-
mercial value
2 Of interest to a competitor with a value of
NOK10,000 or less
3 Of value to a competitor of the size
NOK10,001 to NOK100,000
4 Of value to a competitor of the size
NOK100,001 to NOK1,000,000
5 Of value to a competitor of the size
NOK1,000,001 to NOK10,000,000
6 Of value to a competitor of the size more
than NOK 10,000,000
7 Could substantially undermine economic and
commercial interests
8 No entry
9 Would be likely to cause substantial material
damage to economic and commercial inter-
ests
10 Would be likely to cause severe long-term
damage to the economy of the company
It is the stakeholders of a ToE that assigns the values to the ToE assets. This task
is however sometimes di¢ cult to perform in practice. To make the asset valuation
feasible for the stakeholders the AORDD framework allows the stakeholder to
interpret the asset value as: the degree of importance that the preservation of
each of the security attributes has for a particular asset. To further assist the
stakeholder, the AORDD framework has adopted two asset valuation schemes:
(1) asset values on the scale 1-10 and (2) asset values on the qualitative scale
{low, medium, high}. The rst is the asset valuation scheme used in CRAMM,
only modied to t the AORDD framework. Table 13.1 shows a modied version
of the CRAMM asset valuation table for the asset category Commercial and
economic interests. More details are given in the CRAMM toolkit and CRAMM
user guide [103].
Type 2 asset valuation schema involves valuing an asset in relation to a qualitative
scale. An example of such is when each stakeholder assigns a qualitative value for
each security attribute according to an appropriate qualitative scale, such as for
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Table 13.2. Example of qualitative scale evaluation
Name Value
Stakeholder x
Stakeholder category Decision-maker
Asset password
Asset category Data and information
Asset value condentiality high
Asset value integrity medium
Asset value availability low
Asset value authenticity N/A
Asset value accountability N/A
Asset value non-repudiation low
Asset value reliability N/A
example {low, medium, high}. Table 13.2 shows an example of a qualitative scale
type valuation for Stakeholder x. As can be seen in the table stakeholders are
also assigned to stakeholder categories. This is done to ease the risk evaluation
activities in the risk-driven analysis of Phase 1 of the following development
iterations. Recall that Phase 1 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis
deals with prioritising security risks. Recall also that the AORDD process is
iterative, which means that several iterations of the activities involved in Phase
1 and Phase 2 is usually undertaken during a development using the AORDD
process, as described in Chapter 11.
The result of the asset valuation activity is a set of tables like Table 13.2 for
each stakeholder. As the asset values are not always given as quantitative values
and as there often are more than one stakeholder involved in the asset valuation,
Equation 13.5 can often not be directly applied to derive the asset value for
an asset. Thus, the sets of tables must be aggregated for each asset over all
stakeholders. In the AORDD framework a simple asset value aggregation schema
where set by set of asset values from the stakeholder are inserted and combined
by taking the arithmetic average for quantitative asset values or the median
for qualitative asset values is used, as illustrated in Figure 13.10. The result is
one asset value table, which is a composite of the aggregated asset values from
the set of stakeholders involved. In addition, the stakeholders may have di¤erent
trustworthiness associated with them. This is discussed further in the presentation
of the trade-o¤ tool in Chapter 15 and the trust-based information aggregation
schema described in Part 5.
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Legal and regulatory obligations Law enforcement
Commercial and economical interestCompany reputation
Business strategy Business goals Budget Physical
Data and informationOrganisational aspects Software Other
Asset Value Table
Fig. 13.10. Asset value table as a composite of the 15 asset valuation categories (sub
variables)
13.2.2 Misuse impact and security solution e¤ect and their relation
to asset value
Misuse impact and security solution e¤ect is measured using the same scale as
the valuation scale used for valuing the assets that these a¤ect. If the same scale
is not used either the asset value or the misuse impact and the security solution
e¤ect value must be transformed so that they can be compared. However, the
reader should be aware of the problems involved in transforming values into a
scale di¤erent from their original one.
Figure 13.11 illustrates the 15 misuse impact categories. As for asset valuation
two types of misuse impact scales are used and these are (1) quantitative scale
from 1-10 in terms of seriousness and (2) the qualitative scale {low, medium,
high}. In the trade-o¤ tool discussed in Chapter 15 misuse impact is represented
as a value with the 15 misuse impact categories as sub-variables where all can be
in either the state {low, medium, high} or a number in the range [1; 10].
As can be seen in Figure 13.11, the set of misuse impact sub-variable is aggregated
into the misuse impact table. This aggregation is done for each asset that the
misuse has an impact on. The resulting misuse impact is then aggregated with
the original asset values for each a¤ected asset to derive the updated asset value,
as illustrated in Figure 13.12. The aggregation technique used depends on the
type of values given. If the asset value and misuse impact are given according a
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Fig. 13.11. The 15 misuse impact sub variables and how to aggregate these into the
misuse impact table
qualitative scale the rule is such that the lowest value of the two becomes the
resulting asset value. For example, if the original asset value is mediumand the
misuse impact is lowthe result is a decrease in the asset value from medium
to low. If the quantitative scale is used the arithmetic average is used as the
aggregation technique.
Security solutions are introduced to prevent, reduce or detect and act on the
potential decrease in asset value caused by a misuse. These solutions protect the
assets of the ToE by either preventing the associated security threat, by removing
the vulnerability that the security threat exploits or by doing a combination of
preventing and removing so that the impact of a potential misuse is reduced to
an acceptable level. The e¤ects of these security solutions are therefore measured
in terms of regaining the asset value. Figure 13.13 shows the 15 security solution
impact sub-variables and how these are aggregated into the security solution
e¤ect table. The aggregation of the solution e¤ect sub-variables is performed in
the same way as for the misuse impact sub-variables.
The asset value reduction caused by the misuse impact brings the asset value to
an unacceptable level and a security solution needs to be employed to bring the
asset value back to an acceptable level. This is done by applying the values in the
security solution e¤ect table on the updated asset value table from Figure 13.12.
The result is an reupdated asset value table, as shown in Figure 13.14.
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Fig. 13.12. The relation between misuse impacts, the original asset values and the
resulting updated asset value table
13.2.3 Misuse and security solution costs
Misuse cost is usually harder to estimate than security solution costs as it is
often easier to see the potential costs of alternative solutions than to estimate
the potential cost if a misuse occurred. A security solution has a procurement
cost, licence cost and maintenance cost while misuses often have costs outside
of what is obvious and a¤ects the resource usage to a larger degree than an
controlled introduction of a security solution. This work has not examined factors
inuencing the misuse cost in detail and have adopted the simplistic version of
misuse cost estimation approach described in Sonnenreicht et al. (2006) [93].
In the AORDD framework misuse costs are measured in terms of one cost vari-
able, namely productivity while security solution cost is measured using the four
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Fig. 13.13. The 15 security solution e¤ect sub variables and how to aggregate these
into the security solution e¤ect table
cost variables: procurement, employment, maintenance and productivity. Pro-
curement cost covers all expenses related to procuring a security solution and in-
volves the initial price for the security solution, cost associated with the necessary
software licences, cost of regular software updates, cost of support agreement etc.
Employment cost targets the phase between procurement and the normal opera-
tion of the security solution and covers all factors related to installing and product
clearance of the security solution. This includes time, resources and budget nec-
essary for tailoring the security solution to the ToE and its security environment.
Maintenance cost targets the phase after the security solution is completely em-
ployed in its operational environment and until it is taken out of production. This
means that this cost category covers the day-to-day operation and maintenance
and includes costs such as the resources needed for maintenance, expected time
that the system need to be down or run with reduced capabilities due to regular
updates etc. Productivity is measured as described in Sonnenreicht et al. (2006)
[93] and targets the extra hassle that comes as a result of either the occurrence of
a misuse or the introduction of a security solution. As done in [93] the estimation
of the time and thus money spent on reduced productivity is measured using a
set of categories that are combined into misuse cost and security solution cost
respectively.
For misuse costs the following categories are supported in the AORDD framework:
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Fig. 13.14. The relation between asset value, misuse impact and security solution e¤ect
 Application and system related crashes
 Email ltering sorting and spam
 Bandwidth e¢ ciency and throughput
 Ine¢ cient and ine¤ective security policies
 Enforcement of security policies
 System related rollouts and upgrades from IT
 Security patches for OS and applications
 Insecure and ine¢ cient network topology
 Virus and virus scanning
 Worms
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 Trojan horses and key logging
 Spyware and system trackers
 Popups
 Compatibility issues (hardware and software)
 Permission based security problems (e.g. usernames and passwords)
 File system disorganisation
 Corrupt or inaccessible data
 Hacked or stolen system information and data
 Backup and restore
 Application usage issues
For security solutions the following cost categories are supported in the AORDD
framework:
 Application and system related crashes
 Bandwidth e¢ ciency and throughput
 Over-restrictive security policies
 Enforcement of security policies
 System related rollouts and upgrades from IT
 Security patches for OS and applications
 Trouble downloading les due to virus scanning
 Compatibility issues (Hardware and Software)
 Too many passwords or other permission security problems
For each of these categories an estimate of the time spent related to either a
misuse or a security solution needs to be estimated. As it might be di¢ cult
to estimate the time as a quantitative value both cost values can be estimated
both quantitatively and qualitatively. This is the same as for misuse impact and
security solution e¤ect and thus the same aggregation techniques apply.
14. Structure of the AORDD Security Solution
Trade-O¤Analysis
The structure of the underlying trade-o¤ analysis method and procedure for the
AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis are such that they are easy to tai-
lor, change and maintain. This exibility is necessary to easily incorporate any
updates from experience gained during the use of the AORDD security solution
trade-o¤ analysis. To ensure the required level of exibility, the trade-o¤ analysis
method and procedure are built as a set of replaceable sub-components grouped
into levels that are linked together through interfaces in such a way that the con-
tent of each level is independent of each other provided that the required output
is delivered accordingly. This means that components can be changed indepen-
dently of each other while interfaces are dependent on the outputs provided from
the lower level and the inputs required by the higher level and thus are depen-
dent on these two types of information. For example, a component in one of the
layers of the trade-o¤ method can be replaced without having to update other
parts of the method provided that no interfaces are changed, but if an interface
is changed, all components associated with the interface might be a¤ected.
Figure 14.1 illustrates the component-wise and hierarchical step-by-step structure
of the underlying trade-o¤ method of Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution
trade-o¤ analysis. The structure consists of four levels and follows the seven step
trade-o¤ procedure described below. The AND gates in Figure 14.1 mean that
all information coming in at the incoming arches are combined. The outgoing
arches from an AND gate carries the result of the combination of the incoming
information to the next level in the analysis. Each of the squares in Figure 14.1
represents a set of information, such as the set of information that contributes to
the static security level. As the trade-o¤ tool directly implements the structure
of the trade-o¤ analysis as shown in Figure 14.1 details of the content of each
component and how information are AND-combined are described in relation to
the trade-o¤ tool in Chapter 15.
The seven step trade-o¤ procedure is as follows.
Step 1: Estimate the input parameters in the set I where
I = fMI;MF;MTTM;METM;MC;SE; SCg and MI is misuse impact, MF
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Fig. 14.1. Overview of the structure and the step by step procedure of the trade-o¤
analysis
is misuse frequency, MTTM is mean time to misuse, METM is mean e¤ort
to misuse, MC is misuse cost, SE is security solution e¤ect and SC is security
solution cost. The output from Phase 1 of the trade-o¤ analysis is a set of secu-
rity risks in need of treatment. A security risk is a composite of misuse, misuse
frequency, misuse impact, MTTM and METM and a particular security risk is
the unique combination of exactly one misuse, one misuse frequency, one misuse
impact, one MTTM and one METM. The misuse cost denotes the nancial and
other costs that comes as a direct or indirect consequence of the misuse and is
handled separate from the other misuse variables. The security solution e¤ect and
cost are derived in activities 5.1 and 5.2 of the AORDD security assessment ac-
tivity and are part of Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis,
as described in Section 13.2.
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Step 2: Estimate the static security level by examining the relevant factors from
the development of the ToE according to the security assurance components
in Common Criteria Part 3 and the asset values of the involved ToE assets as
described in Section 13.2.1. Note that it is the assurance components in Com-
mon Criteria Part 3 that is used and not the security functional components of
Common Criteria Part 2. Recall that Common Criteria Part 2 and Part 3 are
independent and that Part 2 contains classes of security functional components
that address di¤erent factors of applying proper security functions to a system.
Hence, this part provides support for the selection and composition of security
solutions in a system. Common Criteria Part 3 however describes a set of classes
of security assurance components that are used by an evaluator in a Common
Criteria evaluation to establish the necessary condence in the security level of a
system. This is done through examining the resulting ToE or ToE design and the
development documentation provided by the developer. This is the same strat-
egy for evaluating software quality as is used in the safety standards IEC 61508
Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE)
Safety-Related Systems [51] and DO-178B: Software Considerations in Airborne
Systems and Equipment Certication [89]. Similarly to the Common Criteria
these two standards determine the quality of the end-product by examining the
activities involved in the development. As standards tend to neither be easily
accessible nor easy to interpret and employ in practice tools and methodology
support are often helpful. An example of such for DO-178B is given in Gran
(2002) [40], which describes a BBN topology for safety assessment of software
based systems to support the DO-178B evaluation approach.
Step 3: Estimate the operational risk level using appropriate security assess-
ment methods and models such as the availability prediction model described
in Houmb, Georg, France, Reddy and Bieman (2005) [43]. This prediction model
is tailored for estimating the level of availability for an information system or ToE
but is applicable for estimating other security attributes as well. In the trade-o¤
analysis method, the prediction model is extended to include variables related
to Common Criteria Part 2, such as attacker abilities, in addition to METM,
MTTM, MF and MI. Figure 14.2 shows the variables involved when estimating
the risk level of a ToE in the trade-o¤ analysis method for the AORDD security
solution trade-o¤ analysis.
As can be seen in Figure 14.2 the operational risk level is derived by combining
the existing security controls according to the recommendations in Common Cri-
teria Part 2, the security risks identied in the risk-driven analysis of Phase 1 of
the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and the operational security level
as described in Littlewood et al. (1993) [74]. It is important to note however that
the main factor that separates the operational risk level from the static security
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Fig. 14.2. Variables involved in estimating the risk level of a ToE in the trade-o¤
analysis method
level in the trade-o¤ analysis method is that the static security level expresses
the risk level associated with the development activities while the operational
risk level expresses the security level of the ToE and its security environment in
its operational environment. Thus, the static security level makes use of the idea
of quality through development activities while the risk level targets the security
level of the end-product employed in its security environment. Note that both
future events and current events relevant for the operational risk level can be es-
timated when the subjectivistic approach is applied. Details on the subjectivistic
approach is given in Chapter 7.
The operational security measures included in the trade-o¤ analysis method are
the Mean Time To Misuse (MTTM), the Mean E¤ort To Misuse (METM) and
the attacker abilities. MTTM denotes the mean calendar time between successful
misuses (security breaches) while METM denotes the mean calendar time that
an attacker needs to invest in order to perform a misuse. Here, the attacker
e¤ort depends on the abilities of the attacker, such as the attacker skills (novice,
standard, expert) and the resources availability to the attacker. Hence, METM is
dependent on the attacker abilities. MTTM and METM are estimated according
to the security adaptation of reliability theory as discussed in Littlewood et al.
(1993) [74].
The operational risk level also depends on the security functional components
already employed in the ToE and the ToE security environment. In the trade-o¤
14. Structure of the Trade-O¤ Analysis 125
MC SCMCn SC
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analysis method this is covered by the security functional component classes of
Common Criteria Part 2, which includes Security Audit (FAU), Communication
(FCO), Cryptographic Support (FCS), User Data Protection (FDP), Identica-
tion and Authentication (FIA), Security Management (FMT), Privacy (FPR),
Protection of the TSF (FPT), Resource Utilisation (FRU), TOE Access (FTA)
and Trusted Path/Channels (FTP).
Step 4: Estimate the security solution treatment level. The treatment level of
a security solution is the composite of the security solution e¤ect and security
solution cost. In the trade-o¤ analysis method, the security solution e¤ect is
evaluated against the misuse frequency and impact while the resulting cost after
employing the security solution in the ToE and/or the ToE security environment
is computed by updating the misuse costs taking the security solution cost into
mind, as illustrated in Figure 14.3.
Step 5: Estimate the trade-o¤ parameters in the set T where
T = fSAC;POL; STA;LR;BG; TTM;BU;PRIg and SAC is security accep-
tance criteria, POL is policies, STA is standards, LR is law and regulation, BG
is business goal, TTM is time-to-market, BU is budget and PRI is priorities.
As for the other variables involved in the trade-o¤ analysis method, there are
also di¢ culties involved in estimating some of the trade-o¤ parameters. The two
trade-o¤ parameters that should be straightforward to estimate are the budget
and TTM. These two pieces of information should be as concrete as possible
and can usually be derived from the development plan, schedule and budget and
modelled either as a discrete value or as a probability distribution, dependent
on the operational risk level and the security solution treatment level derived in
Step 3 and 4 respectively.
Security acceptance criteria are part of the context identication of the AORDD
security assessment activity. However, such criteria are often di¢ cult to assign
during the early stages of a security assessment activity. Stakeholders often nd
it easier to relate to what is an acceptable and unacceptable risk when the list of
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misuses and the security risks that these lead to becomes clearer. This risk picture
seems to be a suitable abstraction level for stakeholders to relate to and hence,
the stakeholders should be given the ability to express the security acceptance
criteria also at the later stages in a security assessment activity.
Policies cover any kind of relevant policies associated with the involved organ-
isation(s). The current assumption in the trade-o¤ analysis method is that the
relevant policies are security policies and that these are clearly specied in terms
of tge required level of condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, account-
ability, non-repudiation and reliability. As this is often not the case, the existing
policies must be interpreted so that they can be expressed as required levels of
each of the security attributes. This is done so these can be directly usable in
the trade-o¤ analysis method. When several organisations are involved and/or
several stakeholders are concerned with the same assets, policy statements across
the organisations might conict. In such cases, the conict must be resolved as
part of the trade-o¤ analysis. A practical trick in such cases is to rank stakeholder
interest and use the resulting ranked list to negotiate the policy conict.
Laws and regulations include any relevant legal aspect that a¤ects the ToE or
the ToE security environment. Examples of such are the EU directive on data
retention (2006/24/EC) [28], which a¤ects all systems storing or processing traf-
c data in the telecommunication domain, the Privacy directive [27] and the
Personopplysningsloven (act relating to the processing of personal data) in Nor-
way. As for policies, the relevant perspectives of the laws and regulations need
to be expressed in terms of required level of condentiality, integrity, availability,
authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability.
Standards cover any security or other relevant standards that the ToE needs
to comply with. Examples of such are the EALs in the Common Criteria and
the security integrity levels (SIL) in IEC 61508 Functional safety of electi-
cal/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems. As for the policies
and laws and regulations, standards need to be expressed in terms of required
level of condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-
repudiation and reliability.
Business goals are usually a bit more fuzzy than the above-mentioned trade-o¤
parameters. The reason for this is that many organisations do not have a clear goal
for their security work. The security goal is often formulated in a highly abstract
manner regarding how to ensure that the organisations information system is
secure enough. Since being secure is a relative term, the trade-o¤analysis requires
precise formulations of the security goals of the involved organisations. Hence,
the business goals for the security work must be expressed as aims to achieve a
certain level of condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability,
non-repudiation and reliability.
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The last trade-o¤ parameter in the set T is priorities. Priorities di¤er from the
other trade-o¤ parameters in that it does not measure security in some way but
rather provide a prioritised list of the requirements formulated by the other trade-
o¤ parameters. Priorities are included to explicitly model the importance rank of
each parameter in relation to the others. Hence, priorities contain a priority list
of the other trade-o¤ parameters in the set T .
Step 6: Derive security solution tness score for the security solution by: (1)
Derive the security level by combining the static security level and the risk level.
(2) Evaluate the treatment level of the security solution. (3) Derive the treatment
e¤ect of the security level from (1), by applying the result from (2), with the
security level from (1). (4) Derive the treatment cost and e¤ect by examining
the relative return on security solution investment, by comparing the relative
di¤erence in security solution cost and misuse cost, in relation with the e¤ect
that the security solution has on the misuse impact and frequency. (5) Compute
security solution tness score by evaluating the result of (4), using the set of
trade-o¤ parameters.
Step 7: Evaluate tness score for each security solution against the other alterna-
tive security solutions in the set A of alternative security solutions. The aim of
this step is to compare the tness score for the alternative security solutions and
identify the best-tted security solution(s). In cases where the aim is to identify
the overall best set of security solutions all involved security solutions need to be
grouped into solution sets and the tness score of these solution sets need to be
compared.

15. The Trade-O¤Tool
Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis is implemented as a
BBN topology and called the trade-o¤ tool. BBN is chosen as the implementa-
tion language as it sophisticatedly handles large scale conditional probabilities
and has, through practical application, proven to be a powerful technique for
reasoning under uncertainty. The notion trade-o¤ analysis topology implies that
the trade-o¤ tool is split into a set of Bayesian networks that interacts. Thus, the
requirement for separation of concerns and independent levels with clear inter-
faces are achieved, as described in Chapter 14. Furthermore, the BBN topology
also follows the trade-o¤ procedure described in Chapter 14. This means that
the trade-o¤ tool can easily evolve as experience is gained and that it is easy
to tailor the trade-o¤ tool to a particular context, such as making a company
specic trade-o¤ tool version.
Figure 15.1 shows the top-level network of the BBN topology of the trade-o¤
tool. The topology consists of four levels and follows the structure of the trade-
o¤ analysis method and the step-wise trade-o¤ procedure described in Chapter
14. As can be seen in the gure level 1 from the trade-o¤ analysis method struc-
ture is employed as the SSLE and RL nodes with associated subnets. Subnets are
connected to the parent network through output nodes in the subnet and corre-
sponding input nodes in the parent network. The latter are modelled as dotted
line ovals in Figure 15.1 where the SSLE input node receives information from
the associated SSLE subnet, the RL input node receives information from the
associated RL subnet, etc.
Subnets are generally a renement of an input node and models the details of the
nodes containing sub-variables and the internal relations of these sub-variables.
It is this hierarchy of subnets, with output nodes and parent networks with in-
put nodes, that enable the propagation of information and evidence through the
topology. Information and evidence are inserted into the observable nodes in the
subnets and propagated through the output nodes in the subnets to the input
nodes in the higher level networks. Hence, information or evidence are usually
not inserted directly into the input node of the parent network. However, as all
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Fig. 15.1. The top-level network of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology
networks in the BBN topology are self-su¢ cient evidence and information can
be inserted at any level in the topology, provided that the level of abstraction is
appropriate.
Level 2 in the trade-o¤ analysis method is employed as the security leveland
SSTL nodes in the top-level network. As can be seen in Figure 15.1 the SSTL
node is a subnet while the security level node is a stochastic intermediate node.
Being an intermediate node means that states of the variables of the security
level node are dependent on the state of the variables in the two subnets SSLE
and RL. In practice this means that before any security solutions are employed
the security level of a ToE is derived by examining the risk level of the ToE and
the existing safeguards in the ToE. The SSTL subnet models the sub-variables
and their internal relations for the input node SSTL. As for the SSLE and RL
subnet the SSTL subnet is connected to the top-level BBN by the corresponding
output and input nodes. The SSTL subnet contains a set of sub variables used
to determine the treatment level of a security solution.
Level 3 in the trade-o¤ analysis method is employed by the subnet TOP, the sto-
chastic intermediate node treatment e¤ects and costsand the two input nodes
BU and TTM. The stochastic intermediate node treatment e¤ect and costtakes
input from the SSTL subnet through the input node SSTL and the intermediate
stochastic node security level and computes the relative treatment e¤ect and
cost for a particular security solution or set of security solutions. The relative
treatment e¤ect and cost is measured in terms of how e¤ective the security so-
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lution or security solution set treats the risk level of the ToE in relation to the
associated costs of procuring and employing the security solution.
The TOP subnet contains the trade-o¤ parameters and models the relations
between the involved trade-o¤ parameters. It is these parameters that are used
to trade-o¤ the security solutions against each other and thus used to determine
how to rate a security solution. Nodes BU and TTM are part of the TOP subnet
as well as being input nodes in the top-level network. The reason for separating
these two trade-o¤ parameters and modelling them explicitly in the top-level
network is that they are of particular importance when determining the tness
score of a security solution and thus needs to be linked directly into the tness
score utility function in level 4 of the trade-o¤ analysis method described in
Chapter 14.
Level 4 in the trade-o¤ analysis method is employed by the utility node Fitness
score utilityand the decision node Fitness score. The tness score decision node
is the target node of the network. This means that this node at all times holds
the current tness score of the security solution being evaluated.
Details of how the trade-o¤ procedure is employed in the trade-o¤ tool are de-
scribed and demonstrated using an example case study of the trade-o¤ tool in
Section 18.1.
15.1 SSLE subnet
In the trade-o¤ tool, the static security level is separate from the operational
risk level of the ToE. The main reason for this separation of concern is to easy
the evolving and maintenance of the trade-o¤ tool. Figure 15.2 shows the static
security level (SSLE) subnet. The SSLE is the renement of the SSLE input node
in the top-level network and hence feeds information into the SSLE input node in
Figure 15.1. The concept staticin this context refers to the fact that it denotes
the security level of the system before any security risks and security solutions are
taken into consideration. Hence, the static security level denotes the original
security level.
The SSLE subnet consists of two parts and these are: (1) The security assurance
components of Common Criteria Part 3 and (2) Asset value. Part 3 of the Com-
mon Criteria contains sets of security assurance components and describes general
development factors that inuence the quality of a system. To ease the security
evaluation according to the Common Critera the security assurance components
are grouped together into Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL), as described in
Chapter 4. Recall that the Common Criteria consist of four parts where Part
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Fig. 15.2. SSLE subnet
1 gives the general model for security evaluation, Part 2 contains the security
functional components, Part 3 contains the security assurance components and
Part 4 is the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM), which gives evaluation
guidelines to assist the Common Criteria evaluator. This is according to other
relevant software and safety quality evaluation standards and best practices, such
as IEC 61508, DO-178B and Capability Maturity Model (CMM).
The SSLE subnet includes six of the assurance classes from Common Criteria
Part 3. These are development (ADV), guidance documents (ADG), life cycle
support (ACL), tests (ATE), vulnerability assessment (AVA) and composition
(ACO). Part 3 has two additional classes: the Protection Prole Evaluation class
(APE) and the security target evaluation class (ASE), but these are not included
in the subnet as only the general development factors are relevant for Phase 2 of
the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis.
Furthermore, Common Criteria Parts 3 consists of the four levels: classes, fami-
lies, components and elements. Classes are used for the most general grouping of
assurance components that share a common general focus. Families are groupings
of components that share a more specic focus but that usually di¤er in empha-
sis or rigour. Components are atomic entities with a specic purpose that are
constructed from individual elements. An element is the lowest level expression
of requirements to be met in the evaluation, see [15] for details. The structure of
the SSLE subnet follows the structure of Common Criteria Part 3 and thus has
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four levels. As can be seen in Figure 15.2 each of the assurance classes included
in the SSLE subnet are input nodes with associated subnets and each of these
subnets have four levels. Level one is the SSLE subnet and includes the assurance
classes. The other three layers for each assurance class models assurance families,
assurance components and assurance elements respectively. In the following the
focus is put on level 1.
As discussed in Chapter 4 security evaluation according to the Common Criteria is
about establishing condence in the quality of the end-product, here measured as
the security level, through observing development factors. In the trade-o¤analysis
in Phase 2 of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis this condence level
is measured using the three states: low, medium and high. This means that all
nodes in the Common Criteria part of the SSLE subnet have these three states
where the value of these states refer to the level of condence in the quality for
the associated node. As all these nodes are stochastic variables the value of the
states are expressed using probability distributions of the subjective belief of the
evaluator or other experts assessing the development factors. Note that evidence
or information can be inserted directly into the Common Criteria assurance input
nodes if such information is available. However, as each of the Common Criteria
assurance nodes are subnets that follow the guidelines of Common Criteria Part
3 the general recommendation is to insert evidence at the element or component
level.
The propagation of evidence and information in the Common Criteria assurance
part of the SSLE subnet follows the guidelines for the EALs as given in Common
Criteria Part 3. This means that the relationship between the variables within
each subnet in each level of the Common Criteria assurance part is modelled to
reect the recommendations for the assurance components for each EAL. In the
trade-o¤ tool this means that the trade-o¤ analysis method models the internal
relations between the assurance components. This is done to reect that an EAL
has a list of assurance components from each assurance family that should be
included. Note that the actual information propagation still is probabilistic and
performed using the Hugin propagation algorithm contained in the HUGIN tool
for the trade-o¤ tool. To simplify the model each involved node reecting infor-
mation that should be included in a particular EAL needs to be in the high state
with a probability of < 0:8 for it to be fullled. There are no requirements for
the low and medium states. These rules are captured in the CC EAL utility
node in the SSLE subnet. The decision on which EAL the ToE might conrm to,
is determined by the rules modelled in the CC EAL utility node. Note that the
use of the wording might conrm to, as the aim is not to replace the Common
Criteria evaluations but rather to incorporate the best practice and guidelines
contained in the Common Criteria.
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The asset value node in the SSLE subnet is also an input node and has a subnet
associated to it. This input node is used to aggregate the asset values for the assets
in the ToE, according to the previously discussed asset valuation categories. More
details are given in the following.
The computation order for the SSLE subnet is that the Common Criteria assur-
ance part and the asset value subnet are computed independently but before the
SSLE decision node as their variables are independent and given as input to the
latter. The static security level is then derived by combining the result from these
two input nodes.
15.1.1 Aggregating asset value for the ToE in the SSLE subnet
Assets and their values is the driving factor in many risk assessment methods,
such as CRAMM, the CORAS framework and AS/NZS 4360. It is however not
always clear how to perform the actual identication and valuation of the assets.
In this work the asset valuation technique of CRAMM is applied on a small scale.
The complexity of asset valuation in a security assessment context is that there are
multiple stakeholders involved. These stakeholders often have di¤erent and even
conicting interests and hence there is a need to specify a prioritised list of these
interests based on something. In the trade-o¤ analysis method and the trade-o¤
tool that something is an importance weight measuring the relative importance
of a particular stakeholder interest in relation to the other stakeholder interest.
The the weight assignment approach used is that of CBAM and the reader is
referred to CBAM [69] for details.
This valuation strategy is however not straightforward in practice as many sit-
uations end up in some sort of negotiation where the strongest stakeholder or
the stakeholder picking up the bill gets his or her will. It is no di¤erent in the
trade-o¤ tool except that the tool includes guidelines about how to measure the
interests against each other using the notion of importance weights. Thus, the
trade-o¤ tool takes the role of a negotiation tool in such situations. The way this
works is that the risk analyst inserts the set of asset values into the trade-o¤ tool
to reect the importance weights and propagates the information. The e¤ect of
the priorities on the security solution costs and risk level can then be observed
and used to guide the asset valuation. This means that if a particular stake-
holder interest leads to a high level of risk that requires an expensive security
solution the stakeholder might reconsider and decide to take some risks, rather
than protecting the asset(s) to the desired level. Figure 15.3 shows the asset value
subnet.
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Fig. 15.3. Asset value subnet
As can be seen in Figure 15.3 the ten asset valuation categories are modelled
as observable nodes in the asset value subnet and thus information is inserted
directly into these nodes. The stakeholder interest weight is represented by the
stakeholder weight node and the stakeholder interest is represented by the com-
bination of asset values given by a particular stakeholder. This means that one
asset value conguration represents one stakeholder interest and that the result-
ing asset value is an aggregate of all stakeholder interest that are derived in the
decision node Asset value. This also means that the asset values from separate
stakeholders should be inserted separately, as the trade-o¤ tool uses the impor-
tance weight of each stakeholder to aggregate asset values. This asset aggregation
schema is called the importance weight asset aggregation schema and consists of
three steps. (1) Determine the importance weight of each stakeholder. (2) Derive
stakeholder interest, by computing the asset value and combining the asset value
given by a stakeholder with the associated stakeholder importance weight for each
stakeholder. (3) Derive the resulting asset value by aggregating the stakeholder
interests over all stakeholders.
The importance weight asset aggregation schema is executed by inserting one
stakeholder interest at a time and then propagating this information to derive
the asset value for the ToE for that particular stakeholder. This is done in the
utility node Asset value utility shown in Figure 15.3 and the resulting asset
value for the ToE is output in the decision node Asset value. Step 3 is achieved
by inserting one stakeholder interest at a time and using the asset value utility
node to update the asset value for the ToE for each stakeholder interest. Please
note that the importance weights are only valid for the context that they are
assigned for. The weights are also relative, meaning that each stakeholder is
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Fig. 15.4. The ToE risk level or operation security level of a ToE as a result of the
environmental (security) and internal (dependability) inuence on the ToE
measured in relation to the other involved stakeholders for a particular context.
The importance weights thus say nothing about the absolute importance of a
stakeholder.
15.2 RL subnet
The risk level (RL) subnet is used to derive the operational risk level of the
security risks identied. The risk level is also called the operational security level
of the ToE and points to the security level of the ToE under operation that are
subject to both inuence from its internal and external environment. The notion
of operational security level was rst discussed in Littlewood et al. (1993) [74] and
describes the situation in a ToE at any point in time, taken all possible inuence
from the ToE security environment into mind. To illustrate the set of inuences
and how they a¤ect the system, the AORDD framework has rened operational
security level into the concept ToE risk level. Figure 15.4 shows the factors that
a¤ect the ToE risk level or the operational security level of a ToE. The model
is based on the dependability framework in Avizienis et al. (2004) [6] and the
integrated framework for security and dependability in Jonsson (1998) [61] and
incorporates both security related factors and dependability or reliability factors.
Please see Houmb and Sallhammar (2005) [46] for details.
Figure 15.5 shows the RL subnet. This subnet provides input to the RL input
node in the top-level network of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. The relevant in-
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Fig. 15.5. RL subnet
formation for the RL subnet is the information used to derive the ToE risk level, as
shown in Figure 14.2. These are the security risk concepts misuse frequency (MF)
and misuse impact (MI), the existing safeguards, such as the security functional
components of Common Criteria Part 2 and the operational security measures
METM and MTTM. In addition, misuse cost (MC) is included and used to sup-
port the evaluation of relative treatment e¤ect and cost in level 3 of the trade-o¤
analysis method.
As can be seen in Figure 15.5 the RL subnet has six observable nodes and three
subnets associated to it. The observable nodes are the stochastic nodes MI,
METM, MTTM, Attacker motivation, Attacker resources and Attacker skills.
The three subnets are: MC, MI and the existing safeguards. The latter subnet
will not be described in detail, as a number of methods exist to determine the
strength of the existing safeguards in a ToE, such as the Common Criteria. States
associated with this node are {low, medium, high}, meaning no safeguards, some
safeguards and su¢ cient set of safeguards.
MTTM points to the average calendar time that it takes from an attacker initi-
ates the misuse until the misuse is successfully completed. METM points to the
average calendar time it takes one attacker to initiate and complete a successful
attack. Both these variables depend on the time it takes to mount the attack, the
knowledge that the attacker has of the ToE and the abilities of the attacker(s).
The latter is modelled as the intermediate node Attacker abilitywhich has three
incoming observable nodes, namely Attacker motivation, Attacker resources and
Attacker skills.
Misuse frequency (MF) is a qualitative or quantitative measure of the rate of
occurrence of a misuse. When qualitative measures are used, they are called
138 15. The Trade-O¤ Tool
Fig. 15.6. Negative and positive misuse impacts
likelihood while a quantitative misuse frequency measure is usually expressed as
either the probability of occurrence within a time unit or the number of events
per time unit. Information on the frequency is inserted directly into the MF node
in the RL subnet as MF is an observable node. More information on the concept
of misuse frequency can be found in the CORAS framework, AS/NZS 4360 and
the like.
Misuse Impact (MI) is measured in terms of asset loss and asset gain. As discussed
earlier one misuse can only have either negative or positive impact on one asset
but the same misuse can have negative impact on one asset and positive impact
on another asset. As for misuse frequency misuse impact can be measured in
terms of qualitative and quantitative values. Figure 15.6 shows an example of a
risk matrix composed of qualitative misuse impact and misuse frequency scales
that covers misuse impact both as asset gain and asset loss.
The misuse impact is an aggregate of all its negative and positive impacts on all
a¤ected assets in the ToE and/or the ToE security environment. To make it feasi-
ble to measure the impact that one misuse has on the asset values in the trade-o¤
tool the misuse impact is categorised according to the asset valuation categories.
This means that a negative impact increases the asset value, as the asset values
are either given on the ordinal scale [1; 10] where 10 represents the worst case
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Fig. 15.7. Misuse impact (MI) subnet
scenario for the asset or according to the qualitative scale {low, medium, high}.
Similar, a positive impact moves the asset value one or more steps closer to the
value 0 or the state low. Determining the misuse impact is done by aggregating
over all negative and positive impacts. In the trade-o¤ tool this is done through
aggregation by inserting one misuse impact at the time, recompiling the misuse
impact and then inserting the next misuse impact etc. Figure 13.11 shows the
misuse impact subnet.
The third input node and subnet in the risk level subnet is the misuse cost
(MC) subnet shown in Figure 15.8. Misuse cost is often hard to measure and
particularly as a pure nancial loss, as it is rarely possible to observe the direct
link between the misuse and the nancial perspectives. Often it is evident that
there is a cost associated with the misuse but the magnitude of it is not. However,
if such information is available it can be inserted directly into the MC node of
the risk level subnet. If such information is not available the MC subnet is used
to derive the misuse cost.
In the MC subnet the cost of a misuse is measured in terms of the three variables:
productivity, TTM and budget. Here, productivity includes factors like a stop
in normal production for a shorter or longer period, delays in the production,
increased hassle and loss of productivity for the end-user. TTM relates to delivery
date for the system and is one of the factors that usually a¤ected as a result of a
misuse. The cost associated with increased TTM may be hard to estimate and the
qualitative scale {low, medium, high} is used to measure this sub variable. The
same qualitative scale is used to measure potential increase in the budget and
reduction in the productivity where the interpretation is that the misuse leads to
a low, medium or high increase in the budget or reduction in the productivity.
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Fig. 15.8. Misuse cost (MC) subnet
The output node of the MC subnet is the decision node Misuse Cost (MC). It is
this misuse cost that is propagated through the MC decision node from the RL
subnet to the RL node in the top-level network. The states of the decision node
equal that of the three observable nodes of the MC subnet and hence the misuse
cost can be low, medium or high.
15.3 SSTL subnet
The security solution treatment level (SSTL) subnet in Figure 15.9 is the re-
nement of the SSTL node in the top-level network of the trade-o¤ tool BBN
topology. This subnet contains variables used to determine the treatment level of
a security solution. This treatment level is then fed back to the top-level network
and used to evaluate the treatment e¤ect and cost of the security solution in
relation to the risks level and static security level of the ToE as described earlier.
The SSTL subnet follows the same structure as the SSLE and RL subnet and
consist of a set of stochastic observable nodes and intermediate nodes, an ad-
ditional subnet, a decision support utility function node and an output decision
node that is connected to the top-level network and hence carries the information
from the SSTL subnet to the top-level network in the trade-o¤ tool.
As can be seen Figure 15.9 the treatment level of a security solution is determined
from the security solution cost (SC) and the security solution e¤ect (SE). Here,
the e¤ect of a security solution is measured in terms of its e¤ect on the risk level
variables METM, MTTM, MI and MF for the misuse that the security solution is
intended to treat. This could be a security risk theme (group of misuses with their
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associated frequency, impact, MTTM and METM, which comprises a security
risk), as discussed in the CORAS framework.
There are several information sources available for determining the solution e¤ect,
such as formal security verication using UMLsec as shown in Houmb et al.
(2006) [48] in Appendix B.2 and Houmb et al. (2005) [44] in Appendix B.3. There
are also more informal ways of obtaining the information, such as subjective
expert judgment. Possible information sources and aggregation techniques for
various types of information (both observable and subjective expert judgments)
is discussed further in Chapter 16.
The states of all nodes involved in determining the solution e¤ect are modelled
according to the qualitative scale {low, medium, high}. This means that if the
node SE on METMis in the state lowthe security solution has a low e¤ect
on the mean e¤ort to misuse and is not able to signicantly increase the e¤ort
needed to complete the misuse. On the other hand, if this node is in the high
state the security solution signicantly increases the mean e¤ort that an attacker
must invest to complete and succeed with the misuse and thus makes it more
unlikely that the misuse can be completed successfully.
The security solution cost (SC) is modelled as an input node with associated sub-
net in the SSTL subnet. The reason for this is the cost of a security solution may
vary from domain to domain and hence are application, system and domain spe-
cic. Thus, the contained sub-variables contributing to the security solution cost
are separated and put into a subnet. This subnet is called the security solution
cost subnet and depicted in Figure 15.10.
In the trade-o¤ analysis method and the trade-o¤ tool the cost of a security
solution is measured as the combination of the four variables: procurement, em-
ployment, maintenance and productivity. Here, procurement covers the actual
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cost of purchasing the solution (the price tag on the security solution). Employ-
ment costs are the costs related to tailoring the security solution to the particular
context and for employing the security solution as part of the ToE and/or the
ToE security environment. Maintenance costs cover expenses related to ensuring
continuous normal operation of the security solution in the ToE after the solu-
tion is employed in the ToE and/or the ToE security environment. These include
extra resources to update the security solution or to respond to user requests in
relation to the functionality of the security solution. Productivity costs cover the
costs related to the hassle that the security solution has on the end-users and
their productivity, such as extra time needed to log-in, extra procedures needed
to carry out etc. As for security e¤ect the state spaced used for all involved vari-
ables is {low, medium, high}. More details are given in the example run of the
trade-o¤ tool in Section 18.1.
15.4 TOP subnet
The TOP subnet renes the trade-o¤ parameter node in the top-level network of
the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. The TOP subnet includes the decision criteria
or variables used to trade security solutions o¤ against each other and hence are
the variables that model the preferences of the stakeholders or decision maker,
such as that the budget being more important than TTM and similar. The trade-
o¤ parameters included in the current version of the trade-o¤ tool are priorities,
budget, business goals, standards, business strategy, law and regulations, TTM,
policies and security risk acceptance criteria. The trade-o¤ parameter priorities
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Fig. 15.11. TOP subnet
di¤er from the other parameters by receiving input from the others and from that
producing a prioritised list of trade-o¤ parameters. Figure 15.11 shows the TOP
subnet.
As can be seen in this gure the target node of the TOP subnet is an output node
that corresponds to the input node TOP in the top-level network. As discussed
earlier, the target node of a BBN represents the objective of the assessment,
which in this case is to derive a prioritised list of the trade-o¤ parameters. The
TOP subnet also has two additional output nodes, namely TTM and BU. As for
the TOP output node both BU and TTM have their associated input nodes in
the top-level network that they fed information into. This construct by explicitly
transferring budget and time-to-market information directly into the top-level
network gives the ability to give budget and TTM double e¤ect when trading o¤
security solutions.
The trade-o¤ variables each represent factors that inuences which security solu-
tion is best-tted for a particular security solution decision situation. By allowing
the prioritising of the trade-o¤ parameters the trade-o¤ tool ensures that a de-
cision makers preferences or needs regarding the development factors actually
inuence the outcome of the security solution evaluation. To support this priori-
tising the trade-o¤ parameter prioritiesare modelled as a decision node with
associated utility function. By using a utility and decision node pair construct to
model priorities the preferences is explicitly modelled. As can be seen in Figure
15.11 the parameter priorities receive input from the other trade-o¤ parameters
and derive the prioritised trade-o¤ parameters list using the node probability
matrix of its utility node. This node probability matrix species the relations
between the states of all the other trade-o¤ parameters and makes the network
exible in tailoring the trade-o¤ tool and to quickly incorporate new trade-o¤ pa-
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rameters. Hence, the node probability matrix of the TOP priorities utility node
can be used to make the BBN topology company, system and domain specic.
In addition to the above-mentioned node probability matrix of the utility node,
conditional expressions can be used to explicitly model precedence constructs and
dependencies, such as if-then-else constructs. An example of such are: IF PRI.BU
== 1THEN TOP.BU=high, which explicitly species that budget is given a
high priority whenever the budget is given the priority 1.
In a Bayesian network or an inuence diagram all nodes have one or more states
that they can be in. Which state a node is in at a particular point in time de-
pends on the density probability function of the node and the states of other
nodes connected to this node with incoming arches. As the TOP priorities deci-
sion node outputs a prioritised list of the other trade-o¤ parameters there is one
corresponding state for each incoming trade-o¤ parameter in the TOP priorities
node. The node BU denotes the budget available for mitigating security risks and
is given as the interval [min;max] wheremin is the minimum budget available for
mitigating security risks andmax is the maximum budget available for mitigating
security risks. The variable BG species security specic business goals, such as
that the condentiality of customer information is a critical business asset. BG is
comprised of seven states: {Conf, Integr, Avail, NonR, Accnt, Auth, Relia} cor-
responding to condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability,
non-repudiation and reliability. These are the seven security attributes included
in the denition of information security in the AORDD framework. The node
STA is used to specify standards that the system must adhere to and the node
BS covers security issues related to the business strategy expressed as the degree
of importance of security as a quality measure for the business. LR covers laws
or regulations for security issues that the system must comply by, such as the
data privacy regulations in Personopplysningsloven (act relating to the process-
ing of personal data) in Norway. SAC represents security risk acceptance criteria
and are used to specify the acceptable risk level for the ToE and the node POL
denotes the relevant security policies that the ToE should comply by. As for the
BG node, the states of STA, BS, LR and POL are the seven security attributes.
TTM is given as the interval [mindate;maxdate] where mindate is the earliest
TTM date and maxdate is the latest TTM date. Table 15.1 shows the nodes and
their states for the TOP subnet.
The states assigned to the nodes in the trade-o¤ tool may di¤er and can be
tailored to the information that is available. The state space described for the
trade-o¤ tool in this chapter is an examples. In Section 18.1 the trade-o¤ analysis
method and the trade-o¤ tool are demonstrated using the example state space
described here. Part 6 also contains a discussion on how to tailor the trade-o¤
tool for a particular context while Chapter 16 looks into potential information
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Table 15.1. Nodes and their states in the TOP subnet
Node/Variable States
TOP BU, TTM, Conf, Integr, Avail, NonR, Ac-
cnt, Auth and Relia
PRI BU, BG, BS, LR, TTM, SAC, POL
BU [min, max]
TTM [mindate, maxdate]
SAC, STA,
BG, BS and
POL
Conf, Integr, Avail, NonR, Accnt, Auth
and Relia
sources for the variables in the trade-o¤ tool. Note that the trade-o¤ tool has
been developed using the action research based development process described in
Part 1 and that parts of the results from the last case study by examples is given
in Section 18.1. Details on the trade-o¤ tool and examples of its use can also be
found in Houmb et al. (2006) [48] enclosed as Appendix B.2 and Houmb et al.
(2005) [44] enclosed as Appendix B.3.

Part V
Aggregating Information in the Trade-O¤Tool

16. Information Sources for Misuse and Security
Solution Variable Estimation
The AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis makes use of misuse and security
solution variables to estimate the impact and cost of a misuse and the e¤ect and
the cost of a security solution. These are the inputs to the trade-o¤ tool and
thus are necessary information to derive the best-tted security solution or set
of security solution. Furthermore, to trade o¤ the security solutions against each
other the involved variables must be comparable and hence they must be either
qualitatively or quantitatively measurable.
Due to the lack of su¢ cient amount of empirical data to measure the misuse
and security solution variables and due to the great deal of uncertainty involved
in determining which security solution best ts a particular security risk, there
is a need to extend the trade-o¤ tool with techniques for aggregating whatever
information available as input to the trade-o¤ tool.
There are two main types of information sources that can be used to estimate
misuse and security solution variables. These are: (1) Observable information and
(2) Subjective or interpreted information. Observable information is also referred
to as empirical information (or objective information) and includes informa-
tion from sources that have directly observed or experienced a phenomenon. Such
sources have not been biased by human opinions, meaning that the sources have
gained knowledge or experience by observing events and facts. Interpreted infor-
mation sources include sources that have indirectly observed phenomena or those
that pose a particular set of knowledge and experience, such as subjective expert
judgments.
16.1 Sources for observable information
Observable information sources are most often represented using the classical
interpretation of probability, meaning that these describe some event and the
observed occurrence of this event. Here, uncertainty is associated with how repre-
sentative the observations are of the actual facts. Observable information sources
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includes among other things publicly available experience repositories, company
condential experience repositories, domain knowledge (facts), recommendation
or best practice, standards (a collection of best practice), results from risk as-
sessment, results from formal security verication, honeypot log-les, Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) log-les and other type of log-les, such as Firewall
log-les.
Information from IDS and honeypots are real-time information sources and thus
record information in real-time. Such sources are useful both for deriving the
misuse scenario and for estimating misuse occurrence frequencies and security
solution e¤ects. The latter can be done by employing two log periods, one be-
fore and one after the employment of a security solution. There are many ways
that information can be obtained from real-time information sources and some
examples are given in the following.
The real-time observable information source Snort is a freeware IDS and fre-
quently used both in academia and in industry. An example of output from Snort
for the Internet worm CodeRed is:
10/30-11:47:14.834837 0:80:1C:CE:8C:0! 0:10:60:DB:37:E5 type:0x800 len:0x3E 129.241.216.114:1203
! 129.241.209.154:139 TCP TTL:125 TOS:0x0 ID:45447 IpLen:20 DgmLen:48 DF ******S* Seq:
0x6F12FE95 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0xFFFF TcpLen: 28 TCP Options (4) => MSS: 1260 NOP NOP SackOK.
The above is interpreted as following:
{date}{time} {source MAC address} ! {destination MAC address} {type} {length} {source ad-
dress} ! {destination address} {protocol} {TTL} {TOS} {ID} {IP- length} {Datagram length}
{Flags}{Sequence number} {Acknowledgment} {Window} {TCPlength} {TCP options}
The above information from Snort is an example of transport layer logging (layer
4 in the OSI reference model and layer 3 in the TCP/IP protocol stack), in this
case TCP. As for anti-virus software Snort triggers alarms according to known
signatures describing suspicious activity. By conguring the logging mechanism,
Snort can be set up to monitor particular attacks, such as specic Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. Due to its exible conguration abilities Snort has the
ability to record potential impacts and frequency of DoS attacks and therefore
represents an e¤ective and real-time gathers of information for estimating both
misuse and security solution variables. However, for the logging to be e¤ective
and accurate the IDS should be combined with a honeypot, such as the freeware
honeypot Honeyd [77]. Such a conguration gives a second layer of logging which
is necessary due to the problem of false positives with IDS. Using both IDS and
honeypot makes it possible to compare and calibrate the two information sources
against each other to eliminate some of the false positives.
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A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in all unauthorised
or illicit use of that resource [94]. The advantages of an honeypot is its ability
to capture new attacks and attack methods by observing, responding to and
documenting interactions with its environment. Honeypots come in a wide range
of types and more advanced types are able to capture more information than
a simpler and low-interaction honeypot. Honeypots are able to capture attack
information easily, as they are set up as resources that normally are not used by
any authorised users. This limits the problem with false positives. It also means
that any data sent from the honeypot indicates a successful attack which makes
it easier to measure events such as the number of successful attacks within a
particular time frame.
There are three main categories of honeypots available. These are low-interaction,
middle-interaction and high-interaction honeypots. The low-interaction honey-
pots have limited interaction with the attackers and hence are limited in their
ability to detect more advanced and innovative attacks. Low-interaction hon-
eypots can only simulate parts of an operating system and some applications.
Middle-interaction honeypots are able to simulate an entire operation system
and its belonging applications and hence provide more realistic information than
the low-interaction honeypots. High-interaction honeypots are real system that
usually are employed in parallel with the production system, only separated by
an attack routing gateway called Honeywall. However, employing the honeypot
as a real system involves the risk of attackers taking over the honeypot and using
it as a gateway into the network. This problem has been further elaborated on
in Østvang (2004) [81] and Østvang and Houmb (2004) [82].
Combing the two information sources IDS and honeypot gives the ability to test
the e¤ect that a particular security solution has on a particular misuse in a
realistic environment. Assume that a set of security solutions S are identied as
potential treatments for DoS attacks. Each security solution si where i points to a
particular security solutions is employed into the Honeyd simulation environment
for the logging period 4t. Here, 4t is dened as the time di¤erence between start
time and end time of the logging. By taking each security solution through a series
of logging periods an estimate for the anticipated number of DoS attacks can by
derived by calculating the set average. From this the anticipated e¤ect on DoS
attacks for each security solution can be derived and thus the solution tness for
DoS attacks have been observed. To make the evaluation as realistic as possible
the logging period 4t should cover the same amount of time and be comparable
as there are often di¤erences in number of attack tries during weekends than
during week days.
In the example given in Section 18.1 the e¤ect of two DoS security solutions for
a .NET e-commerce system are measured using the combination of Snort and
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Honeyd. This is done by simulating the employment of each security solution
separately and then comparing the result of the logging with the result of the
simulation of the .NET e-commerce system without any DoS solutions. By doing
so a real-time simulation of future congurations of ToEs can be performed. The
trick, in this context is that the alternative security solutions are included into the
simulation environment so their actual e¤ect on preventing DoS attacks can be
observed. Note that there are still problems creating a realistic and comparable
context for the simulation.
Log-les from rewalls, anti-virus rewalls, Internet gateways (routers) etc. pro-
vide information such as the source and destination IP addresses and the accessed
TCP port for all connection attempts. Such logging mechanism can also employ
action rules, such as ltering mechanisms on the IP and TCP levels. Here, l-
tering means to congure the router with access lists containing either single IP
addresses or ranges of IP addresses. The rules used are among others access
and deny. In addition, rewalls provide application layer ltering in combina-
tion with the two other ltering functions. In the trade-o¤ tool information on
who tried to contact whom, at what time and for what reason is of interest. Such
information can provide information on whether there has been an attempt of
port scan or other DoS attacks that was not successfull due to the ltering rules.
These pieces of information are valuable for both the misuse and the security
solution variables in the trade-o¤ tool.
Virus and spyware scanners also use log-les to record the result of their activities.
In addition, these mechanisms have the capability to issue alarms and perform
prescribed actions to remove the problem detected, such as removing a virus and
closing a connection. A vulnerability scanner works in a similar way but has more
options when it comes to the actions. It detects and proposes solutions to the
vulnerabilities detected, if such solutions exist (such as a list of downloadable
vulnerability xes). These tools are all helpful in detecting vulnerabilities in the
system and other relevant information for the misuse variables in the trade-o¤
tool. These tools can also be used to identify potential security solutions.
Public repositories are used to store experience and best practise from various
relevant activities that are publicly available. Examples of such are the quarterly
reports from Norsk Senter for Informasjonssikring (NorSIS) in Norway, incident
and security reports and white papers from CERT, NIST, NSA and CSO, reports
from the Honeynet-project and other attack trend reports. A repository can also
be specic to a company and in such cases they are called company experience
repositories. Often these repositories contain company condential information
and thus the access to them is restricted. The information that these two types
of repositories contain is mostly related to the misuse variables in the trade-o¤
tool. However, the repositories might also provide input to the security solution
16.1 Sources for observable information 153
variables, such as suggested solutions to a particular security problem and exam-
ples of unsolved issues with these that reduce their ability to withstand certain
attacks.
Domain knowledge is similar to the experience repositories but represent estab-
lished knowledge within a particular domain, such as the e-commerce domain.
Information denoted domain knowledge is based on observations of multiple co-
herent events over a certain amount of time. Examples are lists of well-known vul-
nerabilities in existing systems, such as patch lists with downloadable patches for
a particular operating system version or application. Such information is highly
relevant for the both the misuse and the security solution variables in the trade-o¤
tool.
Recommendations and standards are best practice and industry standards de-
rived from long-term experience from industry or similar, such as the quality
assurance best practise and standards (e.g. CMM and ISO 9000). Recommen-
dations could also take the form of interpreted information source type, such as
subjective recommendation from domain experts. Examples of recommendations
are those captured in Common Criteria Protection Proles (PP). Examples of
security standards for security level evaluation are the Common Criteria, Infor-
mation Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) and ISO 17799 Infor-
mation technology Code of Practice for information security management.
System analysis and tests are module and integration tests performed on both
or either of the design models and the implementation. Vulnerability analysis is
such as those in the vulnerability assessment techniques and guidelines described
for the Common Criteria assurance class vulnerability assessment (AVA). The
main aim of these tests is to detect design aws or security problems in the
implementation and to check whether the implemented system meets the security
requirements outlined in the design models.
Formal security verication covers techniques that use mathematical rigour to
check a system model for aws and for resistance to attacks. An example of this
is the UMLsec security verication approach described in Houmb et al. (2005)
[44] (Appendix B.3). Results from security verication are applicable to both the
misuse and the security solution variables of the trade-o¤ tool. The example given
in [44] demonstrates the use of such information as input to the security solution
variables.
Risk assessment results give information on the potential misuses, their potential
frequency and their associated impacts on the system assets. In some cases a
risk assessment may also identify alternative security solutions and perform an
evaluation of these solutions. The result from such activities is thus relevant for
both the misuse and the security solution variables of the trade-o¤ tool.
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16.2 Sources for subjective or interpreted information
Subjective information sources provide information for the misuse and security
solution variables according to the subjectivistic interpretation. Thus, the sub-
jective information sources express their uncertainty on some event, rather than
providing a value and trying to estimate how close this value is to the actual value.
The reader should note however that the subjective or interpreted information
sources described here are according to the truly subjective interpretation and
not the Bayesian interpretation. The important factor in this context is that with
the truly subjective approach the problem of expressing the uncertainty related
to a true value is avoided, as it is the information sources uncertainty that is
expressed. See Chapter 5 and DeFinetti (1973) [31, 32] for details.
The AORDD framework and the trade-o¤ tool support three categories of subjec-
tive information sources, namely subjective expert judgment, interpreted expert
information and expert judgment on prior experience from similar systems.
Subjective expert judgment makes use of domain experts, developers, security
experts, stakeholders and other sources that are considered to posses a signicant
amount of understanding of the problem being assessed. The process of collecting
these opinions consists of choosing the domain experts, elicitation of the expert
opinions and analysis of potential biases using seed and calibration variables, as
discussed in Chapter 7.
In subjective expert judgment, the experts have directly gained knowledge and
experience that they use when providing information. This is di¤erent than for
the subjective information source interpreted expert judgment where an expert
interprets events observed by external sources, such as the opinion from a do-
main expert or a directly observable source. Here, the experts base their opinion
on their interpretation of information from other sources. This means that the
information these source provides is indirect.
The third category of subjective information sources is expert judgment on prior
experience from similar systems. Here, the experts base their opinion on empiri-
cal information from the use of similar systems or on their own experience from
working with a similar system. It is important however that the experience infor-
mation used to assess misuse and/or security solution variables for a ToE is from
a system that is similar to such a degree that the information is applicable to the
ToE. To ensure documentation of the basis of the opinions provided the experts
need to document their reasoning about the di¤erence between the system that
the empirical information or experience is gathered and the ToE and the e¤ects
that eventual di¤erences have on the information provided.
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In the following, the trust-based performance weighting schema for informa-
tion aggregation of misuse and security solution variables in the trade-o¤ tool
is described. This information aggregation schema is able to combine all above-
mentioned information source categories, both for observable information sources
and subjective information sources.

17. Trust-Based Information Aggregation Schema
There are a variety of performance-based aggregation techniques, such as the
copula model developed by Jouini and Clemen (1996) [66] and the dependence-
based aggregation techniques developed by Cooke and his group at Delft Uni-
versity of Technology [68, 18, 72, 38]. The latter is also supported by their
expert aggregation program Excalibur (Software product downloadable from
http://ssor.twi.tudelft.nl/~risk/software/excalibur.html). These techniques are tai-
lored for aggregating subjective expert judgment. However, as there is some ob-
servable information available for misuse and security solution variables, tech-
niques for combining observable and subjective information is needed.
The AORDD framework renes and extends the current aggregation approaches
in its trust-based information aggregation schema. This schema di¤ers from other
performance information aggregation techniques in that it enables the combina-
tion of objective and subjective information by adding the perceived condence
of each information source to the aggregation weights. This is done through the
introduction of the notion of trust, in addition to calibration variables, when
deriving the aggregation weights.
In most trust-based approaches trust is measured using binary entities such as
total trust or no trust. See Ray and Chakraborty [88] for examples of related
work on binary trust approaches. The vector trust model developed by Ray and
Chakraborty [87, 88] extends the binary approaches by considering degrees of
trust. In their model trust is specied as a vector of numeric values with the three
parameters: knowledge, experience and recommendation where each of these ele-
ments inuence the level of trust. The model allows trust to be a value in the range
v 2 [ 1; 1] and ? where  1 represents total distrust, 1 represents total trust, 0
represents no-trust and ? represents situations where not enough information
are available to evaluate the trust level. Values in the range [ 1; 0] denotes semi-
untrustworthiness and values in the range [0; 1] denotes semi-trustworthiness.
The trust-based performance weight information aggregation schema is based on
the vector trust model in [87, 88], but has been rened and extended to tailor the
model for information aggregation as input to the trade-o¤ tool. Among other
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things this includes the introduction of an additional dimension when assessing
trust.
In this work trust is considered to be between a decision maker A and an in-
formation source bi and there might be several information sources that provide
information to the decision maker. The set of information sources is thus denoted
B where B = fb1; :::; bi; :::bng. Trust and distrust in relation to estimating misuse
and security solution variables is dened as the following (note that these den-
itions are rened from [88] to target information gathering and aggregation for
security solution evaluation).
Denition Trust is dened to be the rm belief in the competence of an entity
to provide accurate and correct information within a specic context.
Denition Distrust is dened to be the rm belief in the incompetence of an
entity to provide accurate and correct information within a specic context.
Figure 17.1 shows the ve steps of the information aggregation schema for the
trade-o¤ tool. As can be seen in the gure, the rst four steps of this schema
cover the trust-based performance weighting schema while Step 5 of the schema
covers the trust-based information aggregation. This separation of the informa-
tion aggregation schema is done to allow for the use of alternative methods, both
to derive the internal relative information source weights and for aggregating the
information using the information source weights.
Step 1 concerns the specication of the trust context. This is an important task
when combining information from di¤erent sources and of di¤erent types as in-
formation given under di¤erent trust contexts cannot directly be combined. The
trust context is specied using a trust context function C(T ). This function takes
the trust purpose and assumptions such as input and returns the context of the
trust relationship as output.
Step 2 concerns the specication of the relationship between the set of informa-
tion sources B using knowledge domain models and is measured in terms of the
perceived knowledge level, against the desired knowledge level and the perceived
experience level. Both the knowledge level and the experience level are measured
in relation to the problem in question and used to derive the information source
perceived and relative knowledge and experience level.
The relationship between the information sources is a relative measure within B.
These relationships denote the internal rank and needs to be determined before
the relationship between the decision maker and the information sources are
examined. The latter is the task of Step 3 where the trust relationships between
the decision maker and the information sources are evaluated using the three
trust variables: knowledge, experience and recommendation.
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Fig. 17.1. Overview of the ve steps of the trust-based information aggregation schema
In Step 4 the trust relationship between the decision maker and the information
sources derived in Step 3 are applied to the relative internal trust relationship
between the information sources from Step 2. This results in the trust-based
information source performance weights. Step 4 is thus the last step of the trust-
based performance weighting schema.
Step 5 is the trust-based information aggregation technique and concerns the
aggregation of information from the information sources using the trust-based
information source performance weights from Step 4. This is done by combining
the information source weights with the information provided from each informa-
tion source over all information sources. It is Step 5 of the trust-based information
aggregation schema that connects the schema with the trade-o¤ tool described
in Part 4. A demonstration of the use of Step 5 in the trade-o¤ tool is given in
Section 18.1.
Note that Step 1 and 3 are renements of parts of the vector trust model [87, 88]
while all other steps are new.
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17.1 Step 1: Specify trust context
Step 1 in the trust-based information aggregation schema species the trust con-
text for the information elicitation and aggregation. The trust context denes
under which conditions the trust relationships for information aggregation are
established. Furthermore, the trust context is also used to make sure that the
decision maker and the information sources have the same understanding of both
the problem being assessed and the information being provided for the trade-o¤
tool. The way that the trust context is specied might include several variables
as well as varying from case to case depending on the trust purpose as discussed
by Branchaud and Flinn (2004) [10].
The purpose of a trust relationship states why the relationship is established, such
as The purpose of the trust relationship between the decision maker A and the
information source bi is that of bi providing information on <case description>.
A case description represents the problem being assessed. An example of such is
the number of average DoS attacks per month for the coming year for a particular
e-commerce system. More information on case description is in Chapter 7.
The assumptions of a trust relationship species the understanding that the in-
volved parties have about the information provided and received. This is com-
prised of the decision makers understanding of the information provided by the
information source and the information sources understanding of the informa-
tion provided to the decision maker. These two understandings need to be equal
to ensure that all pieces of information are accurate and in accordance with the
information request (the case description) from the decision maker.
Denition The atomic purpose of a trust relationship A C! bi is that of
 Provide information on <case description>. The main reason for es-
tablishing the trust relationship is for one information source to provide
correct and accurate information on <case description> where case de-
scription is a clear and unambiguous model of the problem being assessed.
Denition The Purpose of a trust relationship is that of (modied from Ray
and Chakraborty [87])
 An atomic purpose is a purpose of a trust relationship,
 The negation of an atomic purpose denoted by not atomic purpose is a
purpose,
 Two or more purposes connected by the operator and form a purpose,
 Two or more purposes connected by the operator or form a purpose,
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 Nothing else is a purpose.
The assumption of a trust context denotes any understanding or prerequisite
made by any of the involved parties when requesting and providing informa-
tion. Hence, assumptions is used to specify the setting and understanding of the
information given or received.
Denition The atomic assumptions of a trust relationship A C! bi is that of
 Decision makers understanding of the information request. This
denotes the decision makers own understanding of the information request
that the decision maker provides to the information source.
 Information sources understanding of the information request.
This denotes the information sources understanding of the information
request as given by the decision maker.
 Decision makers understanding of the information provided. This
denotes the decision makers understanding of the information as provided
by the information source.
 Information sources understanding of the information provided.
This denotes the information sources own understanding of the informa-
tion that the information source provide to the decision maker.
Denition The assumptions of a trust relationship is that of
 An atomic assumption is an assumption of a trust relationship,
 The negation of an atomic assumption denoted by not atomic assump-
tion, is an assumption
 Two or more assumptions connected by the operator and form an as-
sumption,
 Two or more assumptions connected by the operator orform an assump-
tion,
 Nothing else is an assumption.
By combining trust purpose and trust assumptions trust is dened as the inter-
related conditions in which trust exists or occurs. This trust context is specied
using a trust context function C(T ).
Denition The trust context function C(T ) of a trust relationship T is a function
that takes the trust relationship as input and returns the context of the trust
relationship as output (modied from Ray and Chakraborty [87]).
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Denition Let U denote the set of trust purposes and A the set of trust as-
sumptions. Then the trust context C(T ) of a trust relationship is dened as
(modied from Ray and Chakraborty [87])
 A tuple of the form < ui; ai > is a trust context where ui 2 U and ai 2 A,
 Two or more trust contexts connected by the operator andform a trust
context,
 Two or more trust contexts connected by the operator or form a trust
context,
 Nothing else is a trust context.
17.2 Step 2: Trust relationship between information sources
Step 2 of the trust-based information aggregation scheme concerns assessing and
deriving the trust relationship between the set of information sources in B. These
relations are also called information source relative trustworthiness. The rst
version of the technique to derive information source relative trustworthiness was
described in Houmb, Ray and Ray (2006) [45].
Determining information source relative trustworthiness to express the perceived
abilities of an information source for providing accurate and correct information
for a particular case description is done using two trust variables: (1) knowledge
level and (2) expertise level. Details on how to derive these two levels is given in
the following.
17.2.1 Knowledge level
The trust variable knowledge level is used to express the perceived and relevant
domain knowledge for an information source according to the case description and
the trust context and is measured in terms of a knowledge score. Here, knowl-
edge covers the perceived aggregate of information that an information source
possesses. Knowledge is most often perceived either through education or profes-
sional work situations.
Knowledge level is a subjective measure and should therefore be assessed not
only by the information source itself but also by an evaluator (as done during
evaluation according to the Common Criteria) or a third party that has su¢ -
cient overview of both the education and work experience for the information
source. In addition, the third party or the evaluator has to be su¢ ciently aware
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of the implications of the case description and the purpose and assumptions of
the information that the information source is providing, as dened by the trust
context. Such an evaluator or third party is external to a decision maker (the en-
tity requesting information) and hence the trust relationship between the decision
maker and the external source should also be established and evaluated However,
in the trust-based performance weighting schema all trust relationships between
the decision maker and an external source are assumed to have the trust value 1.
This means that the external source is considered to be totally trustworthy.
Deriving the knowledge level of an information source is done using three activi-
ties. These are: (1) Establish the reference knowledge domain model. (2) Estab-
lish the information source knowledge domain model for each information source.
(3) Derive the relative knowledge score for each information source, by evaluation
the information source knowledge domain models against the reference knowledge
domain model normalised over all information sources. Estimating the relative
knowledge score from the comparison in activity 3 might be done in a number of
ways. In the example in Section 18.1, a simple score-based approach is used.
When computing the knowledge score of an information source the two types of
knowledge domain models derived in activities 1 and 2 have di¤erent purposes
in the computation and are thus modelled separately. The reference knowledge
domain model is used to derive the relative score for each of the knowledge
domains in the reference model. This is done using the knowledge domain score
model of activity 1. The information source knowledge domain models, which are
evaluated against the reference knowledge domain model to derive the knowledge
score of the information sources, describes the perceived knowledge level for each
of the knowledge domains for each information source. These models express the
knowledge score for each of the information sources and are derived using the
information source knowledge domain score model in activity 2.
Activity 1: Establish the reference knowledge domain model. The ref-
erence knowledge domain model consists of a set of knowledge domains relevant
for the case description and a specication of their internal relations. The inter-
nal relations are measured as the relative importance of each involved knowledge
domain. The knowledge domains might be derived using several techniques and
a reference knowledge domain model is used to describe the relevant knowledge
for the case description under the conditions given in the trust context.
Figure 17.2 shows a general reference knowledge domain model consisting of four
domains. The gure shows both the involved knowledge domains and their relative
importance weights. As can be seen in the gure the four domains are: domain
A, domain B, domain C and domain D and the relative importance weight for all
knowledge domains is 0:25 in the importance weight interval [0; 1]. Section 18.1
gives an example of a reference knowledge domain model, information source
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Fig. 17.2. General reference knowledge domain model
knowledge domain models and how to compare the two types of models to derive
the knowledge score.
Usually, the internal relation between the knowledge domains of the reference
knowledge domain model is not directly given or extractable and several external
sources must be used to derive the internal relation. This is supported by the
knowledge domain score model described below.
Knowledge domain score model derives the relative importance and cover-
age measured as knowledge domain score for each knowledge domain in the
reference knowledge domain model according to the trust context C.
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WKimp(x) =
h
[wKimp(x(j))]
m
j=1
i
x2X
(17.1)
qKimp=
"
1P
jWKimp(x(j))
#
x2X
(17.2)
WRKimp(x) = [qKimpWKimp(x)]x2X (17.3)
WaggrKimp(X) = faggrKimp([WRKimp(x(j))]x2X) (17.4)
WKcov(x) =
h
[wKcov(x(j))]
m
j=1
i
x2X
(17.5)
qKcov=
"
1P
jWKcov(x(j))
#
x2X
(17.6)
WRKcov(x) = [qKcovWKcov(x)]x2X (17.7)
WaggrKcov(X(j)) = faggrKcov([WRKcov(x)]x2X) (17.8)
WinitKDscore(X) =W aggrKimp(X)W aggrKcov(X) (17.9)
qinitKDscore=
1P
jW initKscore(X(j))
(17.10)
WDKscore(X) = qinitKscoreW initKDscore(X) (17.11)
As can be seen in the knowledge domain score model each knowledge domain
in the reference knowledge domain model is measured in terms of their impor-
tance (weight) and coverage (weight) and modelled as the vectors wKimp and
wKcov respectively. Here, coverage measures the extent that a knowledge domain
covers the required knowledge to assess the particular case description, which
is the problem being assessed. Importance on the other hand measures the im-
portance that the knowledge domain has for an information source to provide
accurate information. More details on this distinction is given in the example in
Section 18.1.
A knowledge domain is denoted j and the set of knowledge domains is denoted
J . Furthermore, there are m number of j in J , #j 2 J = m and thus the wKimp
and wKcov vectors each have m elements. Note as m is a variable the number of
knowledge domains may vary from case to case.
The importance and coverage weights for each knowledge domain in the reference
knowledge domain model might be assigned by any of the involved evaluators or
third parities, such as stakeholders, standards or regulations. This means that
there might be several data sets for the importance and coverage of a particular
knowledge domain. These stakeholders, standards, regulations etc. are denoted
external sources x and the set of external sources are denote X. The importance
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and coverage for each external source x 2 X are thus modelled as WKimp(x) =
[wKimp(x(j))]
m
j=1 and WKcov(x) = [wKcov(x(j))]
m
j=1.
The knowledge domain score model rst considers the importance weights. Equa-
tion 17.1 in the knowledge domain score model derives the importance vector
WKimp(x) for all external sources in X. This gives #x 2 X number of impor-
tance vectors. These importance vectors represent the initial importance weights
and must be normalised to express relative knowledge domain internal relation.
This is done in (17.3) using the normalisation factor derived in (17.2) and results
in #x 2 X number of normalised importance weight vectors.
As it is easier to work with one importance weight vector than an arbitrary num-
ber of such vectors, the set of importance weight vectors are combined into one
importance weight vector. This is done using the aggregation function faggrKimp
in Equation 17.4. Here, the aggregation function includes normalisation and the
output from the aggregation is one aggregated normalised importance weight
vector.
The aggregation can be done using one of several available aggregation techniques,
such as those described in Cooke (1991) [16]. In the example in Section 18.1 the
aggregation is done by taking the arithmetic average. Taking the arithmetic aver-
age is the simplest type of expert opinion aggregation and thus does not capture
the di¤erences in the ability of x to evaluate the relations between knowledge
domains.
Deriving the coverage weights for each knowledge domain is performed by fol-
lowing the same procedure as for deriving the importance weight. The coverage
weight vector for each x 2 X is derived using Equation 17.5. This result in
#x 2 X of not normalised coverage weight vectors. Before these coverage weight
vectors can be combined each must be normalised, which is done in (17.7) using
the normalisation factor derived in (17.6). The aggregation of the #x 2 X of
normalised coverage weight vectors derived in (17.7) is then aggregated in (17.8).
The importance score and coverage score vectors are then combined into an initial
knowledge domain score vector using Equation 17.9. Finally, the initial knowledge
domain scores are normalised in (17.11) using the normalisation factor derived
in (17.10).
Activity 2: Establish the information source knowledge domain model
for each information source. Activity 2 is supported by the information
source knowledge domain score model described below. This model derives the
score of an information source for each of the knowledge domains in the reference
knowledge domain model. This is done independently from assessing the impor-
tance and coverage of the knowledge domains in the reference knowledge domain
model.
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As for the knowledge domain score model, there might be several external sources
(third parties) providing information used to evaluate the knowledge of an infor-
mation source. Here, these external sources are denoted y to specify that these
external sources are di¤erent from those in the knowledge domain score model
and that x and y are independent. However, in practice x and y might be di¤er-
ent external sources or the same sources playing di¤erent roles. The set of these
external sources is denoted Y .
Information source knowledge domain score model derives the relative score
for each knowledge domain in the reference knowledge domain model for an
information source bi according to the trust context C.
WKis(y(bi)) =
h
[wKis(bi(j))]
m
j=1
i
y2Y
(17.12)
qKis=
"
1P
jWKis(bi(j)))
#
y2Y
(17.13)
WRKis(y(bi)) = [qKisW is(y(bi))]y2Y (17.14)
WaggrKis(Y (bi)) = faggrKis([WRKis(y(bi))]y2Y ) (17.15)
As can be seen in the information source knowledge domain score model each ex-
ternal source y in the set of external sources Y gives information on the knowledge
level for information source bi. The output of the information source knowledge
domain score model is a vector of information source knowledge domain score ag-
gregated over all y in Y . This vector is denoted WaggrKis(Y (bi)) and the model
derives one such vector for each information source bi 2 B.
Equation 17.12 is used to assess the score for information source bi, for all knowl-
edge domains in the reference knowledge domain model. This is done for all
external sources, meaning all y 2 Y and result in #y 2 Y of vectors. As these
vectors are not normalised their contained knowledge score for each knowledge
domain in the reference knowledge domain model must ve updated to express
the relation between thema. This is done by normalising all #y 2 Y number of
vectors in (17.14) using the normalisation factor derived in (17.13).
To obtain one information knowledge domain score vector for bi, the #y 2 Y
number of vectors derived in (17.14) is combined into one vector by aggregating
over Y using the aggregation function faggrKis in (17.15). Note that the aggrega-
tion function includes normalisation and that the output of the aggregation thus
is a normalised vector.
Activity 3: Derive the relative information source knowledge score.
The result from the knowledge domain score model and the information source
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knowledge score model is then combined to derive the knowledge score for the
information source bi. This is done in activity 3, which is supported by the knowl-
edge score model described below.
Knowledge score model derives the knowledge score for an information source
bi by combining the knowledge domain scores from the knowledge domain
score model with the values for each knowledge domain for an information
source bi derived in the information source knowledge domain score model.
WKscore(bi) =
X
bi2B
WDKscore(X)W aggrKis(Y (bi)) (17.16)
The result from the knowledge score model is a vector holding the score that
an information source bi has for each knowledge domain contained in the ref-
erence knowledge domain model. This resulting knowledge score vector is de-
rived by component-based multiplication of the two vectors WDKscore(X) and
WaggrKis(Y (bi)) using Equation 17.16. By diving over the number 1 it makes it
easier to combine the knowledge score vector with the experience score to derive
the information source trustworthiness weight for bi which is the output of Step
2 of the trust-based performance weighting scheme.
Note that the factor of trustworthiness of the external sources in X and Y are not
considered in this model. As mentioned earlier all external sources are considered
to be completely trustworthy and thus all these trust relationships are assigned
trust value 1.
17.2.2 Expertise level
The second trust variable expertise level concerns the perceived level of expertise
that a particular information source has obtained in some way. Determining who
is an expert and thus has a high level of expertise is usually highly subjective
and determined by such as a certied assessor in a security evaluation. Here, the
trust-based information aggregation schema is not concerned with the absolute
measure of the expertise level but rather the relative perceived expertise level
of an information source. Relative in this context means relative to the other
information sources in B. As for knowledge level the expertise level is measured
in terms of a score, here called expertise score.
This expertise score is determined using three activities and these are: (1) Derive
internal and relative category scores for all categories for each calibration variable.
(2) Derive category scores for all calibration variables for each information source.
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Table 17.1. Example calibration variables for determining the expertise level for an
information source
Variables Categories
level of expertise low, medium, high
age under 20, 20-25, 25-30, 30-40, 40-50,
over 50
years of relevant
education
1 year, 2 years, Bsc, Msc, PhD, other
years of educa-
tion others
1 year, 2 years, Bsc, Msc, PhD, other
years of experi-
ence from the in-
dustry
1-3 years, 5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15
years, over 15 years
years of experi-
ence from acad-
emia
1-3 years, 5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15
years, over 15 years
role experience database, network management, devel-
oper, designer, security management
and decision maker
(3) Derive the expertise score for each information source by combing the result
from activity 2 with the result from activity 1 for each information source. Note
that the category scores in activities 1 and 2 are independent. Hence, changes
can be made in the internal category scores for an calibration variable, without
having to reassess the category scores for all information sources.
The number and set of calibration variables used will vary from case to case de-
pending on the case description. The trust-based information aggregation schema
do not mandate the use of a particular set, as the schema assess the internal re-
lations of the calibration variable set in activity 1. Table 17.1 gives an example
set of calibration variables with their associated categories.
Activity 1: Deriving calibration variable category scores. Activity 1 of
deriving the expertise score is performed by the calibration variable category
score model described below. This model examines the internal relations of the
categories contained in each calibration variable and derives a calibration variable
relative category score for all categories for all calibration variables.
In the trust-based performance weighting schema the internal relations for ex-
pertise level are measured in terms of importance related to the case description,
which is the problem that the information source is providing information for
and modelled using the two vectors WEcat and WEimp. WEcat is a support vec-
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tor used for reference purposes and holds the identity or name of each category
in a calibration variable while WEimp holds the relative importance weights for
the categories of a calibration variable. Thus, the rst element in WEcat for the
calibration variable v holds the name of its category number 1 while the rst
element in WEimp for the calibration variable v holds the importance weight for
its category number 1.
As for the knowledge level several external sources might provide information to
populate the two vectors. Also as for knowledge level, the external sources are
denoted x and the set of external sources are denoted X. In addition, there are
usually several calibration variables involved and these are collected in the set V
of calibration variables v.
Calibration variable category score model derives the internal relative cat-
egory score for all categories of all calibration variables according to the trust
context C.
WEcat(v(k)) =
h
[wEcat(k)]
l
k=1
i
v2V
(17.17)
WEimp(x(v(k))) =
h
[wEimp(k)]
l
k=1]v2V
i
x2X
(17.18)
qEimp(v(k)) =
""
1Pl
k=1WEimp(v(k))
#
v2V
#
x2X
(17.19)
WREimp(x(v(k))) =
h
[qEimp(v(k))WEimp(x(v(k)))]v2V
i
x2X
(17.20)
WaggrEimp(X(v(k))) =
h
faggrEimp([WREimp(x(v(k)))]xX)
i
v2V
(17.21)
The calibration variable category score model starts with populating the cate-
gories for each of the calibration variables. This is done in Equation 17.17 and
results in theWEcat vector with l number of elements for each calibration variable.
The elements of each WEcat vector is the categories for the associated calibra-
tion variable. Note that l might vary depending on the calibration variable and
that the categories for a calibration variable are given prior or as part of the
assessment. Furthermore, in the calibration variable category score model, the
assumption is that all external sources in X have come to an agreement on the
name and number of categories for each calibration variable.
The importance weight of each category in a calibration variable is modelled as
the WEimp vector in the calibration variable category score model. As #x 2 X >
17.2 Step 2: IS trustworthiness weight 171
1 the importance weight for each category of an calibration variable can be given
by several external sources. This means that the WEimp vector for a calibration
variable v is populated #x 2 X times to derive the initial category importance
weights using Equation 17.18. As the importance weight of the categories of v is
measured relative to each other the initial importance weights from (17.18) must
be normalised. This is done in (17.20) using the normalisation factor derived in
(17.19) for all calibration variables v 2 V for all external sources x 2 X.
To derive one category importance vector for each calibration variable, all nor-
malised category importance vectors for all v 2 V are aggregated over X. This
is done using Equation 17.21. As for the knowledge level the aggregation func-
tion used may vary. An example of aggregating importance weights is given in
Section 18.1.
The resulting aggregated category importance weight for all v 2 V needs to be
normalised to recover the relative importance weights after the aggregation. This
normalisation is part of the aggregation function in (17.21).
Activity 2: Deriving information source calibration variable category
scores. Activity 2 of deriving the expertise score concerns the evaluation of the
abilities of each information source in relation to the categories of each calibration
variable. This is done using the information source calibration variable category
score model described below. As for the knowledge level an additional set Y of
external sources y provides the information on the information sources.
Information source calibration variable category score model derives the
relative category score for all categories of all calibration variables for an in-
formation source according to the trust context C.
WEis(y(bi(v(k))))=
h
[wEimp(k)]
l
k=1
i
v2V

y2Y
(17.22)
qEis(bi(v(k)))=
""
1Pl
k=1WEis(bi(v(k)))
#
v2V
#
y2Y
(17.23)
WREis(y(bi(v(k)))) =

[qEis(bi(v)WEis(y(bi(v)))]v2V

y2Y (17.24)
WaggrEis(Y (bi(v(k)))) =
h
faggrEis([WREis(y(bi(v)))]yY )
i
v2V
(17.25)
The rst task to perform in the information source calibration variable category
score model is to populate the WEis vector for the information source bi. This is
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done using Equation 17.22 for all y 2 Y . The WEis vector is used to model the
information source category scores for a calibration variable v. Here, the #v 2 V
is the same as for the calibration variable category score and for each information
source bi 2 B the WEis vector must be populated #v 2 V times for all y 2 Y .
However, as it happens that one or more of y 2 Y do not have information on
all categories for all calibration variables, a value to indicate the lack of informa-
tion is introduced. The symbol for no information is , which is padded for the
corresponding elements in the WEis vector.
As the category scores are measured in relation to each other, all WEis vectors
need to be normalised. This is done in (17.24) by updating the result from (17.22)
using the normalisation factor derived in (17.23) for all WEis vectors.
As the category scores for an information source is given by several external
sources y and as theWEis vectors only hold the scores for one y theWEis vectors
for each calibration variable must be aggregated over Y . This is done using Equa-
tion 17.25 and the results in the information source relative calibration variable
category score for the information source bi. The result of the aggregation may
produce not normalised values and thus normalisation must be performed. This
is part of the aggregation function in (17.25).
Activity 3: Derive expertise score for each information source. In ac-
tivity 3 of deriving the expertise score, the internal category scores from the cal-
ibration variable category score model is combined with the information source
calibration category scores for all v 2 V . In the trust-based performance weight-
ing schema this is done using the expertise score model described below. This uses
Equation 17.26 where the expertise score is derived by component-wise multipli-
cation over all calibration categories k. The construct in Equation 17.26 ensures
that the resulting expertise score is equal or less than 1.
Expertise score model derives the expertise score for an information source
bi by combing the calibration variable category score with the information
source calibration variable category score for all v 2 V . The result is the
expertise score for an information source according to the trust context C.
FEscore(bi) =
X
k
WaggrEimp(X(v(k))W aggrEis(Y (bi(v(k)))) (17.26)
17.2.3 Computing relative information source trustworthiness weights
The results from the two trust variables knowledge level and expertise level are the
knowledge score and the expertise score for an information source bi respectively.
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To derive the information source relative trustworthiness, which is the expected
output from Step 2 in the trust-based performance weighting schema, these two
scores must be combined. This is done using the relative IS trustworthiness model
described below.
As the information sources in B are evaluated against each other the goal of
the relative IS trustworthiness model is to derive a relative information source
trustworthiness weight and not the absolute trustworthiness weight for an infor-
mation source. Also, as trust exists in a context the relative information source
trustworthiness weight is only valid for the trust context C.
Relative IS trustworthiness model is used to derive the relative trustwor-
thiness weight for an information source bi. This is done by combining the
knowledge score and the experience score for bi for the trust context C.
FinitTrust(bi) =

FKscore(bi) + FEscore(bi)
2
 "bi

bi2B
(17.27)
qRTrust=
1P
biB
FinitTrust(bi)
(17.28)
FISTW (bi) = F initTrust(bi)) qRTrust (17.29)
The initial information source trustworthiness of information source bi is com-
puted by the initial trustworthiness function FinitTrust(bi) in (17.27). This initial
trustworthiness is derived by adding the relative knowledge score with the rel-
ative experience scores for all bi 2 B. As can be seen in (17.27) the knowledge
and experience scores are given the same importance weights in the relative IS
trustworthiness model. If there is a need to emphasise one over the other, the
initial trustworthiness function can be changed to reect this.
As one of the common problems in subjective expert judgment is underestimation
and overestimation by the external sources an error function is included in the
initial trustworthiness function. This error function is modelled as "(bi) and holds
the experience-based corrections of overestimation and underestimation of Y on
bi. Thus, "(bi) represents the ability of the model to capture the experience gained
on the use of Y to evaluate bi. If there is no prior experience in using Y to evaluate
bi the error function is left empty. Note that the error function is able to capture
individual experiences of y as the output of the error function is a normalised
expression over all y 2 Y . This also means that "(bi) 6=  in all cases where one
or more y of Y have experience.
More information on the problem of underestimation and overestimation or elici-
tation and aggregation of subjective expert judgments in general can be found in
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Cooke (1991) [16], Cooke and Goossens (2000) [17], Goossens et al. (2000) [38],
Cooke and Slijkhuis (2003) [18] and similar sources.
As the initial trustworthiness is not a relative measure it needs to be normalised.
Normalisation is done by using Equation 17.29 which updates the initial trust-
worthiness in (17.27) using the normalisation factor derived in (17.28).
As the relative information source trustworthiness weights are normalised, trust-
worthiness is expressed as a weight with values in the range [0; 1]. Here, value 0
means no trustworthiness and the value 1 means complete trustworthiness. Val-
ues close to 0 express little trustworthiness and values close to 1 describe high
trustworthiness. If no information on the knowledge level and experience level
of bi is available the model does not provide any output for bi. This should be
interpreted as unknown trustworthiness. To ensure the computability of unknown
trustworthiness in the preceding steps in the trust-based information aggregation
schema unknown trustworthiness is assigned the value 0.
17.3 Step 3: Trust relationship between decision maker and
information sources
Step 3 of the trust-based performance weighting schema evaluates the trust rela-
tionship between the decision maker and each of the information sources bi in the
set of information sources B. This is done using the vector trust model developed
by Ray and Chakraborty [87, 88].
The vector trust model measures trust as a value in the range [ 1; 1] using the
three trust variables: knowledge, experience and recommendation. Please note
that the variable knowledge in the vector trust model is not the same as the trust
variable knowledge level in Step 2. Knowledge in Step 3 addresses the knowledge
that the decision maker has on the perceived past performance of an information
source while knowledge level in Step 2 denotes the perceived level of knowledge
that an information source has gained through its personal and professional activ-
ities. This implies that observable information sources do not perceive knowledge
but that they are considered completely knowledgeable within the knowledge
domain that the information they provide covers.
This work does not describe the vector trust model and the reader is referred to
Ray and Chakraborty [87, 88] for details. Here, it su¢ ces to say that the outcome
is a decision maker specic trust weight for each information source bi in the set
of information sources B. This trust weight denotes the degree that the decision
maker A trusts bi to provide correct and accurate information according to the
trust context C derived in Step 1.
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17.4 Step 4: Updating the relative information source
trustworthiness weights
In Step 4 the relative information source trustworthiness weights derived in Step
2 are updated with the result from Step 3 to derive the decision maker specic
relative information source trustworthiness weights. This is done using Equation
17.30.
As described earlier Step 3 derives the trust relationship and the trust weight
between the decision maker, as the truster A and the information sources bi
in B and Step 2 derives the relative information source trustworthiness weights
for all bi 2 B. These two types of weights are independent in the trust-based
performance weighting schema and thus the contents of Step 2 and 3 can be
modied independent of each other, as long as the output stays the same.
This also means that both this step and Step 3 can be skipped if the decision
maker does not have any previous knowledge, experience or recommendation on
the information sources bi or to reduce the complexity of the schema. The output
of this step is the trust-based performance weight for each information source bi
in B.
FISTW_Step4(bi) =
h
FISTW (bi) v(A
C! bi)
i
bi2B
(17.30)
Step 4 concludes the trust-based performance weighting schema. The initial ver-
sion of this schema was published in Houmb, Ray and Ray (2006) [45]. Note
that the version of the schema described here di¤ers signicantly from the initial
schema described in [45].
17.5 Step 5: Aggregating information (in the trade-o¤ tool)
Step 5 of the trust-based information aggregation schema is the trust-based in-
formation aggregation. This is the step that connects the trust-based information
aggregation schema with the trade-o¤ tool described in Part 4. The main task
in this step is to aggregate the set of pieces of information from the information
sources. This is done by applying the associated trust-based performance weight
derived in Step 4 of the trust-based performance weighting schema on each piece
of information. This task is fullled by performing the two activities: (1) Update
each piece of information from bi by applying to it the relative trustworthiness
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weight of bi. (2) Aggregate all pieces of information by multiplying the result of
(1) for all bi 2 B.
Activity 1 is supported by Equation 17.31 and activity 2 is supported by Equation
17.32. In (19.31), a piece of information provided by bi is denoted Ibi . If bi provides
several pieces of information Equation 17.31 is performed for each of these pieces
of information.
The result of activity 2 and hence Equation 17.32, is one set of information that
can be directly fed into the associated nodes in the BBN topology of the trade-o¤
tool described in Part 4.
FISTW_Step4Ud(bi)=

IbiF ISTW_Step4(bi)

bi2B (17.31)
Faggr_Step5(z)=bi2BFISTW_Step4Ud(bi) (17.32)
An example of trust-based information aggregation and a short description of
the implementation of Step 5 of the trust-based information aggregation schema
is given in Section 18.1. There is also an alternative and explorative approach
to combine observable and subjective information developed in this work. This
approach is described to some detail in Houmb (2005) [41].
Part VI
Validation, Discussion and Concluding Remarks

18. Validation of the Approach
This thesis has given an overview of the AORDD security solution decision frame-
work and described some of the details of its two core components. These are the
AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis with its trade-o¤ method and tool
and the trust-based information aggregation schema for feeding information into
the trade-o¤ tool. Of the two the trust-based information aggregation schema is
rather explorative and has not been thoroughly evaluated. However, some vali-
dation of the feasibility and usability of the schema has been performed through
case studies by examples. The demonstration of the feasibility of the schema is
given in Section 18.1.
The AORDD trade-o¤ analysis has been implemented as a BBN topology trade-
o¤ tool and both have been tested and reviewed through three iterations of case
study by example using the action research approach described in Section 1.4. In
addition, an informal reasoning about the scalability, feasibility and applicability
of the approach has been performed. The latter is documented briey in the dis-
cussion provided in Chapter 19. The three example-runs of the AORDD security
analysis trade-o¤ analysis are documented in several papers, the most important
being Houmb et al. (2006) [48] in Appendix B.2 and Houmb et al. (2005) [44] in
Appendix B.3. Houmb et al. (2005) describes parts of the result from the rst
example run of the trade-o¤ analysis while Houmb et al. (2006) describes parts
of the result from the second example run. The third and nal example run is
partly documented in Section 18.1.
The AORDD framework in itself is evaluated through validation of the fullment
of the research questions of this work and the requirements to the current de-
sign. Validating the practical applicability of the framework and its contained
components is critical to its potential future use in industry as many techniques
developed in the academia never make it to industry due to their inherent acci-
dental complexity and lack of scalability.
The balance between desired and accidental complexity is a key factor in this con-
text. Industry needs approaches that are easy to use and that take all necessary
factors into consideration to ensure that they actually solve some real problems.
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To meet these demands, this work uses an action research based work process
with a step-wise practical validating using an example e-commerce system. The
evaluation in this work used the requirements, design documents and prototype
description of the ACTIVE e-commerce platform developed by the EU-project
ACTIVE and redeveloped parts of the e-commerce platform by a¢ liating the
AORDD framework and in particular the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis and the trust-based information aggregation schema. The prototype of
the ACTIVE system was nalised in 1999. Details of the ACTIVE system can be
found in Georg, Houmb and France (2006) [36].
This work approach has enabled the study of the practical implications of the
current design of the framework and its components at several points in time,
as well as getting practical experience in doing development using the AORDD
framework. This was done both in the initial exploration phase and in the de-
velopment and evaluation phase of the construction work process used in this
work (details are in Part 1). There have been many updates and changes to the
framework and its components throughout the work and the framework and its
contained components are far from nalised and need further revisions and vali-
dation. The evaluation and validation performed in this work merely covers the
initial explorative phase and the rst few iterations of the development and eval-
uation phase from requirement specication to testing and validation. The next
step in the validation will need to include a realistic industrial scale case study.
18.1 Demonstration of the trade-o¤ tool and the
trust-based information aggregation schema to support
choice of security solution
This chapter demonstrates the trade-o¤ tool and the trust-based information ag-
gregation schema for aggregating information as input to the trade-o¤ tool using
the login service of the reengineered version of the ACTIVE e-commerce proto-
type platform, as described in Georg, Houmb and France (2006) [36]. The AC-
TIVE e-commerce platform provides services for electronic purchasing of goods
over the Internet. The platform was initially developed for the purchase of med-
ical equipment, but does also possess qualities that make it a general platform for
providing services on the Internet. Thus, ACTIVE is a general purchase platform
that can host a wide variety of electronic stores for vendors. The infrastructure
consists of a web server running Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS), a
Java application server (Allaire JSP Engine) and a Microsoft SQL server running
RDBMS. The communication between the application server and the database is
handled using the JDBC protocol.
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The IST EU project CORAS performed three risk assessments of ACTIVE in
the period 2000-2003 (for details see [19]). The project looked into security risks
of the user authentication mechanism, secure payment mechanism and the agent
negotiation mechanisms of ACTIVE. Here, the focus is on the result of the rst
assessment which identied the user authentication mechanism to be vulnerable
to various types of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and in particular the SYN-
ACK ooding attack [13]. This attack is well known and exploits a weakness
in the TCP three-way handshake. The handshake works as follows: whenever
a host receive a SYN message it replies with an ACK message and waits for
the returning SYN message. If the returning SYN message does not arrive the
connection is kept open. If an attacker sends several SYN messages and hence
opens several connection with the host it will lead to a situation where too many
connections are left open. Soon the bu¤er at the host is lled up and the host is
unable respond to any other requests. Thus, the host is busy waiting for messages
that never arrive. There are several possible solutions to this security problem.
The following sections demonstrates how to evaluate the tness score of two such
solutions using the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and the trust-
based information aggregation schema.
18.1.1 Aggregating information as input to the trade-o¤ tool using
the trust-based information aggregation schema
As described in Part 5 the trust-based information aggregation schema consists
of ve steps. This section demonstrates the use of Step 1; specify trust context,
Step 2; trust relationship between information sources and Step 5; aggregate
information, of this schema to support choice of security solution.
Step 1 of the trust-based information aggregation schema. Step 1 of
the schema concerns the specication of the trust context which is important to
ensure that the information sources and the decision maker have the same under-
standing of the information provided and received. As described in Part 5 this is
specied as a set of trust purposes and assumptions in the trust context C. The
trust context C must be the same to combine the various pieces of information
provided by the information sources.
However, before the trust context can be specied the case description must be
given, as described in Chapter 7. The goal in this context is to support a decision-
maker A in choosing between two security solutions for the DoS attack SYN
ooding. The two DoS security solutions are: (1) the cookie solution denoted
s1 and (2) the lter mechanism denoted s2. The cookie solution is a patch to
the network stack software that adds another message layer once the partial
connection data structures become close to full. In this solution a cookie is sent
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to the client and the pending connection is removed from the data structure. If
the client does not respond within a short period of time the cookie expires and
the client must restart the TCP three-way handshake. If the client responds in
time the SYN-ACK message is sent and the connection is set up as in the original
case. Adding the cookie message makes it unlikely that an attacker can respond
in time to continue setting up the connection. The cookie will expire on the server
without taking up any storage in the data structures of the pending connections
and if the client address has been spoofed the client will not respond in any event.
In both cases the cookie will expire on the server without taking up any storage
in the pending connections data structures.
The DoS security solution ltering mechanism consist of ltering rules that con-
trolles all inbound and outbound communication requests. These ltering rules
are contained in a software extension to the network stack software. So, rather
than adding another message layer the ltering mechanism adds a ltering service
to the network stack that works similar to a simple rewall ltering mechanism.
This ltering mechanism checks the source IP address of all inbound and out-
bound connections requests against a list of allowed IP addresses. By doing so
the client will only allow communication from hosts that it trusts. However, the
ltering mechanism will not protect against DoS attacks from trusted hosts or
DoS attacks that are routed through one or more trusted hosts.
The above description represents a simple case description. In addition to the
above a state transition diagram and associated transition probability matrix
should also be modelled, as described in Chapter 7 and Houmb, Georg, France,
Reddy and Bieman (2004) [43].
Before starting with the examination of the potential information sources and
collecting the information, the trust context must be specied. As described ear-
lier the trust context species under which circumstances the information sources
will provide information on the problem according to the case description. This
involves specifying the purpose and assumption, as described in Section 17.1.
In this example there are a set of information sources B where bi represent infor-
mation source number i and where all information sources provides information
on the expected availability of the two DoS security solutions. The decision maker
is denoted A. The trust context for all trust relationships is denoted A C! bi and
the trust context function C(T ) is a tuple of the form < ui; ai > where ui 2 U
and ai 2 A. To make the information possible to aggregate, the trust context for
all information sources must be the same, meaning C(T )bi=C(T )bi+1 for all i.
The purpose 8i ubi where 8i ubi 2 U of the trust relationships 8i A !
bi is that of: The information source bi should provide correct and accurate
information on the security attribute availability for each of the two security
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solutions: cookie solution and ltering mechanism, separately according to the
case description in terms of the anticipated number of successful DoS attacks with
the respective security solution incorporated into the login mechanism for the e-
commerce prototype per month.
The assumptions 8i abi where 8i abi 2 A of the trust relationships 8i A ! bi is
as following. Recall from Section 17.1 that the assumptions are comprised of four
parts: (1) Decision makers understanding of the information request. (2) Infor-
mation sources understanding of the information request. (3) Decision makers
understanding of the information provided. (4) Information sources understand-
ing of the information provided. For all information sources in set B their under-
standing of both the information request and information they are providing are
the same, namely the number of successful DoS attacks per month for each of the
security solutions. This refers to assumptions 2 and 4 for all information sources
in the set B. The decision makers (A) understanding of the information he or she
has requested and hence that should be provided by the information sources, is
the number of successful DoS attacks per month for each of the security solutions.
This refers to assumptions 1 and 3. This gives the trust context function:
C(T ) = 8i < ubi ; abi> \ < ubi+1 ; abi+1>=< ubi ; abi>=< ubi+1 ; abi+1> (18.1)
Step 2 of the trust-based information aggregation schema. Step 2 of the
trust-based information aggregation schema is used to derive the relative informa-
tion source trustworthiness weights. Before performing this step the information
sources involved need to be identied and described.
This example uses ve information sources where one is an observable information
source and the four others are subjective information sources. The ve sources are
the real-time observable information source honeypot and four domain experts,
which gives the following: fbhoneypot; b4; b6; b15; b18g 2 B. These ve information
sources provided information on the anticipated number of DoS attacks for the
two involved DoS security solutions to the decision maker A according to the trust
context specied above. In addition to the ve information sources there is one
external source x in X to provide information on the calibration variables used
and one external source y in Y that assesses each information source according
to the calibration variables in Step 2. Details on the external sources are given
in Section 17.2.
The observable information source honeypot was set up to reect the congura-
tion of ACTIVE (Windows NT 4.0 operating system and IIS 4.0). As a second
layer of logging the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Snort were used. For more
information on the honeypot and its conguration the reader is referred to Øst-
vang (2003) [81]. The group of experts used was comprised of undergraduate
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students at Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Further informa-
tion on the collection of expert judgments is provided in Houmb, Johnsen and
Stålhane (2004) [49]. The reader should note that to make the example tractable
only the judgments from 4 of the 18 domain experts involved in the experiement
are included.
For the information source honeypotinformation was extracted from the hon-
eypot and the Snort log les. Logging was done for the same amount of time,
namely 24 hours for the three congurations: (1) system without any security
solutions, (2) system with the patch to the network stack software: the cookie
solution and (3) system with the ltering mechanism. For conguration (1) Snort
detected 470 di¤erent IP addresses trying to open connections to port 80 which
gives 470=24 = 19:8 attack tries per hour. Here, the interest is in the attack
attempts where outsiders sent several SYN requests to the same source. 140 of
the 470 IP-addresses sent series of SYN requests to the same source within 24
hours which gives 140=24 = 5:8 SYN ooding attack attempts per hour. Two
of the attack attempts were successful and thus MTTM=12:0 hours. The mean
attack time (e¤ort) for the successful attacks is denoted mean e¤ort to misuse
and was METM=0:2 hours. METM is a measure of the average time (clock time)
it takes an attacker to perform the attack. MTTM is a measure for the average
time (clock time) it takes between attacks. In this case it is the successful attacks
that are taken into consideration and not the attack attempts. More information
on MTTM and METM is given in Part 4 and Houmb, Georg, France, Reddy and
Bieman (2005) [43].
Computed average monthly (assuming a 30 day month) successful attacks for (1)
were 60. For the cookie solution (conguration 2), the average monthly successful
attacks observed was 1:5 and for the ltering mechanism (conguration 3), the
average monthly successful attacks observed was 4:0. As the honeypot simulated
these three congurations no updates were done between the attack attempts
and successful attacks. However, this is usually done in a real system (otherwise
the system would just keep on being attacked until it crashed).
The information extracted from the log les is used as the information provided
from the information source bhoneypot when evaluating the two DoS security so-
lutions. The information source is assigned the trust value v(A C! bhoneypot) = 1
which means completely trustworthy as honeypot is a directly observable informa-
tion source that observes actual events and as the decision maker A has complete
trust in the abilities of honeypot to provide accurate and correct information
on the potential number of successful DoS attacks. This means that there is no
need to calculate the knowledge and experience score for the information source
honeypot and that the initial trustworthiness weight can be directly assigned as
FinitTrust(bhoneypot) = 1. This is done using the relative IS trustworthiness model
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Fig. 18.1. Reference knowledge domain model
described in Part 5. It should be noted however that honeypots are subject to
the problem of simulating su¢ ciently realistic system environment and that IDSs
are subject to the problem of false positives.
Elicitation of expert judgments was done using a combined knowledge and ex-
pertise level questionnaire. The data provided on each expert for all variables in
the questionnaire was then used to derive the knowledge and expertise score, as
described in Sections 17.2.1 and 17.2.2. Table 18.1 shows the variables and the
values provided for the combined questionnaire. For discussion on problems and
possible biases related to the procedure of collecting expert judgment, see Cooke
(1991) [16] and Cooke and Goossens (2000) [17].
As described in Section 17.2.1 the knowledge score for an information source is
determined by comparing the information source knowledge domain models with
the reference knowledge domain model. The reference knowledge domain model
is created by combining the importance and coverage weights for the aggregated
set of knowledge domains provided, by the set of external sources X, using the
knowledge domain score model described in Section 17.2.1. The relevant knowl-
edge domains are: security management, design, network manager, database and
developer. Figure 18.1 shows the four knowledge domains and their internal rela-
tive importance. For demonstration purposes the focus is put on the result of the
identication rather than discussing techniques used to identify these knowledge
domains.
To provide data on each information source a domain expert that was not part of
the expert judgment panel was used as the external source x1 2 X. This external
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Table 18.1. The combined knowledge and experience level questionnaire
Expert
num-
ber
Calibration variable Information provided on bi
4 level of expertise medium
years of relevant edu-
cation
BSc
years of experience
from industry
0
roles experience database and security man-
agement
6 level of expertise low
years of relevant edu-
cation
BSc
years of experience
from industry
0
roles experience database
15 level of expertise high
years of relevant edu-
cation
BSc
years of experience
from industry
0
roles experience designer, developer and se-
curity management
18 level of expertise low
years of relevant edu-
cation
BSc
years of experience
from industry
0,5
roles experience developer
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source did the identication based on prior experience in the domain of secure
system development. Due to the subjective nature of this assessment and because
the set of external sources X only consist of one external source x1 the potential
biases need to be assessed. What is needed to reduce the degree of bias is to
establish guidelines for knowledge domain identication. This is the subject of
further work.
The importance weight for each of the knowledge domains is modelled using
Equations 17.1, 17.2, 17.3 and 17.4 from the knowledge domain score model
described in Section 17.2.1. This information is provided by x1 and according
to Equation 17.1. This gives WKimp(x1) = [1; 0:5; 0:5; 0:2; 0:2]. The elements
in the importance vector for x1 are then normalised in Equation 17.3 using
the normalisation factor derived in Equation 17.2, which is qKimp  0:4. This
gives WRKimp(x1) = [0:4; 0:2; 0:2; 0:1; 0:1]. As there is only one external source
WaggrKimp(X) =WRKimp(x1).
As can be seen in Figure 18.1 the coverage for the di¤erent knowledge domains
in the reference knowledge domain model are: 50% for security management,
20% for network management, 15% for database, 10% for design and 5% for
developer. The coverage vector is modelled using Equation 17.5 in the knowledge
domain score model, which givesWKcov(x1) = [0:5; 0:2; 0:15; 0:1; 0:05]. As X only
contains x1 and as the coverage weights are already normalisedWaggrdKcov(X) =
WRKcov(x1) =WKcov(x1).
Based on the two above vectors the knowledge domain score for each of the knowl-
edge domains is computed using Equation 17.9, which gives WinitKDscore(X) =
[0:5 0:4; 0:2 0:2; 0:15 0:1; 0:1 0:1; 0:05 0:1] = [0:2; 0:04; 0:015; 0:01; 0:005].
These knowledge scores are then normalised in Equation 17.11 using the normali-
sation factor derived in Equation 17.10. The normalisation factor is: qinitKscore =
3:8 and the normalised vector is WDKscore(X) = [0:8; 0:2; 0:0; 0:0; 0:0].
Figure 18.2 shows the information source knowledge domain models for the four
experts (the subjective information sources). The coverage that each of the ex-
perts have for the knowledge domains are the following: 80% on security manage-
ment and 15% on database for expert 4. 100% on database for expert 6. 60% for
design, 30% on developer and 10% for security management for expert 15. 100%
on developer for expert 18. The knowledge level for each expert is computed us-
ing the information source knowledge domain score model described in Section
17.2.2 and Equation 17.16 in the knowledge score model. Using Equation 17.12
in the information source knowledge domain score model gives the information
source knowledge domain vectors:
 Expert 4: b4: Wis(y1(b4)) = [0:85; 0:0; 0:15; 0:0; 0:0]
 Expert 6: b6: Wis(y1(b6)) = [0:0; 0:0; 1:0; 0:0; 0:0]
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 Expert 15: b15: Wis(y1(b15)) = [0:1; 0:0; 0:0; 0:6; 0:3]
 Expert 18: b18: Wis(y1(b18)) = [0:0; 0:0; 0:0; 0:0; 1:0]
As all information source knowledge domain vectors are already normalised,
WRKis(y1(bi)) = Wis(y1(bi)) for all bi 2 B. And as there are only one exter-
nal source y1 in the set of external source Y Equation 17.14 and 17.15 does not
apply and thus FaggrKis(y1(bi)) = Wis(y1(bi)). The knowledge score for each of
the information source are then derived using Equation 17.16 in the knowledge
score model:
 Expert 4: b4:WKscore(y1(b4)) = 0:850:8+00:2+0:150+00+00  0:7
 Expert 6: b6: WKscore(y1(b6)) = 0 0:8 + 0 0:2 + 1 0 + 0 0 + 0 0 = 0
 Expert 15: b15:WKscore(y1(b15)) = 0:10:8+00:2+00+0:60+0:30 =
0:08  0:1
 Expert 18: b18: WKscore(y1(b18)) = 00:8+00:2+00+00+1:00 = 0
These resulting knowledge scores are not normalised over the number of informa-
tion sources in this example. The reason for this is to express the perceived level
of knowledge rather than the normalised level, as this makes it easy to add in
more information sources in B throughout the evaluation (recall that there were
18 experts and that only 4 of these are included in this example).
The expertise level for an information source is derived using the calibration vari-
ables described in Table 18.1, as described in Section 17.2.2. First the importance
weight for each of the categories for all calibration variables needs to be deter-
mined. This is done using the calibration variable category score model. In this
example only three calibration variables is used to determine the expertise level,
namely level of experiencedenoted v1, years of relevant educationdenoted v2
and years of experience from industrydenoted v3. This gives the following vec-
tors of categories for the three calibration variables according to Equation 17.17
in the calibration variable category score model from Section 17.2.2:
 WEcat(x1(v1(k))) = [0low0;0medium0;0 high0]
 WEcat(x1(v2(k))) = [0BSc0]
 WEcat(x1(v3)(k)) = [0per_year0]
Next the importance weight for each of the categories for all calibration vari-
ables is derived. This is done using Equations 17.18 through 17.21 in the calibra-
tion variable category score. For the calibration variable level of experiencethe
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Fig. 18.2. Information source knowledge domain models for experts 4, 6, 15 and 18
external source x1 provided the following importance weights: Wimp(x1(v1(k =
low)) = 0:2,Wimp(x1(v1(k = medium)) = 0:5 andWimp(x1(v1(k = high))) =
1:0. For the calibration variable years of relevant education the importance
weight given by x1 are Wimp(x1(v2(k = BSc))) = 0:2. For the calibration vari-
able years of experience from industry the importance weight given by x1 is
Wimp(x1(v3(k = per_year))) = 0:2 for each year of industrial experience. As
for the category vectors the aggregated vectors equals the vectors for the external
source x1, as x1 is the only external source in X. Before aggregating though, the
vectors needs to be internally normalised. This gives the following normalised
aggregated vectors:
 WaggrEimp(X(v1(k))) = [0:1; 0:3; 0:6]
 WaggrEimp(X(v2(k)) = [1:0]
 WaggrEimp(X(v3(k)) = [1:0]
Before computing the expertise score for each information source the external
sources yi 2 Y provide data sets for all bi 2 B . As for the knowledge score
only one external source is used and this is yi. The information provided by y1
is shown in Table 18.1 and the information source calibration variable category
score model in Section 17.2.2 is used to derive the information source specic score
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for each of the categories for all three calibration variables. As when deriving the
knowledge score each variable for each information source is modelled as vectors.
In this case Equation 22 in the information source calibration variable category
score model is used to derive the set of vectors.
 Expert 4: WEis(b4(v1(k))) = [0medium0], WEis(b4(v2(k))) = [0BSc0] and
WEis(b4(v3(k))) = [0]
 Expert 6: WEis(b6(v1(k))) = [0low0], WEis(b6(v2(k))) = [0BSc0] and
WEis(b6(v3(k)) = [0]
 Expert 15: WEis(b15(v1(k))) = [0high0], WEis(b15(v2(k))) = [0BSc0] and
WEis(b15(v3(k)) = [0]
 Expert 18: WEis(b18(v1(k))) = [0high0], WEis(b18(v2(k))) = [0BSc0] and
WEis(b18(v3(k)) = [0:5]
As there are only y1 in Y , there is no need to aggregate information over Y and
WaggrEiS(Y (bi(v(k))) =WEis(y1(b1(v(k))) for all k.
The expertise score for the information sources are then computed using Equation
17.26 in the the expertise score model which gives:
 Expert 4: FEscore(b4(v1(k))) = [0:3], FEscore(b4(v2(k))) = [1:0],
FEscore(b4(v3(k))) = [0:0] and FEscore(b4) = (0:3 + 1:0 + 0:0)=3 = 0:4
 Expert 6: FEscore(b6(v1(k))) = [0:1], FEscore(b6(v2(k))) = [1:0],
FEscore(b6(v3(k))) = [0:0] and FEscore(b6) = (0:1 + 1:0 + 0:0)=3 = 0:4
 Expert 15: FEscore(b15(v1(k))) = [0:6], FEscore(b15(v2(k))) = [1:0],
FEscore(b4(v3(k))) = [0:0] and FEscore(b15 = (0:6 + 1:0 + 0:0)=3 = 0:5
 Expert 18: FEscore(b18(v1(k))) = [0:6], FEscore(b18(v2(k))) = [1:0],
FEscore(b18(v3(k))) = [0:1] and FEscore(b18 = (0:6 + 1:0 + 0:1)=3 = 0:6
Now both the knowledge and expertise score are derived for all ve information
sources. These two scores are then combined when estimating information source
relative trustworthiness using the relative IS trustworthiness model described in
Section 17.2.3. Recall that the initial trustworthiness for the information source
honeypot was set to FinitTrust(bhoneypot) = 1:0. The initial trustworthiness for the
four experts are derived using Equation 17.27 in the relative IS trustworthiness
model which combines the knowledge score for bi with its expertise score. As
there are no previous experience on the use of y1 to assess B, the error function
"bi = 0 for all bi 2 B. See Section 17.2.3 for details. This gives:
 Honeypot: FinitTrust(bhoneypot) = 1:0
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 Expert 4: FinitTrust(b4) = (0:7 + 0:4)=2 = 0:6
 Expert 6: FinitTrust(b6) = (0:0 + 0:4)=2 = 0:2
 Expert 15: FinitTrust(b15) = (0:08 + 0:5)=2 = 0:3
 Expert 18: FinitTrust(b18) = (0:0 + 0:6)=2 = 0:3
These initial trustworthiness weights are normalised in Equation 17.29 using the
normalisation factor derived in Equation 17.28, which is qRTrust = 1=(1:0+0:6+
0:2 + 0:3 + 0:3) = 0:4. This gives the following updated relative trustworthiness
weights:
 Honeypot: FISTW (bhoneypot = 1:0 0:4 = 0:4
 Expert 4: FISTW (b4) = 0:6 0:4 = 0:3
 Expert 6: FISTW (b6) = 0:2 0:4 = 0:1
 Expert 15: FISTW (b15) = 0:3 0:4 = 0:1
 Expert 18: FISTW (b18) = 0:3 0:4 = 0:1
As can be seen by the above results the information source relative trustworthi-
ness weights reect the information provided on each sources knowledge domains
and level of expertise. In this example expert 4 possesses two knowledge domains
where one of the domains is security management which is assigned a high level
of importance. Expert 4 also has a medium level of expertise. It is therefore rea-
sonable that expert 4 is given a higher trustworthiness weight than expert 18 as
expert 18 has a low level of expertise and only covers one knowledge domain for
which are given a low level of importance. As also can be seen by the result it is
not possible to distinguish between expert 6, 15 and 18. This is also reasonable
taking into account that their knowledge domains and level of expertise combined
equals out the di¤erences. This concludes Step 2 of the trust-based information
aggregation schema.
Step 5 of the trust-based information aggregation schema. In Step 5 of
the trust-based information aggregation schema the information source relative
trustworthiness weights derived in Step 2 is applied to the information provided
by each information source. Step 5 is thus the link between the trust-based in-
formation aggregation schema and the trade-o¤ tool in the AORDD framework.
However, note that it is possible to apply an equal weighting information aggre-
gation schema and thus directly insert the information into the relevant variable
in the BBN topology of the trade-o¤ tool. The reason why the trust-based infor-
mation aggregation schema is introduced is to distinguish between information
sources and to make use of disparate information sources.
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Recall that the information provided from the information source honeypot was
for the misuse variables MTTM and METM and the security solution variables
E¤ect on METM and E¤ect on MTTM while the four experts provided infor-
mation on the security level of the e-commerce system taken both the misuse
SYN attack and the two security solutions into consideration. This means that
the pieces of information provided goes into di¤erent variables in the BBN topol-
ogy of the trade-o¤ analysis. However, before populating the BBN topology with
information each piece of information provided must be made relative using the
information source trustworthiness weights derived in Step 2. This is what is done
in Step 5 of the trust-based information aggregation schema.
The information provided by bhoneypot was bhoneypot(s1) = 1:5 and bhoneypot(s2) =
4:0 (s1 =cookie_solutionand s2 =filter_mecha 
nism). The information provided by b4 was b4(s1) =mediumand b4(s2) =low.
The information provided by b6 was b6(s1) =mediumand b6(s2) =medium.
The information provided by b15 was b15(s1) =mediumand b15(s2) =low. The
information provided by b18 was b18(s1) =highand b18(s2) =low. These pieces
of information are then updated with the trustworthiness weights, which gives:
 bhoneypot(s1) = 1:5 and bhoneypot(s2) = 4:0 at a relative weight of 0:4 (this is
interpreted as the state highfor s1 and lowfor s2 in the reminder of this
example)
 b4(s1) =mediumat a relative weight of 0:3 and b4(s2) =lowat a relative
weight of 0:3
 b6(s1) =mediumat a relative weight of 0:1 and b6(s2) =mediumat a relative
weight of 0:1
 b15(s1) =medium at a relative weight of 0:1 and b15(s2) =lowat a relative
weight of 0:1
 b18(s1) =high at a relative weight of 0:1 and b18(s2) =low at a relative
weight of 0:1
The important thing to note is that the trustworthiness weight cannot directly
be combined with the information provided. This is because the trustworthiness
weights do not denote a probability, but the relative weight of each of the infor-
mation sources. Thus, b4(s1) =mediumat a relative weight of 0:1 does not mean
that the state is mediumwith a probability P = 0:1, but that the information
provided by expert 4 should contribute with 0:1 to the outcome of the variable
it is inserted into in the BBN topology of the trade-o¤ tool. The information is
thus aggregated by taking the contribution factor of each piece of information.
To make this tractable Step 5 is implemented as a BBN that are connected to
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Fig. 18.3. Information inserted and propagated for security solution s1 (cookie solution)
Fig. 18.4. Information inserted and propagated for security solution s2 (lter mecha-
nism)
the BBN topology of the trade-o¤ tool for the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis.
Figure 18.3 shows the BBN implementation of Step 5 with the information for
s1 entered and propagated through the network using the utility function Step
5 Utilitywhile Figure 18.4 shows the same for the security solution s2.
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Fig. 18.5. The top-level network of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology
18.1.2 Tradeing o¤ two DoS security solutions using the trade-o¤
tool BBN topology
The AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis is implemented as the trade-
o¤ tool BBN topology as described in Part 4. The overall goal of the trade-o¤
analysis is to support a decision maker in identifying the best-tted security
solution among alternatives taken security, development, project and nancial
perspectives into consideration. This is done by deriving and comparing security
solution tness scores. The following gives a demonstration of the use of the trade-
o¤ tool BBN topology to evaluate the tness of the two DoS security solutions
s1 =cookie_solutionand s2 =filter_mechanismfor the misuse TCP SYN
ooding attack, as described in the previous sections.
Figure 18.5 shows the top-level network of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology from
Part 4. The AORDD trade-o¤ analysis method takes the output from the trust-
based information aggregation schema as demonstrated in the previous section
as input and follows the seven step trade-o¤ procedure described in Chapter 14.
In addition, the development, project and nancial perspectives are added along
with any other relevant information available.
Step 1 in the trade-o¤ analysis method procedure is to estimate the input para-
meters in the set I where I = fMI;MF;MTTM;METM;MC;SE; SCg. The
variables MI, MF, MTTM, METM and MC are misuse variables in the risk level
subnet (modelled as the input node Risk Level (RI) in Figure 18.5) while the vari-
ables SE and SC are security solution variables in the security solution treatment
level subnet (modelled as the Security Solution Treatment Level (SSTL) input
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Fig. 18.6. The resulting risk level
node in Figure 18.5). The information given for these variables was presented and
aggregated using the trust-based information aggregation schema in the previous
section. The result of the information aggregation is the treatment level of s1 and
s2 which is inserted directly into the intermediate node treatment e¤ect and cost
in the top-level network. See previous sections for details.
Step 2 in the trade-o¤ analysis method procedure is to estimate the security
level of the ToE or case description before any security risks or security solutions
have been considered. This is done using the assurance functional components of
Common Criteria Part 3. As no such information is available in this example the
SSLE subnet is not included when deriving the tness scores of s1 and s2.
In Step 3 of the trade-o¤ analysis method the misuse variables information from
Step 1 is inserted into the risk level subnet. In this example only the misuse
variable METM and MTTM are considered (static security level). These where
identied to beMETM =lowandMTTM =low. Details are given in Houmb,
Georg, France, Reddy and Bieman (2005). Figure 18.6 shows the resulting risk
level when these two pieces of information has been entered as evidence into
the network. Note that Figure 18.6 shows a rened version of the RL subnet
where only theMETM andMTTM variables are taken into consideration when
deriving the risk level.
In Step 4 of the trade-o¤analysis method, the information on the security solution
variables from Step 1 is inserted into the security solution treatment level subnet.
As the security e¤ect is measured using the sub-variables SE on METM, SE on
MTTM, SE on MI and SE on MF the SE variable is modelled as an intermediate
node in the SSTL subnet with these four sub-variables as observable nodes that
provides information to the SE node. As there are no information available on
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Fig. 18.7. The resulting security solution treatment level for the security solution s1
with the information from the information sources inserted and propagated
Fig. 18.8. The resulting security solution treatment level for the security solution s2
with the information from the information sources inserted and propagated
the cost of the two DoS security solutions s1 and s2 the SSTL subnet is rened
and includes only the relevant variables in this example. Figure 18.7 shows the
resulting security solution treatment level for the security solution s1 with the
SE information inserted and propagated while Figure 18.8 shows the same for
security solution s2. Details on the computation of the resulting NPT for both s1
and s2 are given in Figure 18.9. Note that the information inserted in the SSTL
subnets for s1 and s2 are the result from Step 5 in the trust-based information
aggregation schema from the previous section.
In Step 5 of the trade-o¤ analysis method the trade-o¤ parameters in the TOP
subnet is estimated. The trade-o¤ parameters are modelled as the set T where
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Fig. 18.9. Details on the computations made for the Security Solution E¤ect node for
security solution s1 and security solution s2
T = fSAC;POL; STA;LR;BG; TTM;BU;PRIg. These are the development,
project and nancial perspectives included in the trade-o¤ analysis and modelled
as variables in the TOP subnet of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology.
To limit the scope and to show the exibility of the trade-o¤ analysis, only three
of the trade-o¤ parameters are considered in this example. These are security
acceptance criteria (SAC), budget and TTM. Figure 18.10 shows the nodes with
the prior node probability distributions of the rened TOP subnet. The SAC
variable is used to specify acceptable risk level or the security requirements that
must be fullled. The budget and TTM variables are used to specify the budget
available for risk mitigation and the date or days or similar when the system
should be launched on the market. All three variables can be estimated using
either qualitative or quantitative values. The trade-o¤ tool supports both but
in this example qualitative values are used for the estimation of all variables
involved.
As can be seen in this gure the variable SAC is an intermediate node in the
TOP subnet and has sub-variables associated to it. These are the seven security
attributes condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-
repudiation and reliability. Each of these seven sub-variables has four associated
states and the outcome of the states of all seven sub-variables determines the
state of the SAC variable.
Security requirements are usually given according to the system assets and their
perceived and desired security properties. To simplify the example neither the
system assets nor the Common Criteria security assurance components which
are part of the SSLE subnet of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology and estimated in
Step 2 of the trade-o¤ analysis method procedure are taken into consideration in
this example. Details on the assets and the user authentication mechanism are in
Houmb et al. (2005) enclosed as Appendix B.3 and Houmb, Ray and Ray (2006)
enclosed as Appendix B.4.
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Fig. 18.10. TOP subnet with prior probability distributions
Here, the security requirements are derived from the trust context and the case
description from previous section. This given the following security requirement:
To preserve the availability of the user authentication mechanism. Interpreted
in the context of the security acceptance criteria this means that the SAC sub-
variable Availabilitymust be in the highstate. As no other requirements are
given the other sub-variables to SAC is put in the state N/A, which means not
applicable.
Figure 18.11 shows the status in the TOP subnet when the security requirements
information is entered into the TOP subnet and propagated from the observable
nodes. Note that only the sub-variable Availabilityis included in the gure.
The information for the budget and TTM variables can be extracted from several
sources, such as project plans. The information can also be provided by any of
the stakeholders involved in the development. In this example the decision maker
provides these two pieces information, which is the following: budget =medium
and TTM =short. This means that the budget available for risk mitigation is
medium and that the time until the ToE should be launched on the market is
short. In practice this means that a security solution that is easy and quick to
employ is preferable as long as the cost is not unreasonable.
Before the result of the TOP subnet can be transferred to the TOP input node in
the top-level network the priorities list of trade-o¤ parameters must be derived.
This is the task of the TOP Priorities decision node and assisted by the TOP
Priorities Utility node. This construct of a decision and utility nodes pair give
exibility in specifying the relationship between the input variables of the decision
node, which is the target node of the TOP subnet in this context. Rule sets for
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Fig. 18.11. Status of TOP subnet when security requirement information is entered
and propagated
prioritising trade-o¤parameter are specied in the utility node, which is modelled
as a diamond in the gure. The rules specied in this example are given by the
decision maker and is the following: priority 1 is given to TTM, priority 2 is given
to security requirements and priority 3 is given to budget. These are the rules
specied in the TOP Priorities Utility.
Figure 18.12 shows the TOP subnet with SAC, budget and TTM information
inserted and propagated to derive the resulting prioritised list of trade-o¤ para-
meters.
As can be seen in Figure 18.12 the TOP subnet is structured into three layers:
the observable node layer, the intermediate node layer and the target node layer.
Observable nodes are where information or evidence is entered into the network
while intermediate nodes are the nodes that connects the aim and questions
that the network is to provide answers to, which is modelled as the target node,
with the information entered into the observable nodes. Hence, the intermediate
nodes specify the relation and e¤ect that the observations has on the target of
the network. For the TOP subnet the target is to derive the trade-o¤ parameter
priorities so that a prioritised list of the trade-o¤ parameters can be fed into the
top-level network in the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology.
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Fig. 18.12. Evidence, propagation and result for the TOP subnet
Information or evidence is marked with an e on the observable nodes in Figure
18.11. The information is then propagated to the target node. For the observable
nodes budget and TTM information is propagated directly to the target node. For
the sub-variables of SAC the information is propagated through the intermediate
node SAC. Propagation is the act of updating the prior probability distributions
of the target or intermediate nodes in a network with the information entered at
the observable nodes to derive the posterior probability distributions, distribu-
tion functions and expected utilities. Four di¤erent propagation algorithms are
available: Sum normal, max normal, sum fast retraction and max fast retraction.
In this example the sum normal propagation is used. See Jensen (1996) [59] for
details.
In Step 6 of the trade-o¤ analysis method the security solution tness scores
are derived. This is done by transferring the result from the SSLE, RL, SSTL
and TOP subnets to the relevant nodes in the top-level network, add any new
information to the network and then compute the tness score for each secu-
rity solution. As for the subnets in the BBN topology the top-level network is
comprised of observable nodes, intermediate nodes and a target node. The target
node is the decision node Fitness score (see Figure 18.13). Also as for the subnets
the top-level network has a target node comprised of a decision and utility nodes
pair and the tness score of a security solution is derived by propagating infor-
mation from observable nodes, through intermediate nodes and to the Fitness
Score Utility node. This node is used to specify relational functions, such as If-
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Fig. 18.13. Fitness score for s1 (cookie solution)
Fig. 18.14. Fitness score for s2 (itering mechanism)
Then-Else constructs, for the incoming arches to the decision node and computes
the tness score using a propagation algorithm. Figure 18.13 and 18.14 show the
resulting tness score for the security solutions s1 and s2 respectively.
In Step 7 of the trade-o¤ analysis method the tness score for each alternative
security solution is derived and compared to identify the best-tted alternative.
As can be seen in Figure 18.13 and 18.14 the tness score for the cookie solution
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is slightly higher than for the ltering mechanism. The tness score for the cookie
solution is believed to be high 54% of the time and low 17% of the time. For the
ltering mechanism the belief is that the tness score is high 40% of the time
and low 30% of the time. This result conrms with the observations made by
the information source honeypot, as discussed earlier. However, the outcome of
the computation in the network is highly sensitive to the structure of the BBN
topology, the conguration of the utility nodes and the propagation algorithm
used. This means that this issue must be handled with care. For example, for the
utility nodes a sensitivity analysis should be performed to check the magnitude
of the impact that changes in the network have on the outcome.
19. Discussion
It is generally recognised that subjectivity is inherent to any risk and security
assessment methodology and that there are no single correct approach to iden-
tifying security risks, as the choice of model and its contained parameters can
never by fully objective. So, rather than trying to formally prove the correctness
of the AORDD framework and its two core components; the AORDD security
solution trade-o¤ analysis and the trust-based information aggregation schema,
this work followed an action research type work process that integrated validation
and evaluation as part of the work process both for the initial explorative phase
and for the development and evaluation phase as described in Section 1.4.
The evaluation performed in this work is done in a research context using three
case studies by example and did not include any industrial evaluation. Also as
discussed earlier the evaluation focused on examining the feasibility, scalability
and applicability of the approach developed and on reasoning about the validity
of the approach, in relation to the research questions of this work. Details on
the example-runs and parts of the result from the third example-run was given
in Chapter 18. The rst and second example-run is documented in Houmb et
al. (2005) [44] and Houmb et al. (2006) [48] enclosed as Appendix B.3 and B.2
respectively.
There exist several evaluations strategies for evaluating results of a subjective
nature. According to McGrath (1984) [58] there are three general perspectives
that are important when evaluation such results and these are: (1) Generalising
the validation evidence. (2) Precision of the measurement used. (3) Realism of
context. McGrath also lists and categories eight evaluations strategies according
to these three research features. These are laboratory experiment, experimental
simulations, eld experiments, eld studies, computer simulations, formal theory,
sample survey and judgment studies.
This work has performed three eld studies or actually simulation example eld
studies in the context of the action research based work process followed. To
ensure proper quality of the result throughout this work, relevant evaluation
criterion from the three categories above was assessed to examine the degree of
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internal, construct and conclusion validity of the approach. For information on
validity of evaluation and research result see Wohlin et al. (2000) [12].
Generalising validation evidence is important in research to make sure that the
results and evaluation of the work is applicable outside of the specic context
that the work has been performed under. This concerns the external applicability
of the approach developed and the structured identication of any assumptions
made during the work and weather these are reasonable for the context that the
work is intended for. This is done by examining the feasibility, scalability and ap-
plicability of the AORDD framework and its two core components and the result
of the validation of the approach through the example-driven eld studies. The
second and third evaluation perspective: precision of measurement and realism of
context, are addressed in relation to internal, construct and conclusion validity.
Bellow are the denition of the evaluation perspectives undertaken in this work.
All denitions are from Thesaurus.
Denition Feasibility is the quality of being doable.
Denition Applicability is the relevance by virtue of being applicable to the mat-
ter at hand where applicable is the capability of being applied or having rele-
vance.
Denition Scalability is the quality of being scalable, where scalable is the ca-
pability of being scaled or that it is possible to scale.
Denition Validity is the property of being strong and healthy in constitution.
As the work process followed in this work is both iterative and includes explicit
evaluation sessions a set of evaluation criteria targeting the above dened evalua-
tion perspectives, for each of the three evaluation categories was specied as part
of the two rst iterations of the work process. This led to the following evaluation
criteria:
Generalising validation evidence:
 EvC.1 on feasibility: To what level is the AORDD framework and its two core
components e¢ cient to use in practice.
 EvC.2 on feasibility: To what degree is the AORDD framework and its two
core components easy to use for the decision maker.
 EvC.3 on applicability: To what level does the AORDD framework and its two
core components address all relevant security aspects and important develop-
ment factors.
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 EvC.4 on applicability: To what degree is the AORDD framework and its two
core components able to produce realistic and usable results.
 EvC.5 on scalability: To what level is the AORDD framework and its two
core components able to address small and medium as well as large and very
complex systems.
Precision of measurement and Realism of context:
 EvC.6 on internal validity: To what degree does the work process and evalu-
ation strategy followed in this work contribute to su¢ ciently address the four
research questions.
 EvC.7 on construction and conclusion validity: To what degree is the contri-
butions of this work (the AORDD framework and its two core components)
capable to su¢ ciently address the four research questions.
Recall that the main contributions of this work are incorporated into the AORDD
framework and its two core components; the AORDD security solution trade-o¤
analysis and the trust-based information aggregation schema. The evaluation cri-
teria are thus applied on these rather than on each of the contributions separately.
EvC.1 looks into the feasibility perspective and concerns to what level the
AORDD framework and its two core components are e¢ cient to use in practice.
This issue has been addressed through the layer-wise structure of the underlying
trade-o¤ analysis method for the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and
the separation of concerns in the underlying trade-o¤ procedure for the AORDD
security solution trade-o¤ analysis. The trade-o¤ tool BBN topology, which is the
implementation of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis, has adopted
both this layer-wise structure and the separation of concern in practice and hence
the di¤erent parts of the trade-o¤ analysis can be executed simultaneously. Fur-
thermore, the trust-based information aggregation schema is also layer-based and
can be executed in parts or in complete depending on the characteristics of the
information that needs to be aggregated. This means that separation of concerns
is also achieved in the information aggregation. This enables the decision maker
to use only the parts of the approach that are relevant to his or her problem and
to focus on small independent tasks as the tool takes care of the dependencies by
the way it is structured. The approach also allows the decision maker to observe
what is going on and to get guidance on what type of information that are needed
as well as make him or her able to input whatever information available. The ap-
proach developed in this work can thus also take the role of a security analyst for
the decision maker (usually only for designer or developer type of decision makers
as management level decision makers usually do not have su¢ cient knowledge to
understand the technical implications of what they observe).
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The trade-o¤ tool BBN topology is designed in the context of security evaluation
and focuses on providing condence in the fullment of the security, development,
project and nancial perspectives posed upon an information system. As current
security evaluation approaches are both time and resource exhaustive the goal
of the security evaluation approach developed in this work has been to come up
with a cost and resource e¤ective way of comparing security solutions in prac-
tice. However, as both the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis and the
trust-based information aggregation schema still involves a substantial amount of
manual tasks, further work is needed on automating more of the tasks involved
before this goal can be achieved.
The trust-based information aggregation schema which is used to aggregate the
information inserted into the tool is able to aggregate disparate types of infor-
mation. However, the schema is somewhat di¢ cult to use when the number of
external sources involved, in evaluating the calibration variables and the abili-
ties of each information source according to these calibration variables, are large.
The reason for this is that when the number of external sources grows it be-
comes di¢ cult to keep track of and separate the calibration information from
the information provided on the abilities of the information sources according
to the calibration variables. Currently the schema performs best when only one
external source in each of the two sets of external sources X and Y is used and
when limiting the number of steps included from the schema. Hence, further
work is needed on more clearly separating the calibration information from the
information provided on the information sources.
EvC.2 concerns the feasibility perspective and whether the AORDD framework
and its two core components is easy to use for the decision maker. This is one
of the most critical factors for an approach to successfully making it in the in-
dustry. Any approach targeting industrial use must successfully balance su¢ cient
complexity with being intuitive and easy to use. Usability is in IEEE Computer
Dictionary - Compilation of IEEE Standard Computer Glossaries [53] dened as
the ease with which a user can learn to operate, prepare inputs for and interpret
outputs of a system or component. The user in the context of this work is the
decision maker and through the eld studies the approach developed has been
demonstrated and described with the aim of making the approach concrete and
showing how to use it in practice. However, the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology and
the trust-based information aggregation schema is currently at an early prototype
stage, involve a substantial amount of manual tasks and hence do not yet full
the usability requirement.
The ultimate goal for work such as this is to provide the decision maker with a
one buttoninterface for choosing a security solution among alternatives where
the tool keeps control of the provided and necessary information and automati-
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cally learns from experience. If this was the case the tool could simply show the
decision maker how it reasoned about the decision problem and through that ac-
tivity establish a high trust relationship with the decision maker. However, this
goal is for now not very realistic and a substantial amount of further work is
needed before this overall goal can be achieved.
EvC.3 concerns whether all relevant security concerns are covered. The relevant
security concerns was identied during the requirements phase in the initial ex-
plorative phase of this work and are captured in the static security level (SSLE)
subnet, risk level (RL) subnet and the security solution treatment level (SSTL)
subnet of the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. Recall from Chapter 15 that the trade-
o¤ tool BBN topology materialise the underlying trade-o¤method and procedure
of the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis. The same is the case for the
relevant development, project and nancial perspectives. These perspectives are
incorporated as the trade-o¤ parameters in the TOP subnet of the trade-o¤ tool
BBN topology. However, so far no extensive analysis on whether the perspectives
included cover all relevant perspectives has been performed. This is a clear weak-
ness of this work and might have consequences for the applicability of the result
of this work in practice. Thus, further work should include a realistic study to
identify additional security, development, project and nancial perspectives that
should be taken into consideration in security solution decision situations. This
can be done either by using semi-structured interviews with decision makers from
several companies or as a series of realistic case studies performed in an action
research context. The problems related to company condentiality made a more
realistic setting for evaluation of the approach di¢ cult, but should nevertheless
have be attempted. What is important in this context is to address the issue of
company condentiality up front and to ensure that any agreements are legally
documented on paper.
EvC.4 concerns the applicability of the approach in terms of the capabilities of
the AORDD framework and its two core components to produce realistic and
usable results. The eld studies performed are documented in various papers and
have shown to produce realistic and usable results based on subjective domain
expertise and the argumentation provided in these papers. However, the eld
studies are limited in that they only look into simplistic security solution deci-
sion situations and do therefore not su¢ ciently address the additional problems
with conicting stakeholder interests. Please consult Houmb et al. (2006) [48] in
Appendix B.2, Houmb et al. (2005) [44] in Appendix B.3, Georg, Houmb and
Ray (2006) [35] and Houmb, Ray and Ray (2006) [45] for details.
EvC.5 concerns the scalability of the AORDD framework and its two core com-
ponents. This issue has only been investigated to some degree in this work by
looking into di¤erent abstraction levels of security solution decisions situations.
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The levels of abstractions investigated range from technology specic security
mechanisms (technology viewpoint in RM-ODP) to the security strategy level
(enterprise viewpoint in RM-ODP) for the design phase of a development. The
examples used are limited to small size information systems and thus this work
makes no claim to support medium, large and complex information systems as
this issue has not yet been addressed properly. Tool support and automation is an
important factor for scalability and have been provided for the AORDD security
solution trade-o¤ analysis and the trust-based information aggregation schema.
However, the fact that a small scale prototype for parts of the security solution
decision framework has been developed does not imply that the approach auto-
matically is applicable outside of small size information system. Examining the
scalability issue is ongoing work and it therefore su¢ ce to say that the believe is
that the approach will scale to some degree and that both the trade-o¤ analysis
and the information aggregation schema will be able to work su¢ ciently e¢ cient
for medium to large information systems, provided that more of the manual tasks
involved are automated.
EvC.6 concerns the internal validity of the result of this work. The result of
this work is the ve contributions incorporated into the AORDD framework and
its two core components, as discussed earlier. The internal validity is thus an
evaluation perspective that aims at examining the degree that these results meet
the four research questions of this work. The latter points to the quality of the
result and on whether this quality has been unbiased examination of this quality
have been performed. Thus, in this work the internal validity is examined by
looking into whether the work and evaluation process followed su¢ ciently ensures
a non-bias examination.
As discussed in Section 1.4 the results of this work are developed and evaluated
using an action research based work process that includes a separate evaluation
phase. This work process was iterated three times with evaluation by simulation
case study for all iterations, as discussed earlier. The main problem with this work
is the lack of industrial validation. This was not carried out as it was considered
to be too time consuming and with too many challenges not directly related
to the actual evaluation of the result. Instead three simulation case studies were
performed as part of the evaluation phase of the work process. The goal with these
case studies was to demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of the approach
and to discover problems with the current results, in each of the three iterations.
The quality of the result has thus been demonstrated to some extend. However,
this does not represent a su¢ cient evaluation and more empirical evidence is
needed until a conclusion can be drawn. It su¢ ces to say that the work and
evaluation process was design to bring in several roles during the process and to
examine the results from several perspectives. However, in practice all evaluation
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and the evaluation meetings were performed by the same people as those that
developed the approach. For details and more discussion, see Houmb et al. (2005)
[44], Georg, Houmb and Ray (2006) [35], Houmb et al. (2006) [48] and future work
in Chapter 20.
EvC.7 concerns the construction and conclusion validity which in this work points
to the degree that the contributions of this work (the AORDD framework and
its two core components) are capable to su¢ ciently address the four research
questions. This can also be referred to as the completeness of the results in relation
to the research questions. The construction validity is in this work interpreted
as the degree that the resulting constructs meet the research questions while
the conclusion validity concerns whether the conclusion drawn on the fullment
of the research questions are sound and un-biased. The latter means that the
conclusions need to be drawn based on empirical evidence or un-biased reasoning
and not merely be based on subjective belief.
This work had four research questions and these are: RQ.1: How can alternative
security solutions be evaluated against each other to identify the most e¤ective
alternative? RQ.2: How can security risk impact and the e¤ect of security solu-
tions be measured? RQ.3: Which development, project and nancial perspectives
are relevant for an information system and how can these be represented in the
context of identifying the most e¤ective security solution among alternatives?
RQ.4: How can the disparate information involved in RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 be
combined such that the most e¤ective security solution among alternatives can
be identied?
As these four research questions cover a large spectre of challenges, this work
used an iterative work process that rened the research questions as new results
was developed and new challenges appeared. After three iterations through the
work process, the nal result consisted of the following ve contributions. C.1: A
set of security risk variables. C.2: A set of security solution variables. C.3: A set
of trade-o¤ parameter variables to represent and measure relevant development,
project and nancial perspectives. C.4: Methodology and tool-support for com-
paring the security solution variables with the security risk variables to identify
how e¤ective a security solution is in protecting against the relevant undesired
behaviour (misuse). C.5: Methodology and tool-support for trading o¤ security
solutions and identifying the best-tted one(s) based on security, development,
project and nancial perspectives.
These ve contributions were all incorporated into the AORDD framework and
its two core components and have all been materialised as described in Parts 3, 4
and 5. All ve results are directly related to one or more of the research questions.
C.1, C.2 and C.4 address RQ.1 and RQ.2 while C.3 and C.5 address RQ.3 and
RQ.4 and C.5 addresses RQ.4.
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The resulting constructs representing C.1-C.5 in the AORDD framework have all
been evaluated three times in the three case studies by examples. These exam-
ples have demonstrated the feasibility and applicability of the approach, as well
as demonstrate how each of the research questions has been addressed. The con-
clusion from these three case studies are that the approach developed represent
an increased support for the decision maker when choosing among alternative
security solutions and thus the conclusion is that C.1-C.5 meet the objective of
this work to a su¢ cient degree. Details can be found in Houmb et al. (2005) [44]
in Appendix B.3, Georg, Houmb and Ray (2006) [35], Houmb et al. (2006) [48]
in Appendix B.2 and Chapter 18.
19.1 Related work
In the domain of security solution decision support there are ve main categories
of techniques that are of relevance. These are operational and quantitative mea-
surement of security, security risk assessment, security management standards,
security evaluation and certication approaches such as the Common Criteria
and architectural or design trade-o¤ analysis.
The rst major step towards techniques for measuring operational security was
described in Littlewood et al. (1993) [74]. In this paper the authors argue strongly
for the importance of extending the capabilities of current security evaluation
approaches with techniques for quantitatively measuring the perceived level of
operational security, rather than merely providing a subjective and qualitative
measure of security. The concept of operational security level points to the per-
ceived level of security in a system when deployed in its future or current security
environment. To meet these challenges the paper provides an initial model that
use the experience in the reliability domain and that computes quantitative se-
curity measures by the use of traditional probability theory. The quantitative
security measures discussed are mean time to successful security attacks and
mean e¤ort to successful security attacks.
These concepts are further explored by Ortalo et al. (1999) in [80], Madan et al.
(2002) [75] and Wang et al. (2003) [104]. In [80] Ortalo et al. (1999) provides a
quantitative model for known Unix security vulnerabilities using a privilege graph
using the ideas from [74]. The privilege graph is transformed into a Markov chain
and examined using Markov analysis. These idea is then taken a step further
in Madan et al. (2002) [75]. This paper also discusses how to quantify security
attributes of software systems using traditional reliability theory for modelling
random processes, such as stochastic modelling and Markov analysis. However,
the authors extends the concept of security from [80] and consider security to be
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a Quality of Service (QoS) attribute, as well as arguing for the need to quantify
security as a means to meet contracted levels of security. In Wang et al. (2003)
[104] this idea is taken a step further by introducing a higher level of formalism
by a¢ liating Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN).
In Jonsson and Olovsson (1997) [62] the authors discusses the challenge in a more
practical way by analysing attacker behaviour through controlled experiments.
The focus in the work documented in this paper was to investigate how attacker
behaviour can be used to aid the quantication of operational security. The paper
discusses an approach to quantitative analysing attacker behaviour based on the
result of the empirical data collected from intrusion experiments using undergrad-
uate students at Chalmers University in Sweden. The result from the experiment
indicated that a typical attacker behaviour comprises the following three phases:
the learning phase, the standard attack phase and the innovative attack phase.
The results of the experiments showed that the probability for successful security
attacks is small during the learning and innovative phases while the probability
was considerably higher during the standard attack phase. For this phase the
collected data indicated an exponentially distribution of perceived time between
successful security attacks.
The AORDD framework and in particular the AORDD security solution trade-
o¤ analysis makes use of the models discussed in the above papers and support
quantitative measures of operational security level through the variables mean
time and e¤ort to misuse (MTTM and METM) in the RL subnet of the trade-
o¤ tool BBN topology. This work also extends the work discussed above and
provides a model for quantitative measure of availability that is able to use both
empirical and subjective information sources. Details are provided in Houmb,
Georg, France, Reddy and Bieman (2005) [43].
Risk assessment was initially developed within the safety domain, but has later
been adapted to security critical systems as security risk assessment. Since the
beginning of the 1990s, several e¤orts have been devoted to developing structured
and systematic security risk assessment approaches. The three main approaches
are the OCTAVE framework [3], CRAMM [8] and the CORAS framework [19].
The OCTAVE framework was developed by the NSS Program at SEI and provides
guidelines that enable organisations to develop appropriate protection strategies,
based on risks to critical information assets. CCTA Risk Analysis and Man-
agement Methodology (CRAMM) was developed by the Central Computer and
Telecommunication Agency (CCTA) in Britain and targets health care informa-
tion systems. CRAMM o¤ers a structured approach to manage risks in computer-
based systems in the health sector. CRAMM is asset-driven which means that
the focus is on identifying the main assets connected to the system and on iden-
tifying and assessing the risks to these assets. The CORAS framework is inspired
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by CRAMM and has adapted the asset-driven strategy of CRAMM. CORAS also
uses models to assist in risk assessment activities, with the use of UML as their
modelling language. The overall objective of the approach is to provide meth-
ods and tools for precise and e¢ cient risk assessment of security-critical systems
using semi-formal models. Here, models are used to describe the target of assess-
ment, as a medium for communication between di¤erent groups of stakeholders
involved in a risk assessment and to document risk assessment results and the
assumptions on which these results depend.
As discussed in Part 3 of this work the AORDD framework and its underly-
ing AORDD development process and the AORDD security assessment activity,
makes use of parts of the CORAS framework and in particular the CORAS inte-
grated system development and risk management process. The AORDD approach
di¤ers from CORAS in that it provides specic guidelines for choosing among al-
ternative treatment options (called security solutions in AORDD). CORAS does
not provide any particular decision support in this context and focused on the
semi-formal modelling rather than on decision support. Details are in Chapter 5
and Part 3.
Security management standards represent best practice for handling the over-
all and detailed management of security in an organisation. The most important
standards in this area are the ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Information technology Code
of Practice for information security management [55], ISO/IEC TR 13335:2001
Information technology Guidelines for management of IT Security [54] and the
Australian/New Zealand standard for risk management AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4].
ISO/IEC 17799 provides recommendations for information security management
and supports those that are responsible for initiating, implementing or maintain-
ing security in their organisation. The standard is intended to aid in developing
organisational specic security standards to ensures e¤ective security manage-
ment in practice. It also provides guidelines on how to establish condence in
inter-organisational matters. ISO/IEC 13335 provides guidance on management
aspects of IT security. The main objectives of this standard are to dene and de-
scribe the concepts associated with the management of IT security, to identify the
relationships between the management of IT security and management of IT in
general, to present several models which can be used to explain IT security and to
provide general guidance on the management of IT security. AS/NZS 4360:2004
is a widely recognised and used standard within the eld of risk assessment. This
standard is a general risk management standard that has been tailored for se-
curity critical systems in the CORAS framework. The standard includes a risk
management process, which consists of ve assessment sub-processes and two
management sub-processes, a detailed activity description, a separate guideline
companion standards and general management advices.
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The AORDD framework is based on all above mentioned risk management related
standards through it denition of information security and information system
and its decision support for choice of security solution in the AORDD security
solution trade-o¤ analysis. Details are in Chapters 3 and 5 and in Parts 4 and 5
of this work.
As described in Chapter 3 security evaluation techniques have been around for
a long time. TCSEC is the oldest known standard for evaluation and certica-
tion of information security in IT products. The standard was developed by the
Department of Defense (DoD) in the USA in the 1980s and evaluates systems
according to the six predened classes: C1, C2, B1, B2, B3 and A1. As a re-
sponse to the development of TCSEC the United Kingdom, Germany, France
and the Netherlands produced versions of their own national evaluation criteria.
These were later harmonised and published under the name ITSEC. ITSEC cer-
tication of a software product means that users can rely on an assured level
of security for any product they are about to purchase. As for TCSEC, ITSEC
certify products according to predened classes of security (E0, E1, E2, E3, E4,
E5 and E6). These standards were later replaced by the Common Criteria which
was developed as a common e¤ort under the International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO). In the Common Criteria certication is done according to the
seven predened classes: EAL1, EAL2, EAL3, EAL4, EAL5, EAL6 and EAL7
where EAL 7 represent the highest level of assurance.
However, the above security evaluation standards have two problems in common
and these are : the large amount of information involved and the heavy reliance on
subjective expert assertions. The evaluation is most often carried out by one or a
few evaluators and even though these evaluators must be certied to perform the
evaluation the evaluation still includes a high degree of inherent trust by holding
a particular role. This means that the decision maker must always completely
trust the evaluator and that he or she has no means of objectively assessing the
abilities of the evaluator. This work addresses these issues in the trust-based
information aggregation schema described in Part 5 of this work by not only
providing the security evaluation information to the decision maker but also the
perceived trustworthiness of the information sources (evaluators) providing the
information.
Related trade-o¤ analysis techniques exist but none are tailored to the security
domain. This does not mean that one cannot use these techniques when per-
forming security solution trade-o¤ analyses. It rather means that a specialised
technique is more e¢ cient and particularly for developers unfamiliar with the
security domain. The main reason for this is that the e¤ects of a series of security
solution decisions are conceptually hard for humans to analyse due to the inter-
relations and dependencies between the security solutions. The two most relevant
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software architectural trade-o¤ analysis methods are the Architecture Trade-o¤
Analysis Method (ATAM) and the Cost Benet Analysis Method (CBAM). In
addition, there are variations on these two methods available. Both ATAM and
CBAM were developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie
Mellon. The focus of ATAM is to provide insight into how quality goals inter-
act with and trade o¤ against each other. ATAM consists of nine steps and aids
in eliciting sets of quality requirements along multiple dimensions, on analysing
the e¤ects of each requirement in isolation and in understanding the interactions
of these requirements. This uncovers architectural decisions and links these to
business goals and desired quality attributes.
CBAM is an extension of ATAM that looks at both the architectural and the
economic implications of decisions. The focus in CBAM is on how an organisation
should invest its resources to maximise gains and minimise risks by incorporating
cost, benet and schedule implications of decisions into the trade-o¤ analysis.
The AORDD security solution design trade-o¤ analysis described in Part 4 of this
work is a security specic trade-o¤ analysis that incorporates ideas from both
ATAM and CBAM. However, the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis is
extended to use security solution and misuse-specic parameters in addition to
the economic implications as input to the trade-o¤analysis. The AORDD security
solution is also extended to evaluate the required security level by combining both
static and operational security levels. Details are in Houmb et al. (2005) [44] in
Appendix B.3, Houmb et al. (2006) [48] in Appendix B.2 and Part 4.
The trust-based information aggregation schema developed in this work and de-
scribed in Part 5 uses the notion of trust and trustworthiness to combine infor-
mation as input to the AORDD security solution trade-o¤ analysis. This schema
is a model that aggregate information using trust weights and hence relevant
literature on trust are work on trust models.
A number of logic-based formalisms of trust have been proposed by researchers.
Almost all of these view trust as a binary relation. Forms of rst order logic [11],
[57], [2], modal logic or its modication [85] have all been used to model trust
in these cases. Simple relational formulae of the form Ta;b (stating that a trusts
b) are also used to model trust between two entities. Each of the formalisms
extends this primitive construct to include features such as temporal constraints
and predicate arguments. Given these primitives and the traditional conjunction,
disjunction, negation and implication operators, these logical frameworks express
trust rules in their language and reason about these properties.
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes (2000) [2] propose a trust model that allows articial
agents to reason about trustworthiness and that allow real people to automate this
process. The trust model is based on a reputationmechanism or word-of-mouth.
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Reputation information and direct experiences are used by a set of algorithms to
make decisions regarding the trustworthiness of agents. Agents can decide which
other agents opinions they trust more and thus allow agents to progressively
tune their understanding of another agents subjective recommendations.
Rangan (1988) [85] proposes a model consisting of simple trust statements of the
form Bi;p, meaning that agent i believes proposition p. In this model a distributed
system is a collection of agents communicating with each other by message pass-
ing. The state of an agent is the agents message history. The state of the systems
is the state of all agents. Rangan uses modal logic to dene a set of properties
of the trust statements, like transitivity etc. These constructs are then used to
specify systems and to analyse them with respect to the property of interest.
Jones and Firozabadi (2000) [60] address the issue of reliability of an agents
transmission. Here, the authors use a variant of modal logic to model various
trust scenarios like b belief that a says to it that m. They also use the language
to model the concepts of deception and the level that an entity trust in another
entity.
Yahalom et al. (1993, 1994) [108, 107] propose a formal model for deriving new
trust relationships from existing ones. In [108] the authors propose a formal model
for expressing trust relations in authentication protocols together with an algo-
rithm for deriving trust relations from recommendations. The authors propose
seven di¤erent classes of trust. These are identifying entities, quality random
key generation, keeping secrets, not interfering, clock-synchronisation, perform-
ing correctly algorithmic steps and providing recommendations. Being trusted
for a particular class means that an entity can be trusted to perform a specic
task. Each of these classes of trust can have two types of trust : direct trust and
recommendation trust. Direct trust is when an entity trusts the other entity with-
out including an intermediary in the trust relationship. Recommendation trust
involves trusting an entity based on recommendation from a third party. There
can be multiple trust relationships between the same pair of entities.
Beth et al. (1994) [9] extends the ideas presented in [108, 107] to include relative
trust. The paper presents a method for extracting trust values based on experi-
ences from the real world and gives a method for deriving new trust values from
existing ones within a network of trust relationships. Such trust values can be
used in models like the ones in [108, 107]. The method proposed is statistical in
nature. It is based on the assumption that all trusted entities have a consistent
and predictable behaviour. To model degrees of trust, the notion of numbers of
positive or negative experiences is used. The authors posit that for calculation
of direct trust, no negative experiences are accepted if an entity is to be trusted
at all. This means that the direct trust level can only increase. A consequence of
this is that a long history of experience implies either almost absolute trust or
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none at all. For recommended, both positive and trust negative experiences are
accepted. This means that the trust value from recommendation can be relatively
low, even after a long history. However, there is one problem with this schema and
this is that the expression for deriving recommended trust is unsuitable in envi-
ronments where the trustworthiness of entities is likely to change, as discussed
in Jøsang (1997) [63]. Furthermore, the expression for deriving new direct trust
from direct and recommended trust appears to be counter-intuitive and can lead
to cases as If you tell me that you trust NN by 100% and I only trust you by 1%
to recommend me somebody then I also trust NN by 100%(see [63] for details).
Jøsang (1998, 1999) [64, 65] proposes a model for trust based on a general model
for expressing relative uncertain beliefs about the truth of statements. In these
papers a trust model denes trust as an opinion where an opinion is a represen-
tation of a belief. An opinion is modelled as a triplet < b; d; u >2 fb; d; ug where
b is a measure of ones belief in a proposition, d is a measure of ones disbelief in
the proposition and u is a measure of the uncertainty. A major shortcoming of
this model is that it does not acknowledge that trust changes over time and thus
the model has no mechanism for monitoring trust relationships to re-evaluate
their constraints.
Cohen et al. (1997) [14] propose an alternative and more di¤erentiated conception
of trust called Argument-based Probabilistic Trust model (APT). This model
includes the more enduring concept as a special case but emphasises instead the
specic conditions under which an aid will or will not perform well. According to
the authors the problem of decision aid acceptance is neither under-trust nor over-
trust but rather inappropriate trust. The authors dene this notion as a failure
to understand or properly evaluate the conditions a¤ecting good and bad aid
performance. To aid in this discrepancy the authors propose a simple framework
for deriving benchmark models for verifying the performance for situations where
previously learned or explicitly identied patterns may be insu¢ cient to guide
decisions about user-aid interaction. The most important use of APT is to chart
how trust changes from one user to another, from one decision aid to another,
from one situation to another and across phases of decision aid use.
Xiong and Liu (2003) [106] present a coherent adaptive trust model for quanti-
fying and comparing the trustworthiness of peers based on a transaction-based
feedback system. In this paper the authors present three basic trust parameters :
peer feedback through transactions, total number of transactions a peer performs
and credibility of the feedback sources. The paper addresses some of the factors
that inuence peer-to-peer trust, such as reputation systems and misbehaviour
of peers by giving false feedback. According to this description, giving a peers
reputation reects the degree of trust that other peers in the community have on
the given peer, based on their past experiences. The paper also provides a trust
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metric for predicting a given peers likelihood of a successful transaction in the
future.
Bacharach and Gambetta (2000) [7] embark on a reorientation of the theory of
trust. In this paper the authors dene trust as a particular belief that arises in
games with a certain payo¤ structure. The paper focuses on how to identify the
source of the primary trust problem in the uncertainty about the payo¤s of the
trustee. One major observation made by the authors is that in almost all games
the truster sees or observes a trustee before making any decision and therefore
uses these observations as evidence for the trustees having or lacking trustworthy-
making qualities. According to the authors in such contexts the truster must also
judge whether apparent signs of trustworthiness are themselves to be trusted.
Purser (2001) [84] presents a simple graphical approach to model trust. In this
paper the author examines the relationship between trust and risk and argues
that for every trust relationship there is a risk associated with a breach of the
trust. Hence, in this work trust relationships are modelled as directed graphs
where an entity can trust or be trusted by another entity, modelled by nodes in
the graph that is labelled by the names of the entities. Here trust is dened as
unidirectional and connects two entities, which means that it is represented as a
directed edge from the trusting entity to the trusted entity.
All the above trust models either restrict trust decisions to binary outcomes or as-
sess trust based on limited information (e.g., only reputation or only experience)
about the target entity. As the trust-based information aggregation schema pre-
sented in this work combines various information types from various information
sources a more generic model of trust is needed. None of the above mentioned
trust models incorporate techniques for aggregating information like trustees be-
haviour history, trustees attributes or third-party judgment to evaluate the trust
level of a trustee. When aggregating disparate information as done in the trust-
based information aggregation schema all these factors a¤ect the level of trust.
Also, a trust model in which trust levels are expressed in terms of numeric values
from a continuous range, is more suitable for expressing trust as an information
source ability (or performance) measure.
The trust-based information aggregation schema in this work has therefore
adapted the concept of trust used in the trust vector model developed by Ray
and Chakraborty (2004) [87]. This model species trust as a vector of numeric
values in the range [ 1; 1], which gives the needed granulated expression of trust
level. The values in the negative region of the range represent distrust while val-
ues in the positive region represent trust. The parameters used in the vector are:
knowledge, experience and recommendation. In this model trust is dened as the
rm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependable and secure within a
specic context. Furthermore, the trust relationship is always between a truster;
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an entity that trusts the target entity, and a trustee; the target entity that is
trusted. The truster is an activity entity such as a human being, an agent or a
subject of some type while the trustee can either be an active entity or a passive
entity such as a piece of information or a software. A trust relationship is denoted
A
C! B where A is the truster, B is the trustee and C is some context in which
the trust relationship exist.
The trust-based information aggregation schema uses the core of this model by
a¢ liating the granulated expression of trust and trust variables. However, the
schema is tailored to work e¢ ciently in a security solution decision support con-
text and is thus not a general approach as the trust vector model is. Hence, the
schema renes the denition of trust and distrust and uses a set of domain specic
variables to measure the level of trust.
20. Concluding Remarks and Suggestions for
Further Work
What is a reasonable security level? How much money is necessary to invest
to feel reasonable secure? And most importantly: which security solution(s) ts
best for a particular security problem or challenge? These are the three core
questions that would be nice to answer rmly and with great level of condence.
Unfortunately, there is still a long way to go. This work merely proposes an
approach to tackle some of the underlying factors of these three core questions
and a substantial amount of research and practical experiments is still needed
before any conclusions can be drawn.
The objective of this work has been to help decision makers to better tackle
security solution decision situations under the restricted time and budget con-
straints that such situations usually are subject to. This work does this by means
of trading o¤ security solutions so that the best-tted security solution among
alternatives are identied taking not only the nancial perspective into consider-
ation but also security, development and project perspectives. These perspectives
are handled by a set of components and an overall security solution decision sup-
port framework called the AORDD framework. The AORDD framework combines
AOM and RDD techniques and consist of the following seven components: (1) An
iterative AORDD process. (2) Security solution aspect repository. (3) Estimation
repository to store experience from estimation of security risks and security so-
lution variables involved in security solution decisions. (4) RDD annotation rules
for security risk and security solution variable estimation. (5) The AORDD se-
curity solution trade-o¤ analysis and trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. (6) Rule set
for how to transfer RDD information from the annotated UML diagrams into the
trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. (7) Trust-based information aggregation schema to
aggregate disparate information in the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology.
The two core components of the AORDD framework are the AORDD security
solution trade-o¤ analysis (component 5) and the trust-based information ag-
gregation schema (component 7). These two components have been studied and
evaluated using an action research work process and consist of the following: C.1:
A set of security risk variables. C.2: A set of security solution variables. C.3: A
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set of trade-o¤ parameter variables to represent and measure relevant develop-
ment, project and nancial perspectives. C.4: Methodology and tool-support for
comparing the security solution variables with the security risk variables. C.5:
Methodology and tool-support for trading o¤ security solutions and identifying
the best-tted one(s) based on security, development, project and nancial per-
spectives.
Plans for further work includes merging the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology and the
information aggregation schema into one BBN topology, to perform more action
research type of eld studies, to eventually perform a realistic and industrial
size case study and to advance the topic of semi-automatic security solution
decision support. The latter is important to e¤ectively enable non-security experts
and decision makers to bring their systems to a controlled security level for a
reasonable cost.
Detailed recommendation for further work on the two core components of the
AORDD framework is given as part of the evaluation discussed in Chapter 19.
All other components of the AORDD framework is still at an explorative state
and substantial amount of further work is needed before any of these components
can e¤ectively contribute in security solution decision situations.
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Part VII
Appendices

Appendix A: AORDD Concepts
Denition Accountability means that actions of an entity may be traced uniquely
to the entity [54].
Denition Assets are entities that has value to one or more of the system stake-
holders (modied from [15]).
Denition Asset value is the value of an asset in terms of its relative impor-
tance to a particular stakeholder. This value is usually expressed in terms of
some potential business impacts. This could in turn lead to nancial losses,
loss of revenue, market share or company image (modied from the risk man-
agement standard AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4]).
Denition Authenticity ensures that the identity of a subject or resource is the
one claimed [54].
Denition Availability means that system services are accessible and usable on
demand by an authorised entity [54].
Denition Basic security threat is the initial security threat that exploits one
or more vulnerabilities in the ToE or the ToE security environment and leads
to a chain of misuses.
Denition Conceptual assets are non-physical entities of value to one or more
stakeholders, such as people and their skills, training, knowledge and experi-
ence, and the reputation, knowledge and experience of an organisation (in-
terpretation of denition given in [20]).
Denition Condentiality (or secrecy) means that information is made avail-
able or disclosed only to authorised individuals, entities or processes [54].
Denition Development environment is the environment in which the ToE is
developed [15].
Denition Evaluation authority is a body that implements the Common Cri-
teria for a specic community by means of an evaluation scheme and thereby
sets the standards and monitors the quality of evaluation conducted by bodies
within that community [15].
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Denition Evaluation scheme is the administrative and regulatory framework
under which the Common Criteria is applied by an evaluation authority
within a specic community [15].
Denition Gain is an increase in the asset value for one asset.
Denition Information system is a system containing physical and conceptual
entities that interacts as a potential target for intended or unintended security
attacks which might a¤ect either the system itself, its data or its stakeholders
and end-users (modied from IEEE Std 14712000 [52]).
Denition Information security comprises all perspectives related to den-
ing, achieving, and maintaining condentiality, integrity, availability, non-
repudiation, accountability, authenticity and reliability of an information sys-
tem (adapted and modied for information security from ISO/IEC TR 13335
[54]).
Denition Integrity means that information is not destroyed or altered in an
unauthorised manner and that the system performs its intended function in
an unimpaired manner free from deliberate or accidental unauthorised ma-
nipulation of the system [54].
Denition Loss is a reduction in the asset value for one asset.
Denition Misuse is an event that a¤ects one or more of the security at-
tributes condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability,
non-repudiation or reliability of one or more assets.
Denition Misuse frequency is a measure of the occurrence rate of a misuse
expressed as either the number of occurrences of a misuse in a given time
frame or the probability of the occurrence of a misuse in a given time frame
(modied from AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4]).
Denition Misuse impact is the non-empty set of either a reduction or an in-
crease of the asset value for one asset.
Denition Non-repudiation is the ability to prove that an action or event has
taken place in order to prevent later repudiation of this event or action [54].
Denition Operational environment is the environment in which the ToE is
operated [15].
Denition Physical assets are physical entities of value to one or more stake-
holders, such as hardware and other infrastructure entities, operating systems,
application and information (interpretation of denition given in [20]).
Denition Protection Prole (PP) is an implementation-independent state-
ment of security needs for a TOE type [15].
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Denition Reliability is the ability of an item to perform a required function
under stated conditions [96] (Please note that the use of the term item
intentionally allows for the calculation of reliability for individual components
or for the system as a whole.).
Denition Safeguard is an existing practice, procedure or security mechanism
in the ToE and/or the ToE security environment that reduces or prevents
security threats from exploiting vulnerabilities and thus reduces the level of
risk (modied from ISO 13335 [54]).
Denition Stakeholder is an individual, team or organisation (or classes thereof)
with interest in or concerns relative to an information system (modied from
the software architectural standard IEEE 1471 [52]).
Denition Security critical information system is an information system where
there are assets with values for which it is critical to preserve one or more of
the security properties of(modied from [15]).
Denition Security Risk Acceptance Criteria is a description of the accept-
able level of risk (modied from AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4]).
Denition Security Risk is the combination of exactly one misuse frequency,
one misuse impact, one mean time to misuse (MTTM) and one mean e¤ort
to misuse (METM) (modied from AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4] by taking in the
concepts for operational security level from Littlewood et al. [74]).
Denition Security solution is any construct that increases the level of con-
dentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation,
and/or reliability of a ToE. Examples of security solutions are security re-
quirements, security protocols, security procedures, security processes and se-
curity mechanism, such as cryptographic algorithm and anti-virus software.
Denition Security Target (ST) is an implementation-depend-
ent statement of the security needs for a specic TOE [15].
Denition Security Threat is a potential undesired event in the ToE and/or
the ToE security environment that may exploit one or more vulnerabilities
a¤ecting the capabilities of one or more of the security attributes conden-
tiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation or
reliability of one or more assets (modied from AS/NZS 4360:2004 [4]).
Denition Target of Evaluation (ToE) is a set of software, rmware and/or
hardware possibly accompanied by guidance [15].
Denition Trade-o¤ Analysis is making decisions when each choice has both
advantages and disadvantages. In a simple trade-o¤ it may be enough to list
each alternative and the pros and cons. For more complicated decisions, list
the decision criteria and weight them. Determine how each option rates on
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each of the decision score and compute a weighted total score for each option.
The option with the best score is the preferred option. Decision trees may be
used when options have uncertain outcomes [101].
Denition User is any external entity (human user or machine user) to the ToE
that interacts (or may interact) with the ToE [15].
Denition Vulnerability is a weakness in the ToE and/or the ToE security envi-
ronment that if exploited a¤ects the capabilities of one or more of the security
attributes condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability,
non-repudiation or reliability of one or more assets (modied from AS/NZS
4360:2004 [4]).
Papers are not included due to copyright. 
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